Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory, communication, and altruism

Review of Economic Design

Volumn 8, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 383-411

  Lagunoff, Roger ^a   Matsui, Akihiko ^b  

^a GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TOKYO   (Japan)

Author keywords

Altruism; Communication; Memory; Organizations; Overlapping generations games; Strongly stationary

Indexed keywords

EID: 17444418956     PISSN: 14344742     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10058-003-0111-1     Document Type: Article

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