Evolution and information in a gift-giving game

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 100, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 1-21

  Johnson, Philip ^a   Levine, David K ^b   Pesendorfer, Wolfgang ^c  

^a INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

^c PRINCETON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Evolution; Information; Learning; Repeated games; Stochastic stability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035190111     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2823     Document Type: Article

References (6)

1. "Basins of Attraction and Long-Run Equilibria"
2. "Learning in Games"
3. Social norms and community enforcement
4. Learning, Mutation and long run equilibria in games
5. p-dominance and belief potential
6. The volution of conventions