Two cheers and a qualm for behavioral environmental economics

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 46, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 235-247

  Shogren, Jason F ^a   Parkhurst, Gregory M ^b,c   Banerjee, Prasenjit ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

^b WEBER STATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c MN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

HEALTH RISKS; RISK ASSESSMENT; RISK PERCEPTION;

BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS; CONTEXT DEPENDENCES; ENVIRONMENTAL CONFLICT; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; INCENTIVE SYSTEMS; RECENT RESEARCHES; SOCIAL PREFERENCE;

ECONOMICS;

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ECOLOGICAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION; EXCHANGE RATE; HEALTH RISK;

EID: 77953581681     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s10640-010-9376-3     Document Type: Article

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