Regulation, reputation, and environmental risk

Economics Letters

Volumn 106, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 45-47

  Banerjee, Prasenjit ^a   Shogren, Jason F ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WYOMING   (United States)

Author keywords

Environmental risk; Information rent; Mechanism; Reputation

Indexed keywords

EID: 70849087801     PISSN: 01651765     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2009.09.021     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Benabou R., and Tirole J. Incentives and prosocial behavior. American Economic Review 96 5 (2006) 1652-1678
2. Baliga S., and Maskin E. Mechanism design for the environment. In: Maler K.G., and Vincent J.R. (Eds). Handbook of Environmental Economics vol. 1 (2003), North-Holland, Amsterdam 305-324
3. Batson D. Altruism and prosocial behavior. In: Gillbert, Fiske, and Lindzey (Eds). Handbook of Social Psychology, II (1998), McGraw Hill
4. Bowles S., and Hwang S. Social preferences and public economics: mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives. Journal of Public Economics 92 8-9 (2008) 1811-1820
5. Frey S.B. Not Just for the Money: an Economic Theory of Personal Motivation (1997), Edward Elgar, Cheltenham
6. Frey S.B., and Jegen R. Motivation crowding theory. Journal of Economic Surveys 15 5 (2001) 589-611
7. Hanley N., Shogren J.F., and White B. Environmental Economics: in Theory and Practice. 2nd Edition (2007), Palgrave, Macmillan
8. Laffont J.J. Regulation, moral hazard and insurance of environmental risks. Journal of Public Economics 58 (1995) 319-336
9. Smith A. The Theory of Moral Sentiment (1759), Prometheus Books, New York
10. Smith R., and Shogren J.F. Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 43 (2002) 169-187
11. Titmuss R. The Gift Relationship (1970), Allen and Unwin, London