The limits of diversion: Rethinking internal and external conflict

Security Studies

Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2010, Pages 307-341

  Fravel, M Taylor ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 77953188785     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636411003795731     Document Type: Article

References (264)

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2. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security 20, no. 1 (Summer 1995), 5-38.
3. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War," International Organization 56, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 303-304.
4. Edward D. Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, Electing to Fight: Why Emerging Democracies Go to War (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 35-36.
5. Michael Oreskes, "Bush Trying A New Topic; Is Talk of War Driven By Policy or Politics?" New York Times [hereafter, NYT], 31 October 1990, A21.
6. Todd S. Purdum, "U.S. Fury On 2 Continents: Congress; Critics Of Clinton Support Attacks," NYT, 21 August 1998, A1. "Wagging the dog" is a euphemism for diversionary behavior, whereby private or parochial interests (the tail) determine state policy (the dog). The term gained popularity following the 1997 release of the movie Wag the Dog in which a presidential aide hired a movie producer to manufacture a war in Albania to deflect attention from a sex scandal that erupted during a presidential election.
7. Dan Milbank, "Democrats Question Iraq Timing; Talk of War Distracts From Election Issues," Washington Post, 16 September 2002, A1.
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9. Karl DeRouen, "Presidents and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Research Note," International Studies Quarterly 44, no. 2 (June 2000): 317-28.
10. Karl DeRouen and Jeffrey Peake, "The Dynamics of Diversion: The Domestic Implications of Presidential Use of Force," International Interactions 28, no. 2 (April 2002): 191-211.
11. Benjamin O. Fordham, "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy and U.S. Uses of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4 (August 1998): 418-30.
12. Benjamin O. Fordham, "The Politics of Threat Perception and the Use of Force: A Political Economy Model of U.S. Uses of Force," International Studies Quarterly 42, no. 3 (September 1998): 567-90.
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14. Patrick James and Athanasios Hristoulas, "Domestic Politics and Foreign Policy: Evaluating a Model of Crisis Activity for the United States," Journal of Politics 56, no. 2 (May 1994): 327-48.
15. Patrick James and John R. Oneal, "The Influence of Domestic and International Politics on the President's Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35, no. 2 (June 1991): 307-32.
16. T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 25-52.
17. Charles W. Ostrom and Brian L. Job, "The President and Political Uses of Force," American Political Science Review 80, no. 2 (June 1986): 541-66.
18. D. Scott Bennett, "Foreign Policy Substitutability and Internal Economic Problems," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 1 (February 2000): 33-61.
19. Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhardt, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad," American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 1 (January 1999): 56-85.
20. Graeme A. M. Davies, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts," Journal of Conflict Resolution 46, no. 5 (October 2002): 672-92.
21. Andrew J. Enterline and Kristian S. Gleditsch, "Threats, Opportunities and Force: Repression and Diversion of Domestic Pressure," International Interactions 26, no. 1 (January 2000): 21-53.
22. Dennis M. Foster, "State Power, Linkage Mechanisms and Diversion Against Nonrivals," Conflict Management and Peace Science 23, no. 1 (February 2006): 1-21.
23. Christopher Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions: Governmental Structure and the Externalization of Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 2 (April 1997): 255-82.
24. Biger Heldt, "Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes, 1950-1990," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 4 (August 1999): 451-78.
25. Richard Ned Lebow, Between Peace and War: The Nature of International Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 61-82.
26. Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.
27. Ross A. Miller, "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force," American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 3 (August 1995): 761-85.
28. Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 48, no. 6 (December 2004): 937-61.
29. John R. Oneal and Jaroslav Tir, "Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace? Assessing the Effect of Economic Growth on Interstate Conflict, 1921-2001," International Studies Quarterly 50, no. 4 (December 2006): 755-79.
30. Jeffrey Pickering and Emizet F. Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention: Reassessing Regime Type and the Diversionary Hypothesis," International Studies Quarterly 49, no. 1 (March 2005): 25-43.
31. Bruce Russett, "Economic Decline, Electoral Pressure, and the Initiation of Interstate Conflict," in Prisoners of War? eds., Charles S. Gochman and N. Sabrosky (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1990), 123-40.
32. On medieval Italy, see David Sobek, "Rallying Around the Podesta: Testing Diversionary Theory Across Time," Journal of Peace Research 44, no. 1 (January 2007): 29-45.
33. Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, "Peace Through Insecurity: Tenure and International Conflict," Journal of Conflict Resolution 47, no. 4 (August 2003): 443-67.
34. Dennis M. Foster and Glenn Palmer, "Presidents, Public Opinion, and Diversionary Behavior: The Role of Partisan Support Reconsidered," Foreign Policy Analysis 2, no. 3 (July 2006): 269-87.
35. Joanne Gowa, "Politics at the Water's Edge: Parties, Votes and the Use of Force," International Organization 52, no. 2 (Spring 1998): 307-24.
36. Brett Ashley Leeds and David R. Davis, "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes," Journal of Conflict Resolution 41, no. 6 (December 1997): 814-34.
37. Bradley Lian and John R. Oneal, "Presidents, the Military Use of Force and Public Opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 2 (June 1993): 277-300.
38. James Meernik, "Presidential Decision-Making and the Political Use of Force," International Studies Quarterly 38, no. 1 (March 1994): 121-38.
39. James Meernik, "Modeling International Crises and the Political Use of Military Force by the USA," Journal of Peace Research 35, no. 2 (2000): 547-62.
40. James Meernik, The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy (London: Ashgate, 2004).
41. James Meernik and Peter Waterman, "The Myth of the Diversionary Use of Force by American Presidents," Political Research Quarterly 49, no. 3 (September 1996): 573-90.
42. Will H. Moore and David J. Lanoue, "Domestic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy: A Study of Cold War Conflict Behavior," Journal of Conflict Resolution 65, no. 2 (May 2003): 376-96.
43. For single-country studies not finding support for diversion, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behaviour 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data," The China Quarterly no. 153 (March 1998): 1-30.
44. Jack S. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique," in Handbook of War Studies, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), 259-288.
45. For a detailed review of the recent literature, see Meernik, The Political Use of Military Force in US Foreign Policy.
46. For recent qualitative tests of diversion, see Jane Kellett Cramer, "'Just Cause' or Just Politics? U.S. Panama Invasion and Standardizing Qualitative Tests for Diversionary War," Armed Forces & Society 32, no. 2 (January 2006): 178-201.
47. Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Clinton's Military Strikes in 1998: Diversionary Uses of Force?" Armed Forces & Society 28, no. 2 (Winter 2002): 309-32.
48. Amy Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," Security Studies 15, no. 3 (July 2006): 431-63.
49. The purpose of this article is to offer a new type of test of the diversionary hypothesis, not to demonstrate the explanatory power of realist approaches to international politics. A standard realist model was chosen because it offers a clear and plausible alternative explanation for decisions to use force.
50. Lewis A. Coser, The Function of Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956).
51. Georg Simmel, Conflict and the Web of Group-Affiliations (Glencoe, Il: The Free Press, 1955).
52. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War."
53. Geoffrey Blainey, The Causes of War, 3rd ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1988).
54. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War."
55. Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War".
56. Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War".
57. Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.
58. George W. Downs and David M. Rocke, "Conflict, Agency and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War," American Journal of Political Science 38, no. 2 (May 1994): 362-80.
59. Diana Richards et al., "Good Times, Bad Times and the Diversionary Use of Force: A Tale of Some Not-So-Free Agents," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (September 1993): 504-35.
60. Alastair Smith, "Diversionary Foreign Policy in Democratic Systems," International Studies Quarterly 40, no. 1 (March 1996): 133-53.
61. Levy, "The Diversionary Theory of War," 259.
62. On diversion as a partial theory of international conflict, for example, see Miller, "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force".
63. T. Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 36, no. 1 (March 1992): 25-52.
64. At the same time, not all theories that posit a relationship between internal and external conflict should be subsumed under diversionary war theory. A theory of internal and external conflict is diversionary if the presence of domestic strife creates incentives for leaders to rally or gamble.
65. On domestic unrest as a necessary condition for diversion, see Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands."
66. One limit of a necessary conditions approach in the study of diversion is the causal equivalence assigned to each condition identified as being necessary, which can downplay and dilute the role of domestic unrest that lies at the theoretical core of the logic of diversion.
67. Importantly, this scope condition includes using force against a state with greater overall capability. On limited aims and asymmetric conflits, see T. V. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Some scholars assert that only states with dominant relative capabilities can engage in diversionary activity, as it represents a "discretionary" use of force.
68. See, for example, Benjamin O. Fordham, "Partisanship, Macroeconomic Policy and U.S. Uses of Force, 1949-1994" Journal of Conflict Resolution 42, no. 4 (August 1998): 418-39.
69. Giacomo Chiozza and H. E. Goemans, "Avoiding Diversionary Targets," Journal of Peace Research 41, no. 4 (July 2004): 423-43.
70. David H. Clark, "Can Strategic Interaction Divert Diversionary Behavior? A Model of U.S. Conflict Propensity," Journal of Politics 65, no. 4 (November 2003): 1013-39.
71. Benjamin O. Fordham, "Strategic Conflict Avoidance and the Diversionary Use of Force," Journal of Politics 67, no. 1 (February 2005): 132-53.
72. Leeds and Davis, "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes."
73. Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions".
74. Heldt, "Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes".
75. Mitchell and Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force."
76. Other explanations for the inconsistent findings are based on the specification of quantitative models. See Meernik, "Modeling International Crises and the Political Use of Military Force by the USA."
77. Davies, "Domestic Strife".
78. Enterline and Gleditsch, "Threats, Opportunities and Force".
79. Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions".
80. Ross A. Miller, "Regime Type, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Use of Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution 43, no. 3 (June 1999): 388-402.
81. Miller, "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force".
82. Mitchell and Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force".
83. Oneal and Tir, "Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace".
84. Pickering and Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention".
85. Bruce Russet, Controlling the Sword: The Democratic Governance of National Security (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
86. Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands".
87. Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions".
88. H. E. Goemans, "Which Way Out?: The Manner and Consequences of Losing Office," Journal of Conflict Resolution 52, no. 6 (December 2008): 771-94.
89. Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Handbook of Political Science, eds., Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 79-138.
90. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA.: MIT Press, 2005), 120-23.
91. Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility: How Leaders Assess Military Threats (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), 33-36.
92. For a useful discussion of testing arguments where speech evidence may be hard to find, see Kevin Narizny, The Political Economy of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007), 36-38.
93. Hendrickson offers an alternative case-based methodology that seeks to identify circumstantial evidence that is likely to be associated with diversionary action. Although it allows researchers one method for accepting or rejecting the diversionary hypothesis, the indicators in this method are not exclusive to the use of force for diversionary purposes. See Hendrickson, "Clinton's Military Strikes in 1998."
94. For a modification, see Cramer, "'Just Cause' or Just Politics."
95. On leadership statements and reasoning, see Press, Calculating Credibility.
96. On territorial disputes, see Paul R. Hensel, "Contentious Issues and World Politics: The Management of Territorial Claims in the Americas, 1816-1992," International Studies Quarterly 45, no. 1 (March 2001): 81-109.
97. Paul K. Huth, Standing Your Ground: Territorial Disputes and International Conflict (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996).
98. Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
99. John Vasquez and Marie T. Henehan, "Territorial Disputes and the Probability of War, 1816-1992," Journal of Peace Research 38, no. 2 (March 2001): 123-38.
100. John A. Vasquez, The War Puzzle (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
101. On coercive diplomacy, see Robert J. Art and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., United States and Coercive Diplomacy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003).
102. Alexander L. George, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994).
103. This research design would be even stronger if it was both a "most likely" test for diversion and a "least likely" test for a standard realist model. Again, as the purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical test of diversion against a plausible alternative, such a research design is adequate for assessing confidence in the diversionary hypothesis. See Jack S. Levy, "Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference," Conflict Management and Peace Science 25, no. 1 (March 2008): 1-18.
104. Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," 432.
105. Greg Cashman and Leonard C. Robinson, An Introduction to the Causes of War: Patterns of Interstate Conflict from World War I to Iraq (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007), 10.
106. Jack S. Levy, "Domestic Politics and War," in The Origin and Prevention of Major Wars, eds., Robert I. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 94.
107. See, for example, Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions".
108. Stephen E. Gent, "Scapegoating Strategically: Reselection, Strategic Interaction, and the Diversionary Theory of War," International Interactions 35, no. 1 (January 2009): 1-29.
109. Goemans, "Which Way Out?".
110. Miller, "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force".
111. Heldt, "Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes".
112. Mitchell and Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force".
113. Morgan and Bickers, "Domestic Discontent and the Use of Force".
114. Richards, et al., "Good Times, Bad Times and the Diversionary Use of Force."
115. Fiona B. Adamson, "Democratization and the Sources of Foreign Policy: Turkey in the 1974 Cyprus Crisis," Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 281-85.
116. Mansfield and Snyder, "Democratic Transitions, Institutional Strength and War," 306-308.
117. Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight, 224-25.
118. For the use of a standard realist model in the study of territorial disputes, see Huth, Standing Your Ground.
119. Michael Charlton, The Little Platoon: Diplomacy and the Falklands Crisis (New York: Basil Blackwell Books, 1989), 111-12.
120. Lawrence Freedman and Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (London: Faber and Faber, 1990), 105.
121. Oscar R. Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum, and Eduardo. van der Kooy, Falklands: The Secret Plot (Surrey: Preston Editions, 1987), 34.
122. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 104-107.
123. The number of scholars and journalists who attribute diversionary motives to the junta is vast: Jimmy Burns, The Land That Lost Its Heroes: The Falklands, The Post-War and Alfonsin (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 1987).
124. Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands.
125. Juan E. Corradi, The Fitful Republic: Economy, Society, and Politics in Argentina (Boulder: Westview Press, 1985).
126. Alejandro Dabat and Luis Lorenzano, Argentina: The Malvinas and the End of Military Rule (London: Verso, 1984).
127. Daniel K. Gibran, The Falklands War: Britain Versus the Past in the South Atlantic (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1998).
128. Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands (London: Michael Joseph, 1983).
129. Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falklands War," in Psychology and Deterrence, eds., Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985), 89-124.
130. Jack S. Levy and Lily I. Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes: Argentina in the Falklands/Malvinas Case," in The Internationalization of Communal Strife, ed. Manus I. Midlarsky (London: Routledge, 1993), 82-107.
131. Paul Lewis, "The Right and Military Rule, 1955-1983," in The Argentine Right: Its History and Intellectual Origins, 1910-Present, ed. Sandra McGee Deutsch and Ronald H. Dolkart (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1993), 147-80.
132. Ruben O. Moro, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict: The War for the Malvinas (New York: Praeger, 1989).
133. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts.
134. Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands".
135. David Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina, 1976-1983," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 55-76.
136. David Rock, Argentina, 1516-1982: From Spanish Colo-nization to the Falklands War (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).
137. Richard C. Thorton, The Falklands Sting: Reagan, Thatcher, and Argentina's Bomb (Washington: Brassey's, 1998).
138. Gary M. Wynia, Argentina: Illusions and Realities (New York: Holmes & Meier Publishers, 1986). Although Lebow includes external factors in his analysis, diversionary motives play a central role in his model of brinks-manship and in his application of the model to the Falklands case. Regarding the junta's calculations, Lebow writes that "Spurned by London, facing growing opposition at home, the distraught, anxious men of the junta must have found the idea of military action more and more attractive."
139. See Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic," 99. In his model of brinksmanship, Lebow highlights domestic sources of aggressive behavior consistent with different variations of diversionary theory, including instability of a state's political system, leadership vulnerability and intra-elite competition. One cause of brinksmanship, for example, is "the time-honored technique of attempting to offset discontent at home by diplomatic success abroad."
140. See Lebow, Between Peace and War, 66.
141. Burns, The Land That Lost Its Heroes, 28.
142. Thorton, The Falklands Sting, 58.
143. Rock, Argentina, 374.
144. Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina."
145. Dabat and Lorenzano, Argentina, 75.
146. Paul, Asymmetric Conflicts, 160.
147. Lowell S. Gustafson, The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 114.
148. World Bank, World Development Indicators, online database, http://www.worldbank.org/data.
149. Ronaldo Munck et al., Argentina: From Anarchism to Peronism: Workers, Unions and Politics, 1855-1985 (London: Zed Books, 1987), 216, 229.
150. Burns, The Land That Lost Its Heroes, 29.
151. Dabat and Lorenzano, Argentina, 74.
152. "Argentine Dies of Wounds Received in Political Protest," NYT, 5 April 1982, A6.
153. Edward Schumacher, "Domestic Issues Led to Argentine Move," NYT, 7 April 1982, A5.
154. Cardoso, Kirschbaum and van der Kooy, Falklands, 32-34, 56-57.
155. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 106.
156. Oriana Fallaci, "Galtieri: No Regrets, No Going Back," The Times, 12 June 1982, 4.
157. On this point, see John Arquilla and Maria Moyano Rasmussen, "The Origins of the South Atlantic War," Journal of Latin American Studies 33, no. 4 (November 2001): 748.
158. By mid-1981, signals of Britain's declining resolve, discussed in the next section, were clear.
159. Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands." In addition the inability of the state to either repress or reform, Oakes also notes the role of perceptions of declining British resolve, perceived support from the United States and the availability of the Falklands as a symbolic target for diversion.
160. Rudiger Dornbusch, "Argentine Economic Policy, 1976-1981," in The Political Economy of Argentina, 1946-83, eds., Guido di Tella and Rudiger Dornbusch (London: MacMillan Press, 1989), 299.
161. Burns, The Land That Lost Its Heroes, 30.
162. Pion-Berlin, "The Fall of Military Rule in Argentina."
163. The historical record does contain denials, but these are easily discounted. See Fallaci, "Galtieri."
164. Arquilla and Rasmussen, "The Origins of the South Atlantic War," 747-48.
165. David A. Welch, "Culture and Emotion as Obstacles to Good Judgment," in Good Judgment in Foreign Policy: Theory and Application, eds., Stanley A. Renshon and Deborah Welch Larson (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 198.
166. "Argentine Activists Call A Brief Truce," NYT, 6 April 1982, A6.
167. Fallaci, "Galtieri."
168. Chris Hedges, "Invasion of Falklands Evokes Little Enthusiasm Argentina," Globe and Mail, 6 April 1982, 10.
169. James M. Markham, "In Argentina, No Sense of a War in the Making," NYT, 13 April 1982, A16.
170. Jackson Diehl, "Argentine Leaders Try to Shore Up Wavering Internal, External Support," Washington Post, 21 April 1982, A16.
171. James M. Markham, "Argentine Crowd Shouts Defiance: But Turnout After the Setback is Much Smaller Than for Jubiliant Rally Earlier," NYT, 27 April 1982, A11.
172. Levy and Vakili, "Diversionary Action by Authoritarian Regimes."
173. Alexander M. Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan, 1984), 277.
174. Horacio Mir Gonzalez, "An Argentine Airman in the South Atlantic," in The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons for the Future, eds., Stephen Badsey, Rob Haver and Mark Grove (London: Frank Cass, 2005), 75.
175. Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, 53.
176. This section builds upon Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War. Other nondiversionary explanations include organizational biases and psychology.
177. See Arquilla and Rasmussen, "The Origins of the South Atlantic War"
178. David A. Welch, Justice and the Genesis of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
179. Lebow also notes Argentine frustration with the British, but he gives greater causal weight to the domestic factors associated with diversion as well as the junta's psychological biases. Regarding domestic unrest, for example, he notes that "in the aftermath of the 30 March demonstration the generals faced a stark choice: step down or do something dramatic to restore public confidence and their own legitimacy. The obvious choice in the latter regard was recovery of sovereignty over the Falklands." See Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic," 99.
180. Lord Franks, Falkland Islands Review: Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors (London: HMSO, 1983),5-7.
181. Ibid., 23-24.
182. Ibid., 41.
183. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 64.
184. Ibid., 12.
185. Franks, Falkland Islands Review, 27-28.
186. Charlton, The Little Platoon, 111.
187. Fallaci, "Galtieri."
188. Franks, Falkland Islands Review, 27. The Franks report summarizes the content of the July 1981 intelligence assessment but does not provide direct quotations.
189. Franks, Falkland Islands Review, 27.
190. Lawrence Freedman, The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Volume 1: The Origins of the Falklands War (London: Routledge, 2007), 137. Freedman quotes directly from the assessment.
191. Franks, Falkland Islands Review, 25.
192. Haig, Caveat, 289-90.
193. Oakes, "Diversionary War and Argentina's Invasion of the Falkland Islands," 441, 445.
194. Three of the sources that Oakes cites as evidence of a December 1981 decision to invade are problematic. They include Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, 32.
195. Moro, The History of the South Atlantic Conflict, 7.
196. Wynia A, Argentina, 10. Yet neither Moro nor Wynia in fact state that any decision was made in December, much less a decision to invade. Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy describe an informal meeting of the junta that occurred on 29 December after an award ceremony at the Air Force headquarters in which Galtieri and Anaya reportedly discussed regaining sovereignty by the end of 1982. The authors note, however, "the junta advanced toward its crucial move... [but] the essential decision was not taken."
197. See Cardoso, Kirschbaum, and van der Kooy, Falklands, 26.
198. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 104-107.
199. The Argentine Navy, for instance, developed a contingency plan for seizing the Falklands in 1977.
200. Nicanor Costa Mendez, "Beyond Deterrence: The Malvinas-Falklands Case," Journal of Social Issues 43, no. 4 (1987): 120.
201. Welch A, "Culture and Emotion as Obstacles to Good Judgment," 200.
202. David Lewis Feldman, "The United States Role in the Malvinas Crisis, 1982: Misguidance And Misperception In Argentina's Decision to Go to War," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 27, no. 2 (Summer 1985): 1-22.
203. Argentine defense spending, doubled in real terms from 1971 to 1981, focused on strengthening air and naval power. See Arquilla and Rasmussen, "The Origins of the South Atlantic War," 756.
204. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 40-48.
205. Several sources also speculate that the Davidoff mission was part of a naval plan, known as Project Alpha, to strengthen Argentina's presence in the Falklands dependencies through subterfuge. See, for example, Thorton, The Falklands Sting. Nevertheless, this fails to provide strong support for diversionary arguments, as there is no evidence that the timing of Davidoff's trip was linked with domestic unrest or that the mission was ordered by the junta (not the navy). Instead, if anything, it reflected long-standing ambitions within the Argentine Navy to seize the Falklands.
206. Franks, Falkland Islands Review, 51-53.
207. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 64.
208. Franks, Falkland Islands Review, 49-55.
209. Charlton, The Little Platoon, 114.
210. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 73-76.
211. Virginia Gamba, The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention (Winchester, MA: Allen & Unwin, 1987), 126.
212. Charlton, The Little Platoon, 114; italics in the original.
213. Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse, Signals of War, 71.
214. Fallaci, "Galtieri."
215. Adamson, "Democratization and the Sources of Foreign Policy," 281-85.
216. Glen D. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus," Political Science Quarterly 95, no. 1 (Spring 1980), 43-70.
217. William Hale, Turkish Politics and the Military (New York: Routledge, 1994), 184-214.
218. World Bank, World Development Indicators, online database, http://www.worldbank.org/data.
219. Tozun Bahcheli, "Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey Since 1955," in Cyprus: A Regional Conflict and Its Resolution, ed. Norma Salem (Ottawa: Canadian Institute for International Peace and Security, 1992), 62-88.
220. William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 150-56.
221. Also, see Mehmet Ali Birand, 30 Hot Days (London: K. Rustem & Brother, 1985).
222. Suha Bolukbasi, The Superpowers and the Third World: Turkish-American relations and Cyprus (Lanham, MD: University Press of America: 1988), 188-89.
223. Birand, 30 Hot Days, 3.
224. Bolukbasi, Superpowers and the Third World, 189.
225. Camp, "Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus," 50.
226. Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight, 224-25.
227. Bahcheli, "Cyprus in the Politics of Turkey," 67.
228. Adamson, "Democratization and the Sources of Foreign Policy."
229. Bolukbasi, Superpowers and the Third World, 30.
230. Birand, 30 Hot Days, 15.
231. For a critique of Mansfield and Snyder's statistical analysis, see Vipin Narang and Rebecca M. Nelson, "Who Are These Belligerent Democratizers? Reassessing the Impact of Democratization on War," International Organization 63, no. 2 (Spring 2009): 357-79.
232. On rally effects and their duration, see, for example, Richard A. Brody, Assessing the President: The Media, Elite Opinion, and Public Support (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1991).
233. Marc J. Hetherington and Michael Nelson, "Anatomy of a Rally Effect: George W. Bush and the War on Terrorism," PS: Political Science and Politics 36, no. 1 (January 2003): 37-42.
234. John Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973).
235. Sarah Sled and Chappell Lawson, "Priming and Framing Can Explain Rally Effects" (unpublished manuscript, Massachussetts Institute of Technology, 2005).
236. Goemans, "Which Way Out?" 776.
237. A similar logic might be applied to long-standing rivals.
238. Scott Cooper, "State-Centric Balance-of-Threat Theory: Explaining the Misunderstood Gulf Coop-eration Council," Security Studies 13, no. 2 (Winter 2003): 306-49.
239. M. Taylor Fravel, "Regime Insecurity and International Cooperation: Explaining China's Compromises in Territorial Disputes," International Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 46-83.
240. Michael Leifer, ASEAN and the Security of South-East Asia (London: Routledge, 1988).
241. Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Detente (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003).
242. Christopher R. Way, "Political Insecurity and the Diffusion of Financial Market Regulation," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 598, no. 1 (March 2005): 125-44.
243. For example, Arno J. Mayer, "Domestic Causes and Purposes of War in Europe, 1870-1956," in The Responsibiltiy of Power, eds., Leonard Krieger and Fritz Stern (London: Macmillan, 1968).
244. Arno J. Mayer, "Internal Causes and Purpose of War in Europe, 1870-1956," Journal of Modern History 41, no. 3 (September 1969): 291-303.
245. Dale C. Copeland, Origins of Major War (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000), 77.
246. Blainey, The Causes of War, 76.
247. Ibid., 76-77.
248. See, for example, Miller, "Domestic Structures and the Diversionary Use of Force".
249. Heldt, "Domestic Politics, Absolute Deprivation and the Use of Armed Force in Interstate Territorial Disputes".
250. Leeds and Davis, "Domestic Political Vulnerability and International Disputes."
251. See, for example, Davies, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of International Conflicts".
252. Dassel and Reinhardt, "Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad".
253. Enterline and Gleditsch, "Threats, Opportunities and Force".
254. Foster, "State Power, Linkage Mechanisms and Diversion Against Nonrivals".
255. Mansfield and Snyder, Electing to Fight.
256. Mitchell and Prins, "Rivalry and Diversionary Uses of Force".
257. Oneal and Tir, "Does the Diversionary Use of Force Threaten the Democratic Peace?".
258. Pickering and Kisangani, "Democracy and Diversionary Military Intervention".
259. Sobek, "Rallying around the Podesta."
260. Gelpi includes several international variables in addition to relative capabilities and alliance ties such as value of the issue at stake for the challenger and whether the challenger in a crisis was defending the status quo. See Gelpi, "Democratic Diversions."
261. Paul Huth's study of escalation in territorial disputes, for example, includes a variable to measure efforts to change the status quo. See Huth, Standing Your Ground.
262. H. E. Goemans, "Fighting for Survival: The Fate of Leaders and the Duration of War," Journal of Conflict Resolution 44, no. 5 (October 2000): 555-79.
263. H. E. Goemans, War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).
264. I thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.