The effects of U.S. foreign assistance on democracy building, 1990-2003

World Politics

Volumn 59, Issue 3, 2007, Pages 404-439

  Finkel, Steven E ^a   Pérez Liñán, Aníbal ^a   Seligson, Mitchell A ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH   (United States)

^b VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRATIZATION; FOREIGN POLICY; GEOPOLITICS;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 36048975189     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S0043887100020876     Document Type: Article

References (152)

1. Peter Burnell, "Democracy Assistance: The State of the Art," in Peter Burnell, ed., Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (London: Frank Cass, 2000);
2. Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad-The Learning Curve (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999);
3. idem, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004);
4. Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999);
5. Julie Hearn, "Aiding Democracy? Donors and Civil Society in South Africa," Third World Quarterly 21 (October 2000);
6. Paula R. Newberg and Thomas Carothers, "Aiding - and Defining - Democracy," World Policy Journal 13 (Spring 1996);
7. Sheila Carapico, "Foreign Aid for Promoting Democracy in the Arab World," Middle East Journal 56 (Summer 2002);
8. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy in Africa: U.S. and International Policies in Transition: Post-Cold War Challenges," in John W. Harbeson and Donald Rothchild, eds., Africa in World Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995);
9. Marina Ottaway and Thomas Carothers, Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2000).
10. Arthur A Goldsmith, "Donors, Dictators and Democrats in Africa," Journal of Modern African Studies 39 (September 2001);
11. Stephen Knack, "Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?" International Studies Quarterly 48 (March 2004).
12. See James M. Scott and Carie A. Steele, "Assisting Democrats or Resisting Dictators? The Nature and Impact of Democracy Support by the United States National Endowment for Democracy, 1990-99," Democratization 12 (August 2005).
13. Dankwart A. Rustow, "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model," Comparative Politics 2 (April 1970);
14. Terry L. Karl, "Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America," Comparative Politics 23 (October 1990).
15. Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge, "Diffusion Is No Illusion: Neighbor Emulation in the Third Wave of Democracy," Comparative Political Studies 39 (May 2006);
16. Jon C. Pevehouse, Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
17. Other forms of development assistance may also empower local agents - for instance, a health program may train community health workers. But, as we argue below, those agents are not expected to work for regime change except in indirect ways, by transforming structural preconditions for democracy.
18. As explained below, we measure USAID assistance using "actual appropriations," or the amount for which USAID is allowed by Congress to incur obligations for specified purposes. Throughout the rest of the article we use the term "obligations" for simplicity (see fa. 33).
19. USAID has organized democracy programs in four subsectors: rule of law (aimed at "strengthening rule of law and human rights"), elections and political processes ("more genuine and competitive political processes"), civil society ("increased development of a politically active civil society"), and governance ("more transparent and accountable government institutions"); United State Agency for International Development, DCHA/DG User's Guide to Programming, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/ democracy_and_governance/publications/pdfs/ug.pdf (accessed February 2007).
20. Abraham F. Lowenthal, ed., Exporting Democracy: The USA and Latin America (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1991);
21. Larry Diamond, "Promoting Democracy," Foreign Policy (Summer 1992);
22. Thomas Carothers, In the Name of Democracy: U.S. Policy toward Latin America in the Reagan Years (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991);
23. idem, Assessing Democracy Assistance: The Case of Romania (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment Book, 1996);
24. Carothers (fn. 1, 1999);
25. idem, Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004);
26. Newberg and Carothers (fn. 1);
27. Ottaway and Carothers (fn. 1);
28. Francis Fukuyama, America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006).
29. Peter Burnell, "The Changing Politics of Foreign Aid: Where to Next?" Politics 17 (May 1997);
30. Peter J. Burnell, Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (London: F. Cass, 2000);
31. Carapico (fn. 1);
32. Hearn (fn. 1);
33. David Sogge, Give and Take: What's the Matter with Foreign Aid? (London: Zed Books, 2002);
34. Knack (fn. 2).
35. Michael McFaul, "Importing Democracy: External Inputs into the Orange Revolution in Ukraine" (Paper presented at the seminar "Measuring Success and Failure in Democracy Promotion," Johns Hopkins University, SAIS, Washington, D.C., April 23, 2007).
36. Goldsmith (fn. 2);
37. Knack (fn. 2). As is becoming increasingly clear in the literature linking foreign assistance to economic growth, different kinds of programs (for example, infrastructure investment, humanitarian aid, or technical assistance) have different kinds of economic impacts. Therefore, we have good reasons to believe that the failure of prior research to distinguish democracy assistance from overall assistance has obscured the potential impact of the former on democracy.
38. Steven Radelet, Michael Clemens, and Rikhil Bhavnani, "Aid and Growth," Finance and Development 42 (July 2005);
39. Michael A. Clemens, Steven Radelet, and Rikhil Bhavnani, Counting Chickens When They Hatch: The Short-Term Effect of Aid on Growth, http://ssrn.com/abstract=567241 (accessed June 2004).
40. Pamela Paxton and Rumi Morishima, "Does Democracy Aid Promote Democracy?" (Manuscript, Ohio State University, John Glenn Institute for Public Service and Public Policy, 2005);
41. Scott and Steele (fn. 3).
42. Seymour M. Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy," American Political Science Review 53 (March 1959);
43. Kenneth A. Bollen and Robert W. Jackman, "Economic and Noneconomic Determinants of Political Democracy in the 1960s," Research in Political Sociology 1 (1985);
44. Ross E. Burkhart and Michael Lewis-Beck "Comparative Democracy: The Economic Development Thesis," American Political Science Review 88 (December 1994);
45. John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, "Does High Income Promote Democracy?" World Politics 49 (October 1996);
46. Adam Przeworski, Michael E. Alvarez, José Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi, Democracy and Development. Political Institutions and Well-Being in the Word, 195 1990 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000);
47. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes, "Endogenous Democratization," World Politics 55 (July 2003);
48. David L. Epstein, Robert Bates, Jack Goldstone, Ida Kristensen, and Sharyn O'Halloran, "Democratic Transitions," American Journal of Political Science 50 (July 2006).
49. Diamond (fn. 1, 1999), 77-88;
50. Przeworski, Alvarez, Cheibub, and Limongi (fn. 14).
51. Barrington Moore, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966);
52. Guillermo O'Donnell, Modernization and-Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism: Studies in South American Politics (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1973);
53. Dietrich Rueschemeyer, Evelyne Huber Stephens, and John D. Stephens, Capitalist Development and Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992);
54. Carles Boix, Democracy and Redistribution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
55. Michael Bernhard, Christopher Reenock, and Timothy Nordstrom, "The Legacy of Western Overseas Colonialism on Democratic Survival," International Studies Quarterly 48 (March 2004);
56. Michael Bratton, Robert B. Mattes, and Emmanuel Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion, Democracy, and Market Reform in Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
57. Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986);
58. Karl (fn. 4);
59. John Higley and Richard Gunther, Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
60. Robert D. Putnam, Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993);
61. Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson, "Civic Culture and Democracy: The Question of the Causal Relationships," American Political Science Review 88 (September 1994);
62. Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997);
63. Ronald Inglehart and Christian Welzel, Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: The Human Development Sequence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
64. Axel Hadenius and Jan Teorell, "Cultural and Economic Prerequisites of Democracy: Reassessing Recent Evidence," Studies in Comparative International Development 39 (Winter 2005).
65. Juan J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, eds., The Failure of Presidential Democracy: The Case of Latin America (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994);
66. Scott Mainwaring, "Presidentialism, Multipartism, and Democracy: The Difficult Combination," Comparative Political Studies 26 (July 1993);
67. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977);
68. G. Bingham Powell, Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1982).
69. Harvey Starr, "Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy in the International System," Journal of Conflict Resolution 35 (June 1991);
70. Laurence Whitehead, ed., The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and the Americas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996);
71. Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, All International Politics Is Local: The Diffusion of Conflict, Integration, and Democratization (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002);
72. Brinks and Coppedge (fn. 5);
73. Scott Mainwaring and Aníbal Pérez-Liñan, "Latin American Democratization since 1978: Regime Transitions, Breakdowns, and Erosions," in Frances Hagopian and Scott Mainwaring, eds., The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America: Advances and Setbacks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005);
74. Jon C. Pevehouse, "With a Little Help from My Friends? Regional Organizations and the Consolidation of Democracy," American Journal of Political Science 46 (July 2002);
75. Pevehouse (fn. 5).
76. Particularly controversial has been whether military interventions aimed to promote democracy can be successful. For qualified optimism, see James Meernik, "United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy," Journal of Peace Research 33 (November 1996);
77. and Mark Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999).
78. For a critical perspective, see Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and George W. Downs, "Intervention and Democracy," International Organization 60 (Summer 2006);
79. and Fukuyama (fn. 9).
80. USAID (fn. 8), 28.
81. This document provides a thorough overview of recent programs, cooperative agreements, and "indefinite quantity contracts" (IOC) in the four sectors areas of the USAID portfolio.
82. Joan M. Nelson, Aid, Influence, and Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968);
83. Robert S. Walters, American and Soviet Aid: A Comparative Analysis (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1970).
84. Thomas Carothers, "The End of the Transition Paradigm," in Thomas Carothers, ed., Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004).
85. On the ensuing debate around the "right" sequence, see Thomas Carothers, "How Democracies Emerge: The 'Sequencing' Fallacy," Journal of Democracy 18 (January 2007).
86. For summaries of those projects, see http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/ democracy_and_governance (accessed June 2007).
87. Terry Lynn Karl, The Paradox of Plenty:Oil Booms and Petro-States (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997);
88. Knack (fn. 2).
89. Knack (fn. 2), 259.
90. The article provides no citation for the statement, and we have not found evidence for such an explicit policy in USAID documents. Rather, the agency's self-described intent is to "target democracy dollars to maximize impact," with "each country's unique history and political evolution defin[ing] opportunities and obstacles in the transition to democracy"; USAID-Office of Democracy and Governance, Strategic Assessment, http://www.usaid.gov/our_work /democracy_and_governance/technical_areas/dg_office/assess.html (accessed February 2007).
91. Countries were included in the analysis if they met any of the following criteria: (1) they were recipients of USAID funds during 1990-2003; (2) they were classified by the World Bank as low or middle income; (3) they had an average Freedom House score equal to or greater than 3 (using the original untransformed scale) over the period 1972-2003; or (4) they were newly independent countries (that is, created after 1990). In total, 165 countries met at least one of the criteria.
92. The database was compiled by John Richter and Andrew Green at USAID. We are indebted to Andrew Green for his advice on how to aggregate figures for different subsectors.
93. In previous research, two other methods of standardization have been tested; aid as percentage of GDP and aid per capita. See Knack (fn. 2);
94. Paxton and Morishima (fn. 13);
95. Craig Burnside and David Dollar, "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review 90 (September 2000). The former method assumes that aid would have larger effects in smaller economies, the latter that aid would have larger effects in countries with smaller populations. We explore each of these possibilities in the analyses that follow.
96. Our series on democracy assistance are based on the information presented in USAID'S Congressional Budget Justification, which reports actual appropriations for the previous year. However, the Green-Richter database improves on the CBJ series in at least three ways: (1) to the extent that it was possible, the USAID team added to the country totals all funding from regional programs or centralized mechanisms that was determined to have been allocated for activities in the specific countries; (2) the team classified the allocation of funding at the subsectoral. (for example, Rule of Law) and the sub-subsectoral (for example, Human Rights) levels; and (3) they occasionally adjusted the administrative classification of funds when the nature of activities was better reflected by a different Label (for example, a civic education activity financed through the Rule of Law budget may have been reclassified as funding for Civil Society). We computed two-year means for all series because appropriations in one year are sometimes obligated and/or expended the following year.
97. The original Freedom House indices (measuring Political Rights and Civil Liberties) range from 1 to 7, with 7 being the least democratic outcome. Following the conventional procedure, we added the two scores, subtracted one point so that the scale would range between 1 and 13, and inverted the scores so that highest values correspond to the most democratic cases. The Polity index is based on several ordinal scales reflecting the competitiveness and openness of executive recruitment, the competitiveness and regulation of political participation, and the constraints on the chief executive; Monty G. Marshall and Keith Jaggers, Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual (College Park: University of Maryland, 2002).
98. For details on the items included in the factor analysis, see Appendix 2. The sources for the items were Freedom House, Freedom in the World Country Ratings, 1972 through 2004, www.freedomhouse.org (accessed May 2005);
99. Tatu Vanhanen, Measures of Democracy 1810-2002, http:// www.fsd.uta.fi/english/data/catalogue/FSD1289/(accessed June 2004);
100. David L. Cingranelli and David L. Richards, CIRI Human Rights Project, www.humanrightsdata.com (accessed June 2004);
101. Monty G. Marshall, Keith Jaggers, and Ted Robert Gurr, Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2003, http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/ (accessed April 2005).
102. Cingranelli and Richards (fn. 35);
103. Mark Gibney, Political Terror Scale, www.unca.edu/politicalscience /faculty-staff/gibney.html (accessed July 2004).
104. Minorities at Risk Project, MAR Data, www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/mar/ (accessed July 2004);
105. Andrew T. Green, Trends in Post-Communist Civil Societies: Nonprofits, Unions, and Information Legislation, 1991-2001 (Washington, D.C.: USAID/DCHA, Office of Democracy and Governance, 2004);
106. Cingranelli and Richards (fn. 35).
107. We employed the interval and ordinal measures of press freedom created by Freedom House, plus the indicators created by Minorities at Risk (fn. 37),
108. and Cingranelli and Richards (fn. 35). See Freedom House, Freedom ofthe Press 2004: Survey Methodology, www.freedomhouse.org (accessed May 2004).
109. Daniel Kaufmann, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi, Governance Matters IV: Governance Indicators for 1996-2004, http:// www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/pubs/govmatters4.html (accessed June 2005).
110. Stephen W. Raudenbush and Anthony S. Bryk, Hierarchical Linear Models: Applications and Data Analysis Methods (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Publications, 2002);
111. Judith D. Singer and John B. Willett, Applied Longitudinal Data Analysis: Modeling Change and Event Occurrence (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
112. 3) were tested as well, with their effects being insignificant.
113. We estimated the models using HLM 6.0 and spss 13.0. In the latter's MIXED module, we specified the error term structure to be (ARH1) in order to model both the heteroskedastic and autocorrelated nature of the disturbances. The Polity IV model, though, attained the best fit without the heteroskedasticity option (an autocorrelation-only specification).
114. The World Bank, World Development Indicators On-Line, http:// devdata.worldbank.org/dataon-line/ (accessed February 2005).
115. jt-1.
116. where X is the diffusion measure, FH is the Freedom House score, d is the distance between capitals, τ indicates the year, i is the country in question, J is the set of all other countries, and jεJ.
117. OECD, CRS Database (International Development Statistics CD-ROM: OECD, 2005). Projects were coded as democracy related when the OECD activity database indicated code PDDG>O or when the five-digit CRS purpose code was between 15020 and 15065. (The two criteria proved to be highly consistent.) Figures are in constant 1995 dollars.
118. Arthur Banks, Cross-National Time-Series Data (CNTS), www.databanks.sitehosting.net/index.htm (accessed July 2004).
119. Political Instability Task Force, Internal Wars and Failures of Governance, 1955-2005, http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/Pitfpset.htm (accessed June 2006). Earlier models also included inflation, unemployment, exports, urbanization, and British colonial experience as predictors. These variables were statistically irrelevant in every model estimated and so we dropped them.
120. Measured as the average of the Annett and the Fearon indices of fractionalization, both ranging between 0 (ethnic homogeneity) and 1 (extreme fractionalization). See Anthony Annett, "Social Fractionalization, Political Instability and the Size of Government," IMF Staff Papers 48, no. 3 (2001);
121. James D. Fearon, 'Ethnic and Cultural Diversity by Country," Journal of Economic Growth 8 (June 2003);
122. James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War," American Political Science Review 97 (February 2003).
123. Measured as the share of income received by the top 20 percent of the population; World Bank (fn. 43).
124. Several sources contained missing data. Listwise deletion resulted in a poor solution because it reduced the geographic coverage of the analysis. Whenever possible, we used alternative sources of information to estimate missing data (for example, Penn World Tables to impute World Bank figures). In other cases, we used an expectation-maximization (EM) imputation procedure. See Paul D. Allison, Missing Data (Thousand Oaks, Calif: Sage Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, no. 136, 2001);
125. Geoffrey J. McLachlan and Thriyambakam Krishnan, The EM Algorithm and Extensions (New York: Wiley, 1997);
126. Gary King, James Honaker, Anne Joseph, and Kenneth Scheve, "Analyzing Incomplete Political Science Data: An Alternative Algorithm for Multiple Imputation," American Political Science Review 95 (March 2001). Imputation models are available upon request.
127. The OECD data on U.S. democracy assistance, for example, has a correlation with the Green-Richter DG variable of only .62, suggesting that the OECD measure has a considerable amount of measurement error. We therefore make no substantive claim that only U.S. democracy assistance matters in promoting democratic outcomes in recipient countries.
128. The "average" country in this context means countries with mean levels of all covariates, including foreign assistance, time-varying covariates, and country-level predictors.
129. Controlling for all variables predicting the growth trajectory intercept and slope, there is still significant variation in those parameters in the overall sample of countries. This is shown in the statistically significant "random intercept" and "random slope" estimates at the bottom of the table. Including these random effects allows us to estimate the impact of DG aid and other time-varying factors, over and above each countrys specific democratic trajectory.
130. An noted above, the hierarchical growth specification controls for selection biases related to the countrys overall democratization trend and the predictable elements of that trend; the endogeneity model here goes further to control for the possibility USAID allocates funding based on the expected level of democracy in the immediate term.
131. Paxton and Morishima (fn. 13).
132. The fixed-effects model cannot estimate the impact of observed country-level stable attributes, as they are perfectly correlated with the unique component of the country intercept. Hence all fixed country-level variables, observed and unobserved, are controlled simultaneously but cannot be disentangled by this procedure.
133. This model was estimated using Stata 9.0's XTREGAR module, which includes first-order autocorrelated disturbances.
134. Nathaniel Beck and Jonathan N. Katz, "Throwing Out the Baby with the Bath Water: A Comment on Green, Kim, and Yoon," International Organization 55 (Spring 2001).
135. The New York Times data were retrieved from the Lexis-Nexis database using the search protocol "[Country name] w/s secretary of state."
136. Among the top ten recipients of State Department mentions are Iraq in 2003 (345 mentions, with a Freedom House score of 3), Israel in 1991 (169 mentions, with a FH score of 11), the Soviet Union in 1990 (100 mentions, with a FH score of 6), China in 1994 (86 mentions, a FH score of 1), and North Korea in 2003 (84 mentions and a FH score of 1). State Department mentions correlate at .22 with DC funding, at -.13 with FH scores, and at -.08 with Polity scores.
137. Arthur Lewbel, "Constructing Instruments for Regressions with Measurement Error When No Additional Data Are Available, with an Application to Patents and R&D," Econometrica 65 (September 1997).
138. For a recent application of this procedure, see Nita Rudra, "Globalization and the Strengthening of Democracy in the Developing World," American Journal of Political Science 49 (October 2005).
139. A fixed-effects instrumental variables version of model 3.2 with identical instruments shows a statistically significant DG effect of .048.
140. Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond, "Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations," Review of Economic Studies 58 (April 1991).
141. For a good discussion of the Arellano-Bond and other GMM estimators in panel models, see Gregory Wawro, "Estimating Dynamic Panel Models in Political Science," Political Analysis 10 (Winter 2002).
142. For case of presentation, we do not show the estimated effects for each and every variable that was included in these models but focus instead on the effects of our primary variables of interest, DG obligations. The full results from these models are available on request.
143. The interpretation of cumulative effects of AID obligations is also reflected in the results of the lagged endogenous variable model of Table 3.3, whereby sustained AID obligations over time would have both short-term impacts on Freedom House scores of .018 per million dollars in any given year and a cumulative long-term or equilibrium effect of .054 (.018/(l-.669), where .669 is the coefficient for the lagged dependent variable). For good expositions on long-term effects in dynamic time series or panel models, see Suzanna De Boef and Luke Keele, "Revisiting Dynamic Specification" (Paper presented at the Society of Political Methodology, Florida State University, 2005);
144. David Kaplan, "Modeling Sustained Educational Change with Panel Data: The Case for Dynamic Multiplier Analysis, "Journal of Educational and Behavioral Statistics 27 (Summer 2002).
145. " Logarithmic models are often used to test nonlinearities of this sort, but we chose the quadratic specification because of the large number of zero values for DG and other assistance variables (nearly half of the sample).
146. That is, a country with average DG expenditures as a proportion of DGP (.0005) is predicted to change .018 units on the Freedom House Scale, compared with a predicted change of .052 units for a country with average raW DG expenditures ($2.3 million).
147. Full tables with the effects of all independent variables are available upon request.
148. Brinks and Coppedge (fn. 5);
149. Gleditsch (fn. 21);
150. Pevehouse (fh. 5);
151. Starr (fh. 21);
152. Whitehead (fn. 21).