Foreign aid and political conditionality: Issues of effectiveness and consistency

Democratization

Volumn 4, Issue 3, 1997, Pages 69-108

  Crawford, Gordon ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

AID POLICY; DEMOCRACY; FOREIGN POLICY; HUMAN RIGHTS; POLITICAL CONDITIONALITY;

EID: 0031450976     PISSN: 13510347     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/13510349708403526     Document Type: Article

References (91)

1. See the work of G.C. Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1985) for an investigation of 103 cases of economic sanctions of foreign policy goals between 1914 and 1984. They identify three main types of economic sanctions: limiting exports; restricting imports; impeding finance, including aid.
2. Sources included: government agency annual reports and other documentation; European Commission documents; ministers' speeches; newspapers and magazines. In addition, information was gained through interviews and correspondence with government and Commission officials.
3. Full details of the 29 country cases, including the aid restrictions taken by each donor, is provided in G. Crawford, Political Conditionality in Practice: Instrumental and Normative Issues (Centre for Democratization Studies Working Paper, University of Leeds, 1997), Appendix 1.
4. For reasons of length, this article concentrates on general findings and omits the comparative analysis of the similarities and differences between the four donors. For details of the comparative findings, see Crawford, op. cit.
5. The higher number of instances of political conditionality in US and EU development cooperation stems mainly from their distribution of development assistance to a larger number of countries. In contrast, the UK, and more so Sweden, concentrate their resources amongst a smaller number of major recipients. The small number of Swedish cases is additionally explained by the reservations about political conditionality expressed by Social Democrat governments, stating a preference for promoting democracy and human rights through dialogue. See Crawford, op. cit.
6. These measures are roughly in descending order of severity, although suspension of programme aid could have more immediate effect, and hence be more coercive, than a freeze on new project aid, where effects are more deferred. A fifth catch-all category of 'other related measures' was included to cover, for example, political statements threatening restrictive action, as well as non-aid measures (such as arms embargoes). See Crawford, op. cit., Appendix 1.
7. Olav Stokke, 'Aid and Political Conditionality: Core Issues and State of the Art', in O. Stokke (ed.), Aid and Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass/EADI, 1995) pp.42-5.
8. Ibid., p.55.
9. A related methodological point is that my evaluations are inevitably based on limited research into the political developments of each of the 29 country cases, which, in some instances, may be subject to qualification or contestation by individual country specialists.
10. Identified cases have included those where donor threats of punitive actions were sufficient to achieve intended objectives, for example in Lesotho, Sierra Leone. It is acknowledged, however, that there may be other cases of donor success that escaped detection, where, for example, the reputation effect of donor responses has led to anticipatory action by aid recipients.
11. Criticisms can be made of the Freedom House survey for the ideological bias inherent in their categorizations. The survey has been used here, however, for two reasons. First, there is no alternative - it is the only annual rating for all countries in the world, and itself does use a number of other qualitative sources. The Charles Humana reports are not updated regularly enough. The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in their 1992 Human Development Report discussed preliminary work on the development of a Political Freedom Index (PFI) to complement their Human Development Index (HDI), but with no further reference to it in subsequent reports. Second, its twofold categorization of political rights and civil liberties approximates to our concern with both democratic development and human rights.
12. This additional categorization is necessary to correspond with the four-point scale of the aid sanctions contribution (below). It is based on a number of sources, for example Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch reports, as well as the Freedom House ratings themselves.
13. The twofold four-point scale applied to country cases was adapted from Hufbauer et al., op. cit., in their survey of the effectiveness of economic sanctions in achieving foreign policy goals during the twentieth century.
14. The human rights and democratization trend is rated 0/1 in an additional three countries, Rwanda, Togo and Zaïre, indicating a possible, but scarcely apparent, positive trend during the period examined. Aid sanctions may also have made some impact in two further cases, both rated 0/1: in Peru, on the return to (amended) constitutional rule after Fujimori's 'selfcoup'; in Rwanda, aid conditionality may have restrained the trend to more limited powersharing.
15. Kenya is one of the most manifest examples of where donor pressures for both economic and political reforms, as well as recipient perceptions of these, become entangled.
16. A more critical stance has been taken by the US government in the 1990s, but it must be noted that it has not conditioned its overall bilateral aid package to Guatemala on improvements in human rights or the negotiation of a peace settlement.
17. This figure of 18 includes only the zero rated cases and not the two ambiguous cases, Peru and Rwanda, where aid sanctions contribution is rated at 0/1.
18. Full suspension by all donors with a government - government programme occurs in eight out of the 29 cases, with an additional five cases where full measures are taken by at least one donor. See Crawford, op. cit., Appendix 1.
19. See M Robinson, 'Will Political Conditionality Work?' in IDS Bulletin, Vol.24 No.1 (1993), and N.G.S. Nordholt, 'Aid and Conditionality: The Case of Dutch-Indonesian Relationships' in Stokke, op. cit. In 1990 and 1991 the Dutch government was the second largest provider of net ODA, although overshadowed by Japanese assistance, according to OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1990-94 (Paris: Development Assistance Committee/OECD, 1996), p.111.
20. See M Robinson, 'Will Political Conditionality Work?' in IDS Bulletin, Vol.24 No.1 (1993), and N.G.S. Nordholt, 'Aid and Conditionality: The Case of Dutch-Indonesian Relationships' in Stokke, op. cit. In 1990 and 1991 the Dutch government was the second largest provider of net ODA, although overshadowed by Japanese assistance, according to OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1990-94 (Paris: Development Assistance Committee/OECD, 1996), p.111.
21. See M Robinson, 'Will Political Conditionality Work?' in IDS Bulletin, Vol.24 No.1 (1993), and N.G.S. Nordholt, 'Aid and Conditionality: The Case of Dutch-Indonesian Relationships' in Stokke, op. cit. In 1990 and 1991 the Dutch government was the second largest provider of net ODA, although overshadowed by Japanese assistance, according to OECD Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1990-94 (Paris: Development Assistance Committee/OECD, 1996), p.111.
22. Zaire could be regarded as an eighth such case, with suspension of new projects since 1992 amounting to full suspension by now. Haiti is the only case of successful full suspension.
23. Similarly, Cuba's long-term resistance to the US economic blockade was assisted by Soviet support. The disappearance of this has forced the Cuban government into some measures of economic liberalization, though, as yet, not political liberalization.
24. UK trade policy towards Burma appeared to have softened in 1996 with some assistance to British firms, in contrast to its stated 1993 policy of not encouraging trade (The Guardian, 5 March 1996). At EU level, however, diplomatic sanctions were imposed in October 1996 and special trading status withdrawn in Dec. 1996, both on human rights grounds (The Guardian, 29 Oct. 1996 and 19 Dec.1996).
25. UK trade policy towards Burma appeared to have softened in 1996 with some assistance to British firms, in contrast to its stated 1993 policy of not encouraging trade (The Guardian, 5 March 1996). At EU level, however, diplomatic sanctions were imposed in October 1996 and special trading status withdrawn in Dec. 1996, both on human rights grounds (The Guardian, 29 Oct. 1996 and 19 Dec.1996).
26. Such broader packages also do not guarantee success, of course, but their likelihood of effectiveness is increased.
27. Stokke, op. cit., p.43.
28. Observers have used this expression to describe circumstances where incumbent regimes have manipulated an uneven playing field to gain electoral victory through their control of state resources and the media, in addition to the advantage of having more developed party organizations than newly legalized opponents.
29. There is evidence that in fact French aid to countries involved in genuine transition in 1991 (Benin, Niger, Mali) was decreasing, whilst that directed to authoritarian regimes was growing (Togo, Cameroon, Zaire). See G. Martin, 'Continuity and Change in Franco-African Relations', Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol.33, No.1 (1995), pp.1-20.
30. See A.A. Shiddo, 'Sudan's View of EU Policy', for a diplomatic presentation of the Sudanese government's views on EU aid sanctions, Human Rights Clause in External Agreements: summary record of presentations made at the Public Hearing, 20-21 November 1995 (Luxembourg: European Parliament, 1995).
31. Detailed country case-studies may reveal attempts by recipient governments to whip up antidonor sentiment, and enable us to comment more precisely on the relative success of this strategy.
32. Stokke, op. cit., p.44.
33. This could be accounted for either by a different British diplomatic style or by the closer ties forged by colonialism and a post-colonialism alliance.
34. Stokke, op. cit., p.44.
35. Note that EU member states are only 'legally bound' to implement 'Common Positions' in their national policies, and simply 'honour bound' to implement other policy statements. 'Common positions', however, make up only a small percentage of EU Common Foreign and Security Policy statements.
36. See Crawford, op. cit., Appendix 1, for comparative information.
37. There are also exceptions where less well co-ordinated measures have had some impact, nevertheless. For example, in Zambia, threats of punitive action by the US and UK were not reciprocated by the EU and Sweden, though also not contradicted. In Thailand, the US acted alone, although here internal pressure outweighed external influence in determining the outcome.
38. A third possible scenario is where donor government imposition of aid restrictions is not wholeheartedly supported by executive agencies, with aid ministry officials less enthusiastic about long-term development programmes being disrupted on political grounds. No examples of the undermining of effectiveness in this way were revealed, however, by the level of research conducted here.
39. Regarding EU-ASEAN relations, negotiations on a revised Trade and Co-operation agreement broke down in 1992, partly due to the EU's wish to insert a human rights and democracy clause, to which ASEAN governments objected. The issue remains unresolved, but with co-operation continuing under the terms of the old agreement dating from 1980. See M. Stankovitch, The European Union and ASEAN - A Background Paper (London: Catholic Institute for International Relations, 1996).
40. See interview with Carl Greenidge, acting Secretary-General of the ACP group, The Courier, No. 155 (Jan.-Feb. 1996), p.22.
41. D. Beetham and K. Boyle, Introducing Democracy: Eighty Questions and Answers (Paris: UNESCO, 1995), qu.54.
42. D.P. Forsythe, Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered (Gainesville: Universtity of Florida Press, 1988), pp.51-60; J. Nelson and S.J. Eglinton, Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid? (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992), p.28.
43. D.P. Forsythe, Human Rights and US Foreign Policy: Congress Reconsidered (Gainesville: Universtity of Florida Press, 1988), pp.51-60; J. Nelson and S.J. Eglinton, Encouraging Democracy: What Role for Conditioned Aid? (Washington, DC: Overseas Development Council, 1992), p.28.
44. See: Stokke, op. cit.; Robinson, op. cit.; P Burnell, 'Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1996), pp.485-503; P. Uvin, 'Do as I Say, Not as I Do; The Limits of Political Conditionality', in G. Sorensen (ed.), Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass/EADI, 1993); G. Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors (University of Leeds: Center for Democratization Studies Working Paper, 1995).
45. See: Stokke, op. cit.; Robinson, op. cit.; P Burnell, 'Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1996), pp.485-503; P. Uvin, 'Do as I Say, Not as I Do; The Limits of Political Conditionality', in G. Sorensen (ed.), Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass/EADI, 1993); G. Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors (University of Leeds: Center for Democratization Studies Working Paper, 1995).
46. See: Stokke, op. cit.; Robinson, op. cit.; P Burnell, 'Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1996), pp.485-503; P. Uvin, 'Do as I Say, Not as I Do; The Limits of Political Conditionality', in G. Sorensen (ed.), Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass/EADI, 1993); G. Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors (University of Leeds: Center for Democratization Studies Working Paper, 1995).
47. See: Stokke, op. cit.; Robinson, op. cit.; P Burnell, 'Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1996), pp.485-503; P. Uvin, 'Do as I Say, Not as I Do; The Limits of Political Conditionality', in G. Sorensen (ed.), Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass/EADI, 1993); G. Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors (University of Leeds: Center for Democratization Studies Working Paper, 1995).
48. See: Stokke, op. cit.; Robinson, op. cit.; P Burnell, 'Good Government and Democratization: A Sideways Look at Aid and Political Conditionality', Democratization, Vol.1, No.3 (1996), pp.485-503; P. Uvin, 'Do as I Say, Not as I Do; The Limits of Political Conditionality', in G. Sorensen (ed.), Political Conditionality (London: Frank Cass/EADI, 1993); G. Crawford, Promoting Democracy, Human Rights and Good Governance Through Development Aid: A Comparative Study of the Policies of Four Northern Donors (University of Leeds: Center for Democratization Studies Working Paper, 1995).
49. Human Rights Watch World Report 1993: Events of 1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), p.359.
50. Amnesty International, Human Rights Violations Five Years After Tiananmen (London: Amnesty International, 1994), p.3.
51. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1995 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1996), China Country Report, p.2.
52. This does not include Sweden, who have no programme with the government of Nigeria.
53. The Guardian, 21 July 1995 and 28 Aug. 1995. The new licences entailed a discreditable circumvention and disregard of the EU guidelines in two ways: first, ignoring 'the presumption of denial'; second, the the phoney distinction of arms to the police not military, for example, CS riot control gas and rubber bullets; third the dubious nature of so-called 'non-'lethal arms. The British government has not denied granting arms exports licences, but stated unconvincingly that they have not been for the supply of 'lethal defence equipment to the Nigerian armed forces', whilst refusing to reveal the details (ibid.).
54. The Guardian, 21 July 1995 and 28 Aug. 1995. The new licences entailed a discreditable circumvention and disregard of the EU guidelines in two ways: first, ignoring 'the presumption of denial'; second, the the phoney distinction of arms to the police not military, for example, CS riot control gas and rubber bullets; third the dubious nature of so-called 'non-'lethal arms. The British government has not denied granting arms exports licences, but stated unconvincingly that they have not been for the supply of 'lethal defence equipment to the Nigerian armed forces', whilst refusing to reveal the details (ibid.).
55. US Department of State (1996), op. cit., Overview, p.4.
56. Baroness Chalker, transcript of speech in House of Lords debate on Nigeria, 7 March 1995.
57. The Guardian, 21 Nov. 1995.
58. Human Rights Watch World Report 1995: Events of 1994 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), p.244.
59. No aid restrictions have been taken by any of the four selected donors, and generally not by any other donor. In some cases, though, a donor may not provide any government-government assistance in the first place, particularly true of Sweden.
60. All aid statistics in these five country cases are taken from the OECD Development Assistance Committee's Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1990-94 (Paris: Development Assistance Committee/OECD, 1996).
61. US Department of State (1996), op. cit., Indonesia Country Report, p.1.
62. Estimates of killings vary from 20 per cent of the population, from The World: A Third World Guide 1995/96 (Montevideo: Instituto del Tercero Mundo, 1995), p.222, to one-third (UK World Development Movement, election materials, 1996).
63. US Department of State (1996), op. cit., Indonesia Country Report, p.1.
64. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., p.157.
65. US Department of State (1996), op. cit., Indonesia Country Report, p.2.
66. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., p.158.
67. Military training was suspended for financial year (FY) 1993 and FY 1994 by Congress on human rights grounds, but the ban lifted for FY 1995.
68. Sweden does not have a programme to Indonesia except small amounts of technical assistance and aid to non-governmental organizations.
69. World Bank News, 27 June 1996, p 8 (Washington, DC: World Bank).
70. Instituto del Tercero Mundo, op. cit., p.222.
71. World Development Movement, Gunrunners Gold (London: World Development Movement, 1995), p.58.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid., pp.51-2.
74. The Sri Lankan government stated that the JVP was responsible for over 6,500 killings from late 1987 to March 1990. They themselves were responsible for 'disappearances' and extrajudicial killings numbering tens of thousands. Amnesty International Report 1990 (London: Amnesty International, 1991), p.209.
75. Human Rights Watch estimates '40,000 people disappeared between 1983 and 1992 after arrest by government forces or abduction by government-linked death squads'. Human Rights Watch World Report 1993: Events of 1992 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), p.186.
76. Human Rights Watch World Report 1996: Events of 1995 (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995), pp.172-3.
77. Examples include the targeting of relatives of known Islamists, particularly women, and generalised retaliatory actions against citizens in areas where armed groups are active. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., pp.255-9; Human Rights Watch (1995), op. cit., pp.263-6.
78. Examples include the targeting of relatives of known Islamists, particularly women, and generalised retaliatory actions against citizens in areas where armed groups are active. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., pp.255-9; Human Rights Watch (1995), op. cit., pp.263-6.
79. The cancellation of the elections brought no criticism from either the EU or from the Bush administration. The latter explicitly made clear its preference for a military junta to a democratic process that resulted in an Islamic-dominated legislature. The EU's silence on human rights abuses is in marked contrast to their critical statements on events in many other countries.
80. Human Rights Watch World Report 1992: Events of 1991 (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1991), p.630. Also see Egypt: Ten Years of Torture (London: Amnesty International, 1991).
81. Human Rights Watch World Report 1992: Events of 1991 (New York, Human Rights Watch, 1991), p.630. Also see Egypt: Ten Years of Torture (London: Amnesty International, 1991).
82. Human Rights Watch (1995), op. cit., p.269.
83. US Department of State (1996), op. cit., Egypt Country Report, p.1.
84. US Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1994 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, 1995), Egypt Country Report, p.2.
85. US Department of State (1995) op. cit. and (1996), op. cit., Egypt Country Reports. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., p.264 and (1995), p.270.
86. US Department of State (1995) op. cit. and (1996), op. cit., Egypt Country Reports. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., p.264 and (1995), p.270.
87. US Department of State (1995) op. cit. and (1996), op. cit., Egypt Country Reports. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., p.264 and (1995), p.270.
88. US Department of State (1995) op. cit. and (1996), op. cit., Egypt Country Reports. Human Rights Watch (1994), op. cit., p.264 and (1995), p.270.
89. The Andean Commission of Jurists - Colombian section (CAJSC) has analyzed those cases where perpetrators are known. For the year until September 1992, it found that 40 per cent were attributable to state agents, 30 per cent to paramilitary groups, 27.5 per cent to guerrillas, and 2.5 per cent to others including drug traffickers: from Human Rights Watch (1992), op. cit., p.86. In 1995, proportions assigned were similar: 65 per cent to government security forces, 35 per cent to guerrillas. Human Rights Watch (1995), op. cit., p.79.
90. The Andean Commission of Jurists - Colombian section (CAJSC) has analyzed those cases where perpetrators are known. For the year until September 1992, it found that 40 per cent were attributable to state agents, 30 per cent to paramilitary groups, 27.5 per cent to guerrillas, and 2.5 per cent to others including drug traffickers: from Human Rights Watch (1992), op. cit., p.86. In 1995, proportions assigned were similar: 65 per cent to government security forces, 35 per cent to guerrillas. Human Rights Watch (1995), op. cit., p.79.
91. Human Rights Watch (1995), op. cit., p.81.