Blind justice: An experimental analysis of random punishment in team production

Journal of Economic Psychology

Volumn 31, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 358-373

  Fatas, Enrique ^a,b   Morales, Antonio J ^a,c   Ubeda, Paloma ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VALENCIA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT DALLAS   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF MÁLAGA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Experiments; Public goods; Punishment

Indexed keywords

EID: 77952745423     PISSN: 01674870     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.joep.2010.01.005     Document Type: Article

References (51)

1. Akerlof G.A., Kranton R.E. Identity and the economics of organizations. The Journal of Economic Perspectives 2005, 19(1):9-32.
2. Andreoni J. Why free ride? Strategies and learning in public goods experiments. Journal of Public Economics 1988, 37:291-304.
3. Andreoni, J., & Vesterlund, L. (Accepted for publication). Public goods: A survey of experimental research. In J. Kagel, A. Roth (Eds.), The Handbook of experimental economics.
4. Becker G. Crime and punishment: An economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 1969, 76:169-217.
5. Brandts J., Cooper D.J., Fatas E. Leadership and overcoming coordination failure whit asymmetric cost. Experimental Economics 2007, 10(3):269-284.
6. Brandts, J., Fatas, E., & Lagos, F. (2009). An experimental study of equity and reciprocity using individual decisions. Mimeo, CSIC-IAE.
7. Burgess R., Pande R. Do rural banks matter? Evidence from the Indian social banking experiment. American Economic Review 2005, 95(3):780-795.
8. Che Y.K., Yoo S.W. Optimal incentives for teams. American Economic Review 2001, 91(3):525-541.
9. Croson R. Partners and strangers revisited. Economics Letters 1996, 53:25-32.
10. Croson R. Feedback in voluntary contribution mechanisms: An experiment in team production. Research in Experimental Economics 2000, 8:85-97.
11. Croson R., Fatas E., Neugebauer T. Reciprocity, matching and conditional cooperation in two public goods games. Economics Letters 2005, 87:95-101.
12. Croson, R., Fatas, E., & Neugebauer, T. (2006). Excludability and cooperation in team production. Mimeo, LINEEX.
13. Fatas, E., Melendez-Jimenez, M. A., & Solaz, H. (2009). Cooperation, punishment and networks. Mimeo, LINEEX.
14. Fatas, E., & Godoy, S. (2009). Take the lead!. Mimeo, LINEEX.
15. Fatas, E., Godoy, S., & Solaz, H. (2009). People with (out) history. Traceability and exemplar behavior. Mimeo, LINEEX.
16. Fehr E., Gächter S. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. American Economic Review 2000, 90(4):980-994.
17. Fischbacher U., Gächter S., Fehr E. Are people conditionally cooperative? Evidence from a public goods experiment. Economics Letters 2001, 71:397-404.
18. Fischbacher, U., & Gächter, S. (forthcoming). Social preferences, beliefs and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments. American Economics Review.
19. Fischbacher U. z-Tree: Zurich toolbox for ready-made economic experiments. Experimental Economics 2007, 10(2):171-178.
20. Frechette G. Learning in a multilateral bargaining game. Journal of Econometrics 2010, 153(2):183-195.
21. Frechette G., Kagel J.H., Morelli M. Behavioral identification in coalitional bargaining: An experimental analysis of demand bargaining and alternating offers. Econometrica 2005, 73(6):1893-1937.
22. Hamilton B.H., Nickerson J.A., Owan H. Team incentives and worker heterogeneity: An empirical analysis of the impact of team on productivity and participation. Journal of Political Economy 2003, 111(3):465-497.
23. Hermman B., Gächter S., Thöni C. Antisocial punishment across societies. Science 2008, 319:1362-1367.
24. Hirshleifer D., Rasmusen E. Cooperation in a repeated prisoners' dilemma with ostracism. Journal of Economic Behavioral and Organization 1989, 12:87-106.
25. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard in teams. The Bell Journal of Economics 1982, 13:324-340.
26. Holt C.A., Laury S.K. Risk aversion and incentives effects. American Economic Review 2002, 92(5):1655-1664.
27. Houser D., Xiao E., McCabe K., Smith V. When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation. Games and Economic Behavior 2008, 62(2):509-532.
28. Hultsch F. The histories of Polybius 1889, McMillan and Co., London, New York.
29. Lazear E.P. Personnel economics for managers 1998, John Wiley, New York.
30. Ledyard J. Public goods: A survey of experimental research. The handbook of experimental economics 1995, 111-194. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ. J. Kagel, A. Roth (Eds.).
31. Margolis H. Cognition and extended rational choice 2007, Routledge.
32. McAfee R.P., McMillan J. Optimal contracts for teams. International Economic Review 1991, 32(3):561-577.
33. Meran G., Schwalbe U. Pollution control and collective punishments. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 1987, 143(4):616-629.
34. Miceli T.J., Segerson K. Punishing the innocent along with the guilty: The economics of individual versus group punishment. The Journal of Legal Studies 2007, 36(1):81-106.
35. Nalbantian H., Schotter A. Productivity under group incentives: An experimental study. American Economic Review 1997, 87(3):314-341.
36. Nikiforakis N. Punishment and counter-punishment in public good games: Can we really govern ourselves?. Journal of Public Economics 2008, 92:91-112.
37. Nikiforakis N., Normann H.T. A comparative statics analysis of punishment in public good games. Experimental Economics 2008, 11:358-369.
38. Ostrom E., Walker J., Gardner R. Covenants with and without a sword: Self-governance is possible. The American Political Science Review 1992, 86(2):404-417.
39. Polinsky A.M., Shavel S. The economic theory of public enforcement of law. Journal of Economic Literature 2000, 38:45-76.
40. Posner R., Rasmusen E. Creating and enforcing norms, with special reference to sanctions. International Review of Law and Economics 1999, 19:369-382.
41. Prendergast C. The provision of incentives in firms. Journal of Economic Literature 1999, 7:63.
42. Rasmusen E. Moral hazard in risk-averse teams. Rand Journal of Economics 1987, 18(3):428-435.
43. Sefton, M., Shupp, R., & Walker, J. (2005). The effect of rewards and sanctions in provision of public goods. Ball State University, Department of Economics, Working Paper 200504.
44. Shapiro C., Stiglitz J.E. Equilibrium unemployment as a worker discipline device. American Economic Review 1984, 74(3):433-444.
45. Segerson K. Uncertainty and incentives for nonpoint pollution control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1988, 15:87-98.
46. Shortle J.S., Horan R.D. The economics of nonpoint pollution control. Journal of Economic Surveys 2001, 15(3):251-253.
47. Smith V.L. Experimental economics: induced value theory. American Economic Review 1976, 66(2):274-279.
48. Weber R.A. Managing growth to achieve efficient coordination in large groups. American Economic Review 2006, 96:114-126.
49. Woolridge J. Cluster-sample methods in applied econometrics. American Economic Review 2003, 93:133-138.
50. Xepapadeas A.P. Environmental policy under imperfect information: incentives and moral hazard. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 1991, 20:113-126.
51. Yamagishi T. Seriousness of social dilemmas and the provision of a sanctioning system. Social Psychology Quarterly 1988, 51(1):32-42.