Punishing the innocent along with the guilty: The economics of individual versus group punishment

Journal of Legal Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 81-106

  Miceli, Thomas J ^a   Segerson, Kathleen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34047252038     PISSN: 00472530     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/509274     Document Type: Article

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