Cognition and Extended Rational Choice

Cognition and Extended Rational Choice

Volumn , Issue , 2007, Pages 1-241

  Margolis, Howard ^a  

^a Irving B Harris Grad Sch Pub P   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 36048950386     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.4324/9780203939024     Document Type: Book

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