Do political action committees give money to candidates for electoral or influence motives?

Public Choice

Volumn 112, Issue 3-4, 2002, Pages 373-399

  Magee, Christopher ^a  

^a BUCKNELL UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0036038532     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1019935524261     Document Type: Article

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