Endogenous trade policy and lobby formation: An application to the free-rider problem

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 57, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 449-471

  Magee, Christopher ^a  

^a BARD COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Free rider problem; Lobbying; Tariffs

Indexed keywords

BARGAINING; TARIFF STRUCTURE; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0036303429     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(01)00146-5     Document Type: Article

References (11)

1. Endogenous tariffs, the political economy of trade restrictions, and welfare
2. Protection for sale
3. Trade wars and trade talks
4. The value of trade agreements in the presence of political pressure
5. Endogenous lobby formation and endogenous protection: A long run model of trade policy determination
6. Is there a free-rider problem in lobbying? Endogenous tariffs, trigger strategies, and the number of firms
7. Interest groups: A survey of empirical models that try to assess their influence
8. Tariffs, subsidies, and welfare with endogenous policy
9. Political economy of trade policy