Trust and governance: untangling a tangled web

Academy of Management Review

Volumn 34, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 11-31

  Puranam, Phanish ^a   Vanneste, Bart S ^a  

^a LONDON BUSINESS SCHOOL   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58549092997     PISSN: 03637425     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5465/AMR.2009.35713271     Document Type: Article

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