Risky human capital and deferred capital income taxation

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 145, Issue 3, 2010, Pages 908-943

  Grochulski, Borys ^a   Piskorski, Tomasz ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b The Sanford C Bernstein Co Center for Leadership and Ethics   (United States)

Author keywords

Deferred tax; Human capital; Optimal taxation; Private information

Indexed keywords

EID: 77951765565     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: 10957235     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2009.09.003     Document Type: Article

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