Advances in dynamic optimal taxation

Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Ninth World Congress, Volume I

Volumn , Issue , 2010, Pages 269-297

  Kocherlakota, Narayana R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84924139906     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: 10.1017/CBO9781139052269.009     Document Type: Chapter

References (22)

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11. GOLOSOV, M., and TSYVINSKI, A. (2004): “Designing Optimal Disability Insurance,” MIT working paper.
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