Deterministic calibration and nash equilibrium

Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence (Subseries of Lecture Notes in Computer Science)

Volumn 3120, Issue , 2004, Pages 33-48

  Kakade, Sham M ^a   Foster, Dean P ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION THEORY; CALIBRATION; ERRORS; MATRIX ALGEBRA; SET THEORY; THEOREM PROVING; COMPUTATION THEORY; GAME THEORY;

CONVEX COMBINATIONS; DETERMINISTIC CALIBRATION; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; THEORECTIC EQUILIBRIUM; LEARNING PROCESS; NASH EQUILIBRIA;

LEARNING ALGORITHMS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

EID: 9444235683     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-27819-1_3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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