Learning correlated equilibria in games with compact sets of strategies

Games and Economic Behavior

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2007, Pages 187-208

  Stoltz, Gilles ^a   Lugosi, Gábor ^b  

^a ECOLE NORMALE SUPÉRIEURE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITAT POMPEU FABRA   (Spain)

Author keywords

Correlated equilibrium; Internal regret; Regret minimization; Repeated games

Indexed keywords

EID: 33947600544     PISSN: 08998256     EISSN: 10902473     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2006.04.007     Document Type: Article

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