Constraining Equitable Allocations of Tradable CO2 Emission Quotas by Acceptability

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 26, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 469-492

  Germain, M ^a   Van Steenberghe, V ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Acceptability; Climate change; Dynamic games; Equity; Tradable quotas

Indexed keywords

CARBON DIOXIDE; CLOSED LOOP CONTROL SYSTEMS; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; OPTIMIZATION; POLLUTION CONTROL; RESOURCE ALLOCATION;

BUSINESS EQUITY; ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS;

GAS EMISSIONS;

ECONOMIC INSTRUMENT; EMISSIONS TRADING; EQUITY; KYOTO PROTOCOL; QUOTA SYSTEM;

EID: 0345447021     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:EARE.0000003625.77571.9f     Document Type: Article

References (26)

1. AGBM (1996), Quantified Emission Limitation and Reduction Objectives within Specified Time-Frames: Review of Possible Indicators to Define Criteria for Differentiation among Annex I Parties, FCCC/AGBM/1996/7, June 21.
2. AGBM (1997), Framework Compilation of Proposals from Parties for the Elements of a Protocol or Another Legal Instrument, FCCC/AGBM/1997/2, January 31.
3. Chander, P. and H. Tulkens (1995), 'A Core-theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution', International Tax and Public Finance 2, 279-293.
4. Chander, P. and H. Tulkens (1997), 'The Core of an Economy with Multilateral Environmental Externalities', International Journal of Game Theory 26, 379-401.
5. Cline, W. (1992), The Economics of Global Warming, Institute for International Economics, Washington, DC.
6. Cropper, M., S. Aydede and P. Portney (1994), 'Preferences for Life Saving Programs: How the Public Discounts Time and Age', Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 8, 243-265.
7. Finus, M. (2002), 'Game Theory and International Environmental Cooperation: Any Practical Application?', in C. Böhringer, M. Finus and C. Vogt, eds., Controlling Global Warming: Perspectives from Economics, Game Theory and Public Choice. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
8. Folmer, H., N. Hanley and F. Missfeldt (1998), 'Game-theoretic Modelling of Environmental and Resource Problems: An Introduction', in N. Hanley and H. Folmer, eds., Game Theory and the Environment. Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
9. Germain, M., Ph. Toint, H. Tulkens and A. De Zeeuw (2003), Transfers to Sustain Coretheoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control. CORE Discussion Paper no9832, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
10. Germain, M., Ph. Toint, H. Tulkens and A. De Zeeuw (2003), Transfers to Sustain Coretheoretic Cooperation in International Stock Pollutant Control. CORE Discussion Paper no9832, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve, forthcoming in Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
11. Germain, M., Ph. Tulkens, H. Tulkens and J. P. van Ypersele (2002), Side Payments and International Cooperation in a Regionalised Integrated Assessment Model for Climate Change. CORE Discussion Paper no2002/19, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve.
12. Germain, M. and J. P. van Ypersele (1999), Financial Transfers to Sustain International Cooperation in the Climate Change Framework. CORE Discussion Paper no9936 and CLIMNEG Working Paper no19, CORE, Université catholique de Louvain, Louvain-La-Neuve.
13. Grubb, M. (1995), 'Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change', International Affairs 71(3), 463-496.
14. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (1996), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions. Cambridge University Press.
15. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2002), Climate Change 2001: Economic and Social Dimensions. Cambridge University Press.
16. Kverndokk, S. (1995), 'Tradeable CO2 Emission Permits: Initial Distribution as a Justice Problem', Environmental Values 4, 129-148.
17. Manne, A. and R. Richels (1998), Economic Impacts of Alternative Emission Reduction Scenarios. Special Report ACCF Center for Policy Research, October 1998, Internet Edition.
18. Nordhaus, W. D. and J. Boyer (1999), Roll the DICE Again: Economic Models of Global Warming. Internet Edition (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/ homepage/dicemodels.htm), October 25, 1999.
19. Nordhaus, W. D. and Z. Yang (1996), 'A Regional Dynamic General-equilibrium Model of Alternative Climate-change Strategies', The American Economic Review 86(4), 741-765.
20. Richels, R., J. Edmonds, H. Gruenspecht and T. Wigley (1996), The Berlin Mandate: The Design of Cost-effective Strategies. Paper prepared for the Standford Energy Modeling Forum, February 3, 1996.
21. Reiner, D. and H. Jacoby (1998), Annex I Differentiation Proposals: Implications for Welfare, Equity and Policy. Report No. 27, Massachusetts Institute of Techonology, Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change.
22. Rose, A., B. Stevens, J. Edmonds and M. Wise (1998), 'International Equity and Differentiation in Global Warming Policy, Environmental and Resource Economics 12, 25-51.
23. Rowland, I. (1997), 'International Fairness and Justice in Addressing Global Climate Change', Environmental Politics 6, 1-30.
24. Torvanger, A. and O. Godal (1999), A Survey of Differentiation Methods for National Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets. Report 1999:5, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO), Oslo, August 1999.
25. Torvanger, A. and L. Ringius (2000), Burden Differentiation: Criteria for Evaluation and Development of Burden Sharing Rules. Working Paper 2000:1, Center for International Climate and Environmental Research (CICERO), Oslo, February 2000.
26. Weitzman, M. (1998), Gamma Discounting. Discussion Paper 1843, Harvard University, Harvard, MA.