Approximation algorithms for combinatorial auctions with complement-free bidders

Mathematics of Operations Research

Volumn 35, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 1-13

  Dobzinski, Shahar ^a   Nisan, Noam ^b   Schapira, Michael ^c,d  

^a Cornell University ^*  (United States)

^b HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^c Yale University   (United States)

^d UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Truthfulness

Indexed keywords

APPROXIMATION RATIOS; COMBINATORIAL AUCTION; DETERMINISTIC ALGORITHMS; INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE; MAXIMIZATION PROBLEM; OPTIMAL LOWER BOUND; OTHER ALGORITHMS; RANDOMIZED ROUNDING; UPPER BOUND; VALUATION FUNCTION;

COMBINATORIAL MATHEMATICS; COMMERCE; OPTIMIZATION;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 77949388489     PISSN: 0364765X     EISSN: 15265471     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/moor.1090.0436     Document Type: Article

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