General deterrence and international conflict: Testing perfect deterrence theory

International Interactions

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 60-85

  Quackenbush, Stephen L ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MISSOURI   (United States)

Author keywords

Conflict; Deterrence; Empirical testing of formal models; Multinomial logit

Indexed keywords

EID: 77949336992     PISSN: 03050629     EISSN: 15477444     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/03050620903554069     Document Type: Article

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