Design of the incentive mechanism in electricity auction market based on the signaling game theory

Energy

Volumn 35, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 1813-1819

  Liu, Zhen ^a   Zhang, Xiliang ^a   Lieu, Jenny ^b  

^a TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SUSSEX   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

High low match; Marginal clearance pricing; Pay as bid; Semi randomized matching; Signaling game

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; COSTS; ELECTRIC NETWORK ANALYSIS; ELECTRICITY; GAME THEORY; MACHINE DESIGN; PROFITABILITY; SIGNALING;

BIDDING MECHANISM; CLEARANCE PRICING; CLEARING PRICE; ELECTRICITY AUCTION MARKET; ELECTRICITY BIDDING; ELECTRICITY GENERATORS; ELECTRICITY MARKET; EQUILIBRIUM STATE; HIGH-LOW; INCENTIVE MECHANISM; INDEX TERMS; MARKET POWER; MULTI AGENT; OVERALL BENEFIT; SIGNALING GAME; SIMULATION EXPERIMENTS; SIMULATION MODEL; SIMULATION RESULT;

ELECTRIC GENERATORS;

DESIGN; ELECTRICITY GENERATION; ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; INCENTIVE; PRICING POLICY; SIGNALING;

EID: 77949272118     PISSN: 03605442     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2009.12.036     Document Type: Article

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