Double-sided auction mechanism design in electricity based on maximizing social welfare

Energy Policy

Volumn 37, Issue 11, 2009, Pages 4231-4239

  Zou, Xiaoyan ^a,b  

^a CHONGQING NORMAL UNIVERSITY   (China)

^b Ohio State University   (United States)

Author keywords

Auction mechanism; Electricity market; Social welfare contribution

Indexed keywords

AUCTION MECHANISMS; CRITICAL FACTORS; ELECTRICITY MARKET; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; MARKET CLEARING; MARKET POWER; MATCHING RULES; NEW MECHANISMS; PRICING MECHANISM; SOCIAL WELFARE; TRANSFER PAYMENT;

ELECTRIC NETWORK ANALYSIS; ELECTRICITY; MACHINE DESIGN;

COMMERCE;

ELECTRICITY SUPPLY; EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; ENERGY PLANNING; PRICE DYNAMICS; THEORETICAL STUDY; WELFARE ECONOMICS;

SPAIN;

EID: 72649088983     PISSN: 03014215     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.enpol.2009.05.019     Document Type: Article

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