Short-term electricity market auction game analysis: Uniform and pay-as-bid pricing

IEEE Transactions on Power Systems

Volumn 19, Issue 4, 2004, Pages 1990-1998

  Son, You Seok ^a   Baldick, Ross ^b   Lee, Kwang Ho ^c   Siddiqi, Shams ^a  

^a Lower Colorado River Authority   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN   (United States)

^c Dankook University   (South Korea)

Author keywords

Auction theory; Electricity market; Game theory; Market design; Market power

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMMERCE; COMPUTER SIMULATION; GAME THEORY; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; MARKETING; MATHEMATICAL MODELS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

AUCTION GAME ANALYSIS; AUCTION THEORY; ELECTRICITY MARKET; MARKET DESIGN; MARKET POWER;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

EID: 9244254260     PISSN: 08858950     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1109/TPWRS.2004.836192     Document Type: Article

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