Suppress price spikes by hybridizing system-marginal-price auction and pay-as-bid auction

Dianli Xitong Zidonghue/Automation of Electric Power Systems

Volumn 26, Issue 9, 2002, Pages 30-35

  Duan, Gang ^a   Wang, Xinfeng ^a   Bai, Wei ^a   Han, Yingduo ^a  

^a TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Electricity market; Market power; Pay as bid auction; Price cap; System marginal price auction

Indexed keywords

COMMERCE; SYSTEMS ANALYSIS;

ELECTRICITY MARKET; MARKET POWER; PRICE CAP; PRICE SPIKES SUPPRESSION; SYSTEM MARGINAL PRICE AUCTION;

ELECTRIC INDUSTRY;

EID: 0037053472     PISSN: 10001026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (5)

1. Mechanism of price spiking in electric power market
2. Real time supply costs above single price auction threshold
3. Pricing in the California power exchange electricity market: Should california switch from uniform pricing to pay-as-bid pricing
4. Bidding in an electricity pay-as-bid auction
5. Experimental analysis of the efficiency of uniform-price versus discriminatory auctions in the england and wales electricity market