Currently used uniform clearing pricing auction facilitates the generators' tacit collusion - Mechanism analysis

Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systems

Volumn 29, Issue 22, 2005, Pages 19-27

  Li, Yu Ping ^a   Xie, Xian Ya ^a   Yan, Mao Song ^a  

^a SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Capacity withholding; Electricity market; Market power; Tacit collusion; Uniform clearing pricing

Indexed keywords

COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

CAPACITY WITHHOLDING; ELECTRICITY MARKET; EXTERNAL STABILITY; GENERATOR MARKET BEHAVIOR; GIVEN LOAD; INTERNAL STABILITY; MARGINAL COST; NECESSARY CONDITION; TACIT COLLUSION; UNIFORM CLEARING PRICING;

INDUSTRIAL MANAGEMENT;

EID: 30544436130     PISSN: 10001026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

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