Market power monitoring and mitigation in the US wholesale power markets

Energy

Volumn 31, Issue 6-7, 2006, Pages 877-904

  Helman, Udi ^a  

^a FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COSTS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; MARKETING; MONITORING; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

BILATERAL POWER; ELECTRICITY SECTOR; WHOLESALE POWER MARKETS;

ELECTRICITY;

COSTS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRICITY; MARKETING; SOCIETIES AND INSTITUTIONS;

ENERGY MARKET; MARKET CONDITIONS; MONITORING;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 30944431889     PISSN: 03605442     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.energy.2005.05.011     Document Type: Article

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