Composite auction method for suppressing unreasonable electricity price spikes in a competitive electricity market

IEE Proceedings: Generation, Transmission and Distribution

Volumn 152, Issue 4, 2005, Pages 460-468

  Duan, G ^a   Dong, Z Y ^b   Wang, X F ^c  

^a BEIJING SIFANG AUTOMATION CO LTD   (China)

^b UNIVERSITY OF QUEENSLAND   (Australia)

^c TSINGHUA UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COSTS; ELECTRIC INDUSTRY; ELECTRIC POWER PLANTS; ELECTRIC POWER UTILIZATION; FLOWCHARTING; INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS; PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS;

BIDDING; COMPOSITE AUCTION METHOD; ELECTRICITY MARKETS; ELECTRICITY PRICE SPIKES;

ELECTRICITY;

EID: 23244464641     PISSN: 13502360     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1049/ip-gtd:20045055     Document Type: Conference Paper

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