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Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2010, Pages 9-23

Economics, public service motivation, and pay for performance: Complements or substitutes?

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EID: 77649196912     PISSN: 10967494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10967490903547134     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (59)

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