Controlling federal agencies: The contingent impact of external controls on worker discretion and productivity

International Public Management Journal

Volumn 12, Issue 1, 2009, Pages 82-115

  Langbein, Laura ^a  

^a AMERICAN UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 58849108263     PISSN: 10967494     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10967490802649551     Document Type: Article

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