Dynamics of conformist bias

Monist

Volumn 88, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 260-269

  Skyrms, Brian ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70450028868     PISSN: 00269662     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5840/monist200588213     Document Type: Article

References (8)

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3. Henrich, J. and Boyd, R. (1998) "The Evolution of Conformist Transmission and the Emergence of Between-Group Differences." Evolution and Human Behavior, 19: 215-42
4. Hofbauer, J. and Sigmund, K. (1998) Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics. New York: Cambridge University Press
5. Sato, Y. Akiyama, E., and Farmer, J. D. (2002) "Chaos in Learning a Simple Two-Person Game." Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 99, 4748-51
6. Schlag, K. H. (1997) "Why Imitate, and If So, How? A Boundedly Rational Approach to Multi-Armed Bandits." Journal of Economic Theory 78, 130-56
7. Taylor, P. D. and Jonker, L. (1978) "Evolutionary Stable Strategies and Game Dynamics." Mathematical Biosciences 40, 145-56
8. Zeeman, E. C. (1980) "Population Dynamics from Game Theory" In Global Theory of Dynamical Systems. Springer Lecture Notes on Mathematics 819