A robust combinatorial auction mechanism against shill bidders

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2006, Issue , 2006, Pages 1183-1190

  Matsuo, Tokuro ^a   Ito, Takayuki ^a,b,d   Day, Robert W ^c   Shintani, Toramatsu ^a  

^a NAGOYA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (Japan)

^b MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

^c UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT   (United States)

^d HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Combinatorial auctions; Computational mechanism design; Incentive compatibility and pareto efficiency; Shill bids; Vickrey clarke groves mechanism

Indexed keywords

COMBINATORIAL AUCTIONS; COMPUTATIONAL MECHANISM DESIGN; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY AND PARETO EFFICIENCY; SHILL BIDS; VICKREY CLARKE GROVES MECHANISM;

ALGORITHMS; AUTONOMOUS AGENTS; INTERNET; PARETO PRINCIPLE; STRATEGIC PLANNING; THEOREM PROVING;

ELECTRONIC COMMERCE;

EID: 34247282053     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/1160633.1160846     Document Type: Conference Paper

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