Managerial compensation and the cost of moral hazard

International Economic Review

Volumn 41, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 669-719

  Margiotta, Mary M ^a   Miller, Robert A ^b  

^a AT Kearney Inc   (United States)

^b CARNEGIE MELLON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0346836855     PISSN: 00206598     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/1468-2354.00080     Document Type: Article

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