Evolving power and environmental policy: Explaining institutional change with group selection

Ecological Economics

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 2010, Pages 743-752

  Safarzyńska, Karolina ^a   van den Bergh, Jeroen C J M ^b,c  

^a INSTITUTE FOR ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES   (Netherlands)

^b INSTITUCIÓ CATALANA DE RECERCA I ESTUDIS AVANÇATS ICREA   (Spain)

^c INSTITUT DE CIÈNCIA I TECNOLOGIA AMBIENTALS   (Spain)

Author keywords

Coevolution; Environmental policy; Evolution; Group selection; Institutions; Socio economic power

Indexed keywords

COEVOLUTION; ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY; EVOLUTIONARY THEORY; GROUP SELECTION; TAXONOMY;

EID: 74549199405     PISSN: 09218009     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/j.ecolecon.2009.04.003     Document Type: Article

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