The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: An indirect evolutionary approach

Journal of Institutional Economics

Volumn 1, Issue 2, 2005, Pages 155-174

  GÜTH, Werner ^a   Ockenfels, Axel ^a,b  

^a MAX PLANCK INSTITUTE FOR THE SCIENCE OF HUMAN HISTORY   (Germany)

^b UNIVERSITY OF COLOGNE   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84858573018     PISSN: 17441374     EISSN: 17441382     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1017/S1744137405000159     Document Type: Article

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