East Asia responds to the rise of China: Patterns and variations

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 82, Issue 4, 2009, Pages 657-675

  Chung, Jae Ho ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS; REGIONAL SECURITY; STATE BUILDING; TERRITORIAL DISPUTE;

CHINA;

AVES;

EID: 73849099972     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.5509/2009824657     Document Type: Article

References (149)

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25. David C. Kang, China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia (New York: Columbia Univeristy Press, 2007), ch. 1.
26. The exclusion of Brunei and East Timor is believed to pose few, if any, problems concerning producing a useful generalization about East Asia's responses to the rise of China.
27. India is not included since it is a South Asian nation. Nor is New Zealand added to the list not only because it does not view itself as an Asian player but also because Wellington has been less of an active "defense state," ceasing to function as a member of the ANZUS.
28. For definitional variations on these, see Evan Resnick, "Defining Engagement," Journal of International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 2 (spring 2001), pp. 556-559.
29. Even such secluded states as Laos and Cambodia are actively engaging China. See Bertil Lintner, "Checkbook Diplomacy Raises China's Standing with Laos and Cambodia," YaleGlobal, April 25, 2008, available online at , last accessed on 11 November 2008.
30. James L. Richardson, "Asia-Pacific: The Case for Geopolitical Optimism," National Interest, no. 38 (winter 1994/95), pp. 28-39
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32. For the concept of containment, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 156-157
33. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), ch. 2. For the concept of preventive war
34. Jack S. Levy, "Declining Power and the Preventive Motivation for War," World Politics, vol. 40, no. 1 (October 1987), pp. 82-107.
35. Even in Europe, most secondary states chose to accommodate the rise of great powers instead of balancing them. See Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," International Security, vol. 19, no. 1 (summer 1994), pp. 108-148.
36. Balancing here does not refer to other-excluding behaviour since, as noted earlier, almost all East Asian nations simultaneously prefer to sustain non-zero-sum engagement with China.
37. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, vol. 19, no. 1 (summer 1994), pp. 75-80, 93-94.
38. Daniel M. Jones, "Balancing and Bandwagoning in Militarized Interstate Disputes," in Frank W. Wayman and Paul F. Diehl, eds., Reconstructing Realpolitik (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1994), p. 231.
39. For two contrasting views of hedging in East Asia, see Evan Medeiros, "Strategic Hedging and the Future of Asia-Pacific Stability," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1 (winter 2005/06), pp. 145-168
40. Evelyn Goh, "Understanding 'Hedging' in Asia-Pacific Security," PacNet Newsletter, no. 43 (31 August 2006) available online at , last accessed on 2 March 2007.
41. For the concept of congagement as a modified mode of engagement or the "third way," see Zalmay M. Khalizad et al., The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), pp. 72-73.
42. While some argue that East Asian nations lack the fear of China, it may in fact not be the absence of fear per se but the absence of an explicit display of fear that more aptly depicts the reality. For a view that stresses the lack of fear, see Kang, China Rising, pp. 67-71.
43. It should be stressed that this spectrum is not about the other-excluding dichotomy of balancing or bandwagoning but about the relative proportion of the two orientations in each nation's stance toward China.
44. S.D. Muni, China's Strategic Engagement with the New ASEAN, IDSS Monograph no. 2 (Singapore: Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, 2002), pp. 28-30
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47. David Lague, "A Crucial Myanmmar Ally, China Hopes for Return to Stability," New York Times, 26 September 2007.
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49. Cambodia seems to have a little more room for leverage than Laos in dealing with China. See Sisowath Doung Chanto, "Cambodia," in Evelyn Goh, ed., Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. and China, IDSS Monograph no. 7 (Singapore: IDSS, 2005), pp. 35-39.
50. Steven M. Goldstein, "Terms of Engagement: Taiwan's Mainland Policy," in Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 79
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52. Michael O'Hanlon and Richard C. Bush, A War Like No Others: The Truth about China's Challenge to America (New York: Wiley, 2007).
53. For Taiwan's concern with China's missile attack as reflected in its National Security Council's report, see Taipei Times, 4 April 2008
54. Stuart Riggs and Stephen Engle, "China Must Remove Missile Threat to Extend Taiwan Thaw, Ma (Ying-jeou) Says," Bloomberg, 31 July 2009.
55. Michael J. Green, "Managing Chinese Power: The View from Japan," in Johnston and Ross, eds., Engaging China, p. 171
56. Wenran Jiang, "The Japanese Assessment of the 'China Threat,'" in Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, eds., China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002), pp. 159-161
57. Mike M. Mochizuki, "China-Japan Relations: Downward Spiral or a New Equilibrium?" in Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift, pp. 135-137, 148-149.
58. For the concept of strategic rivalry, see Michael P. Colaresi, Karen Rasler and William R. Thompson, Strategic Rivalries in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 1.
59. See Renmin ribao [People's Daily] available online at , last accessed on 29 December 2006
60. Dong-A Ilbo (Seoul), 1 January 2007
61. Hisahiko Okazaki, "Entente to Balance China," Japan Times, 30 April 2007
62. P. Jayaram, "India and Japan Ink Security Pact: Agreement Likely to Upset China," Strait Times, 23 October 2008.
63. See Haruko Satoh, "Japan: Reengaging with China Meaningfully," in Shiping Tang, Mingjiang Li and Amitav Acharya, eds., Living with China: Regional States and China through Crises and Turning Points (London: Palgrave, 2009), pp. 124-126.
64. Greg Barns, "That Positive Feeling," South China Morning Post, 1 April 2005.
65. For China's long- term economic attraction for Australia, see Rowan Callick, "Australia's Chinese Future," Quadrant Magazine, January 2006.
66. See Mike Stekete, "Kowtowing to China," The Australian, 12 March 2005
67. "Tiptoeing around China" (editorial), The Australian, 11 June 2005
68. "Enter the Dragon: Australia's Embrace of China," The Age, 12 March 2005.
69. John Kerin, "Beijing's ANZUS Warning," The Australian, 8 March 2005
70. Shushil Seth, "Australia is China's New Spokesman," Taipei Times, 6 October 2005.
71. Greg Austin, "Reactions in Australia and New Zealand to a Rising China," in Kokubun Ryosei and Wang Jisi, eds., The Rise of China and a Changing Northeast Asian Order (Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange, 2004), pp. 266-269
72. Mohan Malik, "The China Factor in Australia-US Relations," China Brief, vol. 5, no. 8 (12 April 2005), pp. 1-4
73. Virginia Marsh, "Australia Warns on China's Army Ambition," Financial Times, 5 July 2007
74. Ralph A. Cossa, "US-Australia: Still Mates," PacNet Newsletter, no. 49A (17 December 2007) at , last accessed on 18 December 2007.
75. Morris Rossabi, "Beijing's Growing Politico-Economic Leverage over Ulaanbaatar" and Migeddorj Batchimeg, "Future Challenges for the PRC and Mongolia: A Mongolian Perspective," China Brief, vol. 5, no. 10 (5 May 2005).
76. Xu Minzhong, "Taijun qingju Menggu jianting Jiupeng jidi shemei daodan" [Taiwan Authorities Assist America in Establishing Intelligence Unites in Mongolia], Yazhou zhoukan [Asia Weekly], 2006, available online at , last accessed on 2 September 2006.
77. Tim Huxley, Insecurity in the ASEAN Region (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993), pp. 35-36
78. Anthony Smith, "Thailand's Security and the Sino-Thai Relationship," China Brief, vol. 5, no. 3 (1 February 2005), pp. 1-3
79. Bruce Vaughn and Wayne Morrison, China-Southeast Asian Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications for the United States (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2006), p. 25.
80. Evelyn Goh, Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies (Washington, DC: The East-West Center, 2005), p. 5
81. the Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China, China's National Defense in 2008 (Beijing, January 2009), ch. 13.
82. Yuen Foong Khong, "Singapore: A Time for Economic and Political Engagement," in Johnston and Ross, eds., Engaging China, pp. 124-125
83. Ian Storey, "Singapore and the Rise of China: Perceptions and Policy," in Yee and Storey, eds., The China Threat, pp. 217, 220
84. Eric Teo Chu Cheow, "Sino-Singaporean Relations Back on Track," China Brief, vol. 5, no. 16 (19 July 2005), pp. 1-2
85. Teo Kah Beng, "Singapore," in Goh, ed., Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. and China, pp. 40, 42, 48.
86. Victor A. Cha, "Engaging China: The Views from Korea," in Johnston and Ross, eds., Engaging China, pp. 40-42
87. Taeho Kim, "South Korea and a Rising China: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects," in Yee and Storey, eds., China Threat, pp. 175-176
88. Jae Ho Chung, "South Korea between Eagle and Dragon: Perceptual Ambivalence and Strategic Dilemma," Asian Survey, vol. 41, no. 5 (September/ October 2001), pp. 777-796.
89. Norman D. Levine, Do the Ties Still Bind? The U.S.-ROK Security Relationship after 9/11 (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004)
90. Jae Ho Chung, Between Ally and Partner: Korea-China Relations and the United States (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), chs. 8-9.
91. Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, "Perceptions of a China Threat: A Philippine Perspective," in Yee and Storey, eds., China Threat, pp. 253-258
92. Leszek Buszynski, "Realism, Institutionalism, and Philippine Security," Asian Survey, vol. 42, no. 2 (March-April 2002), pp. 483-500
93. Kang, China Rising, pp. 138-140
94. Aileen San Pablo-Baviera, "Waltzing with Goliath: Philippines-China Engagement in Uncharted Waters," in Tang, Li and Acharya, eds., Living with China, pp. 173-192.
95. Useful in this endeavour were Wang Gungwu, "China and Southeast Asia: The Context of a New Beginning," in Shambaugh, ed., Power Shift, pp. 190-199
96. Goh, Meeting the China Challenge;
97. Denny Roy, "Southeast Asia and China: Balancing or Bandwagoning?" Contemporary Southeast Asia, vol. 27, no. 2 (2005), pp. 312-319.
98. Amitav Acharya, "Containment, Engagement, or Counter-Dominance? Malaysia's Response to the Rise of China," in Johnston and Ross, eds., Engaging China, p. 145
99. Abdul Razak Baginda, "Malaysia's Perceptions of China: From Hostility to Cordiality," in Yee and Storey, eds., China Threat, pp. 236, 244;
100. Joseph Chin Yong Liow, "Malaysia-China Relations in the 1990s," Asian Survey, vol. 40, no. 4 (July-August 2000), pp. 678-681
101. Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia," in Goh, ed., Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. and China, pp. 55-59.
102. Michael Leifer, "Indonesia's Encounters with China and the Dilemmas of Engagement," in Johnston and Ross, eds., Engaging China, pp. 99, 101;
103. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 477-512
104. Rizal Sukma, "Indonesia's Perceptions of China: The Domestic Bases of Persistent Ambiguity," in Yee and Storey, eds., China Threat, pp. 181, 199;
105. Irman G. Lanti, "Indonesia," in Goh, ed., Southeast Asian Strategic Relations with the U.S. and China, pp. 29-33
106. Kang, China Rising, p. 149.
107. See Caryle A. Thayer, "Vietnamese Perspectives of the 'China Threat,'" in Yee and Storey, eds., The China Threat, pp. 265-266, 272, 277, 282;
108. Ang Cheng Guan, "Vietnam-China Relations Since the End of the Cold War," Asian Survey, vol. 38, no. 12 (December 1998), p. 1122;
109. Richard Sokolsky, Angel Rabasa and C. Richard Neu, The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy toward China (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 40-42;
110. Alexander L. Vuving, "Strategy and Evolution of Vietnam's China Policy: A Changing Mixture of Pathways," Asian Survey, vol. 46, no. 6 (November-December 2006), pp. 808, 814, 822;
111. Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), chs. 8-10.
112. This was based on the author's multiple visits to Japan, Singapore, Taiwan and Vietnam in 2006 and 2007, where interviews and consultations were conducted with experts from Thammasat and Chulalongkorn Universities (Thailand), the University of the Philippines (Philippines), Center for Strategic and International Studies (Indonesia), Institute of Chinese Studies and Institute for International Studies (Vietnam), Institute for Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia), and Singapore Institute for International Studies and the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (Singapore).
113. See Andres C. Winner, "The Proliferation Security Initiative: The New Face of Interdiction," The Washington Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 2 (spring 2005), p. 135.
114. For the list of PSI participants, see Michael Richardson, The Proliferation Security Initiative: An Assessment of Its Strengths and Weaknesses, with Some Proposals for Shaping Its Future (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), p. 7.
115. See "Countries Visited by His Holiness the Dalai Lama," available online at , last accessed on 6 January 2007;
116. "China Slams Dalai Lama's Visit," available online at the CNN website, , last accessed on 1 September 2007.
117. The sources are Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu zhengce yanjiusi, ed., Zhongguo waijiao 2007 [China's Foreign Affairs 2007] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2007), pp. 80, 100, 130, 140, 152, 164, 175, 179, 195, 199, 213, 229, 255;
118. Zhonghua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu zhengce yanjiusi, ed., Zhongguo waijiao 2008 [China's Foreign Affairs 2008] (Beijing: Shijie zhishi chubanshe, 2008), pp. 62, 67, 82, 105, 112, 121, 129, 136, 140, 152, 155, 165, 178, 197.
119. See Zhang Jianhua, ed., Jiejue zhongguo zaidu mianlian de jinyao wenti [On Resolving the Urgent Problems that China Is Facing Again] (Beijing: Jingji ribao chubanshe, 2000), pp. 517-525.
120. Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines share the same designation of "strategic cooperative relationship," while Indonesia's is "strategic partnership" and South Korea's "strategic cooperative partnership."
121. David Kang's assessment of seven nations provides a similar alignment. See China Rising, p. 55.
122. It is interesting to note that all the countries (except for Taiwan) that belong to the latter two categories dispatched military forces to Iraq to join the US-led "Coalition of the Willing."
123. For this logic, see Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980), pp. 26-29. The data used here is an average for 2004 and 2005 found in Zhongguo tongji nianjian [China Statistical Yearbook], 2004 and 2005 issues; and data compiled by the Korea International Traders Association, available online at .
124. The observation that the size of the overseas Chinese population corresponds with their share of economic assets is well supported by the cases of Thailand (asset share of 81 percent), Indonesia (73 percent), Singapore (81 percent), Malaysia (61 percent), and the Philippines (50 percent). Data sources on the size of overseas Chinese in each nation are The Nomura Research Institute, Huajin geizaigen no jidai [The Era of the Chinese Economic Sphere] (Tokyo: NRI, April 1993); and Overseas Compatriot Affairs Commission, available online at , last accessed on 6 September 2006.
125. The 15 nations are grouped into three categories of "free" (Japan, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, Mongolia, the Philippines, Malaysia and Thailand), "partly free" (Singapore and Indonesia) and "not free" (North Korea, Myanmar, Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) nations in accordance with the list developed by the Freedom House. Available online at , last accessed on 3 September 2007.
126. The data on the ongoing territorial disputes with China came from Chien-peng Chung, Domestic Politics, International Bargaining and China's Territorial Disputes (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 36, 127-128, 133, 138, 142-143, 150, 153, 167-169, 172;
127. Taylor Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation: Cooperation and Conflict in China's Territorial Disputes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008).
128. Composite indices were derived for each nation by multiplying the salience score developed by Hensel and Mitchell with the use of force (yes = 2, no = 1). For these figures, see Fravel, Strong Borders Secure Nation, pp. 46-47, 64-65.
129. The US provides military protection for Taiwan via the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA); Mongolia offers an intelligence reconnaissance base for the US under the codename "Rear Gate"; and the Philippines carries out joint military exercises-called Balikatan-with the US.
130. The dependent variable is the ranking grouped into the four categories of bandwagoners (Myanmar, North Korea, Cambodia and Laos), hesitant hedgers (Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam), active hedgers (Thailand, Singapore, South Korea and the Philippines), and balancers (Mongolia, Australia, Japan and Taiwan).
131. The main purpose here is not to construct a model using limited samples but to find one that best fits the actual whole population.
132. The unit of change for these variables is, respectively, percent (trade); 10,000 people (overseas Chinese); 0/1/2 (regime for non-democratic, semi-democratic and democratic); salience-force scores (territorial dispute); and 0/1/2 (US alliance for non-ally, semi-ally and formal ally), determined jointly by the four factors of formal security treaties, the number of US troops stationed, troops sent to Iraq, and joint military exercises with the US.
133. If the probability of a nation belonging to one of the four categories (e.g., bandwagoners, hesitant and active hedgers, or balancers) is the highest and, at the same time, points to the same category that it was originally assigned to, it is indicative of the model's predictive power.
134. For Korea's Sinicization, see John King Fairbank, ed., The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968). For the Mongolian game, see
135. O. Edmund Clubb, China and Russia: The Great Game (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), chs. 3, 6, 12.
136. See Jae Ho Chung, "Dragon in the Eyes of South Korea: Analyzing Evolving Perceptions of China," in Jonathan Pollack, ed., Korea: East Asia's Pivot (Newport: Naval War College Press, 2005), pp. 253-266.
137. In contrast, China is viewed more warily in Vietnam. See Sokolsky, Rabasa and Neu, The Role of Southeast Asia in U.S. Strategy toward China, pp. 40-41;
138. Womack, China and Vietnam, p. 9.
139. Interviews with Mongolian researchers in Beijing and Taipei in 2006; Rossabi, "Beijing's Growing Politico-Economic Leverage over Ulaanbaatar," pp. 1-2;
140. Migeddorj Batchimeg, "Mongolia-China Relations and Its Implications for Mongolia-U.S. Relations," in A Comprehensive U.S.-Mongolia Partnership: Challenges and Opportunities (Ulaanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2005), pp. 53-54.
141. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, Diplomatic Bluebook 2006 (Ulaanbaatar: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2006), p. 156.
142. For Mongolia's proactive approach to the US, see Munkh-Ochir D. Khirghis, "U.S.-Mongolian Comprehensive Partnership: Opportunities and Challenges," in A Comprehensive U.S.-Mongolia Partnership, pp. 34, 40-41.
143. The recent election of Ma Ying-Jeou in Taiwan, of Kevin Rudd in Australia, and of Myung-bak Lee in South Korea, for instance, may introduce some new elements that may adjust these nations' responses to the rise of China. Interposing events such as history controversies and territorial disputes may also produce key changes. See Jae Ho Chung, "China's 'Soft Clash' with South Korea: The History War and Beyond," Asian Survey, vol. 48, no. 3 (June 2009), pp. 468-483.
144. Tsedendamba Batbayar, Mongolia's Foreign Policy in the 1990s: New Identity and New Challenges (Ulanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2002);
145. Munkh-Ochir D. Khirghis, A Constructivist View on Identity and Interest in Foreign Policy: Implications for Mongolia (Ulanbaatar: Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003), ch. 3.
146. See Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: Knopf, 2003);
147. Husain Haqqani, "The American Mongols," Foreign Policy, no. 136 (May-June 2003), pp. 70-71. A notable exception in this regard might be Japan.
148. See, for instance, Benjamin L. Self, "An Alliance for Engagement: Rationale and Modality," in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thompson, eds., An Alliance for Engagement: Building Cooperation in Security Relations with China (Washington, DC: The Henry Stimson Center, 2002), pp. 145-165.
149. For a view that points to the likelihood of such unintended outcomes, see William R. Thompson, "Dehio, Long Cycles, and the Geohistorical Context of Structural Transition," World Politics, vol. 45, no. 1 (October 1992), pp. 131-132.