China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia

International Security

Volumn 23, Issue 4, 1999, Pages 49-80

  Christensen, Thomas J ^a  

^a NONE

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0033470260     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.23.4.49     Document Type: Article

References (134)

1. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," International Organzation, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-492.
2. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," International Organzation, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-492.
3. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," International Organzation, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-492.
4. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33; Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 34-77; Stephen Van Evera, "Primed for Peace: Europe after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 15, No. 3 (Winter 1990/91), pp. 7-57; and James Goldgeier and Michael McFaul, "A Tale of Two Worlds," International Organzation, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-492.
5. For the original security dilemma and spiral models, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-174; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
6. For the original security dilemma and spiral models, see Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-174; and Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976), chap. 3.
7. For writings on the destabilizing influence of offensive weapons and doctrines, see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984) pp. 58-107; Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense- Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691.
8. For writings on the destabilizing influence of offensive weapons and doctrines, see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984) pp. 58-107; Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense- Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691.
9. For writings on the destabilizing influence of offensive weapons and doctrines, see Stephen Van Evera, "The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War," International Security, Vol. 9, No. 1 (Summer 1984) pp. 58-107; Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43; and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Offense-Defense Theory and Its Critics," Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4 (Summer 1995), pp. 660-691.
10. My understanding of the Chinese perspectives reflects more than seventy interviews, often with multiple interlocutors, that I conducted during four month-long trips to Beijing in 1993, 1994, 1995, and 1996, and two shorter trips to Beijing and Shanghai in 1998. My interlocutors were a mix of military and civilian analysts in government think tanks as well as academics at leading Chinese institutions. The government think-tank analysts are not decisionmakers, but they advise their superiors in the following key governmental organizations: the People's Liberation Army (PLA), the Foreign Ministry, the State Council, and the Chinese intelligence agencies. For obvious reasons, the individual identities of particular interviewees cannot be revealed.
11. In fact, even optimistic projections for the region are predicated on a long-term U.S. military presence. See, for example, Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: East Asia in the Twenty-first Century," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 81-118.
12. One might argue that the geographical proximity of Japan alone would make a new regional power a greater threat to China than the more distant United States. In any case, the decision over what poses a larger threat - a distant superpower or a local great power - cannot be reached by analyzing the international balance of power alone. As in the Chinese case, the assessment of which country poses the greater threat will be based on historical legacies and national perceptions. I am grateful to Stephen Walt for helpful comments on this point.
13. For the classic study, see Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989).
14. It is possible that the concerns expressed by Chinese analysts discussed below about Japan and the United States are purely cynical tactics designed to prevent the rise of a new regional power by affecting the debate in the United States and Japan. Such a "spin" strategy could also help justify at home and to regional actors more aggressive Chinese weapons development and diplomacy. Although I believe this probably was the intention of some of my interlocutors, given the large number of interlocutors, the diversity of opinions expressed on various issues over the five years of my discussions, and the controversial positions I sometimes heard expressed on issues such as the Tiananmen massacre or the Chinese missile exercises near Taiwan, I find it difficult to believe that Beijing, or any other government, could manufacture such complex theater over such an extended period of time.
15. Also in that year Japanese rightists built structures on the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands, which are contested by both Japan and China. Many Chinese analysts saw Tokyo's complicity in their activities, especially after the dispatch of Japanese Coast Guard vessels to prevent protestors from Hong Kong and Taiwan from landing on the Japanese-controlled islands.
16. See Yinan He, "The Effect of Historical Memory on China's Strategic Perception of Japan," Paper prepared for the Ninety-forth Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association," Boston, Massachusetts, September 3-6, 1998. For example, my interlocutors generally did not believe that a militarily stronger Japan would try to occupy sections of the Asian mainland as it did in the 1930s and 1940s.
17. The problem of Japan's lack of contrition was raised in nearly every interview I conducted. See Zhang Dalin, "Qianshi Bu Wang, Houshi Zhi Shi" [Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International studies], No. 3 (1995), pp. 6-11. For a critical Japanese perspective on the textbook issue, see Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 113-133. The Chinese view on the generational issue in Japan is similar to the Japanese pacifist view. See Kunihiro Masao, "The Decline and Fall of Pacifism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 35-39.
18. The problem of Japan's lack of contrition was raised in nearly every interview I conducted. See Zhang Dalin, "Qianshi Bu Wang, Houshi Zhi Shi" [Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International studies], No. 3 (1995), pp. 6-11. For a critical Japanese perspective on the textbook issue, see Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 113-133. The Chinese view on the generational issue in Japan is similar to the Japanese pacifist view. See Kunihiro Masao, "The Decline and Fall of Pacifism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 35-39.
19. The problem of Japan's lack of contrition was raised in nearly every interview I conducted. See Zhang Dalin, "Qianshi Bu Wang, Houshi Zhi Shi" [Past experience, if not forgotten, is a guide for the future], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International studies], No. 3 (1995), pp. 6-11. For a critical Japanese perspective on the textbook issue, see Saburo Ienaga, "The Glorification of War in Japanese Education," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 113-133. The Chinese view on the generational issue in Japan is similar to the Japanese pacifist view. See Kunihiro Masao, "The Decline and Fall of Pacifism," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 53, No. 1 (January/February 1997), pp. 35-39.
20. For published Chinese comparisons of postwar Germany and Japan, see Su Huimin, "Yi Shi Wei Jian, Mian Dao Fuzhe: Deguo dui Erci Dazhan de Fansi" [Take lessons from history and avoid the recurrence of mistakes: Germany's introspection about World War II], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International studies], No. 3 (1995), pp. 12-16; and Sun Lixiang, "Zhanhou Ri De Liang Guo You Yi Shili zhi Bijiao" [A comparison of the postwar right-wing forces in the two nations of Japan and Germany], Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu [Research on foreign problems], No. 2 (1988), pp. 1-10.
21. For published Chinese comparisons of postwar Germany and Japan, see Su Huimin, "Yi Shi Wei Jian, Mian Dao Fuzhe: Deguo dui Erci Dazhan de Fansi" [Take lessons from history and avoid the recurrence of mistakes: Germany's introspection about World War II], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International studies], No. 3 (1995), pp. 12-16; and Sun Lixiang, "Zhanhou Ri De Liang Guo You Yi Shili zhi Bijiao" [A comparison of the postwar right-wing forces in the two nations of Japan and Germany], Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu [Research on foreign problems], No. 2 (1988), pp. 1-10.
22. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Burying the Past: War Guilt Haunts Japan," New York Times, November 30, 1998, pp. A1, A10.
23. In 1993 government scholars pointed out that, in many ways, China's youth is more actively anti-Japanese than the government. They pointed to student protests against Japanese "economic imperialism" in 1986 as an example.
24. Interviews, 1996. See also Hafumi Arai, "Angry at China? Slam Japan," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 3, 1996, p. 21. It is clear that compared to students and other members of the public, the Chinese government was a voice of calm during the 1996 Diaoyu/Senkaku affair.
25. Interviews, 1996. See also Hafumi Arai, "Angry at China? Slam Japan," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 3, 1996, p. 21. It is clear that compared to students and other members of the public, the Chinese government was a voice of calm during the 1996 Diaoyu/Senkaku affair.
26. Pan Sifeng, ed., Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu [Research on Japanese military thought] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, October 1992), pp. 388-392 (internally circulated).
27. Multiple interviews, 1993-98.
28. In 1992 an internally circulated analysis of Japan's military affairs points out that Japan could easily spend 4 percent of GNP on its military without doing fundamental harm to its long-term economic growth. The examples of much higher levels of spending in healthy economies in the United States and Europe during the Cold War are cited as evidence. Ibid., p. 499. Similar positions were taken by active and retired military officers in 1996 and 1998.
29. This was a particularly sensitive issue in 1993 and 1994, and remains so today.
30. Multiple interviews, 1996. For written materials, see Gao Heng, "Shijie Junshi Xingshi" [The world military scene], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 14-18. For a similar Western view on Japanese "technonationalism," see Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
31. Multiple interviews, 1996. For written materials, see Gao Heng, "Shijie Junshi Xingshi" [The world military scene], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 2 (February 1995), pp. 14-18. For a similar Western view on Japanese "technonationalism," see Richard J. Samuels, Rich Nation, Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
32. Interview, 1996.
33. This was a consistent theme in interviews from 1993 to 1998, and was repeated in 1998 during the financial crisis.
34. For the realist view, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security. Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51. For the argument that Japan will likely not remilitarize, see Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
35. For the realist view, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security. Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51. For the argument that Japan will likely not remilitarize, see Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
36. For the realist view, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security. Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51. For the argument that Japan will likely not remilitarize, see Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-Militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; and Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996).
37. The simplest versions of the optimistic and most pessimistic forecasts about Japan's future were offered most frequently during my first three research trips from 1993 to 1995. After the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1995-96, one hears less often the most optimistic liberal argument that economic interests will trump security interests in the post-Cold War world. Following the 1995 Nye report, one hears the simplest versions of the pessimists' scenarios less often because they were often predicated on fragility in the post-Cold War U.S.-Japan alliance.
38. Interviews, 1993-98. See also Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, p. 501. This book states in typical fashion, "Of all the factors that could compel Japan's military policy to change, U.S.-Japan relations will be the deciding factor." See also Wang Yanyu, ed., Riben Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu [Research on Japanese military strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1992), pp. 308-310 (internally circulated); and Liu Shilong, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian" [Three special characteristics of the current U.S.-Japan security structure], Riben Yanjiu [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 18-30, at p. 27. One article bases its optimism largely on the author's belief that, despite economic frictions, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stable. See He Fang, "Lengzhan Hou de Riben Duiwai Zhanlüe" [Japan's post-cold war international strategy], Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu [Research on foreign problems], No. 2 (1993), pp. 1-4.
39. Interviews, 1993-98. See also Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, p. 501. This book states in typical fashion, "Of all the factors that could compel Japan's military policy to change, U.S.-Japan relations will be the deciding factor." See also Wang Yanyu, ed., Riben Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu [Research on Japanese military strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1992), pp. 308-310 (internally circulated); and Liu Shilong, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian" [Three special characteristics of the current U.S.-Japan security structure], Riben Yanjiu [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 18-30, at p. 27. One article bases its optimism largely on the author's belief that, despite economic frictions, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stable. See He Fang, "Lengzhan Hou de Riben Duiwai Zhanlüe" [Japan's post-cold war international strategy], Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu [Research on foreign problems], No. 2 (1993), pp. 1-4.
40. Interviews, 1993-98. See also Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, p. 501. This book states in typical fashion, "Of all the factors that could compel Japan's military policy to change, U.S.-Japan relations will be the deciding factor." See also Wang Yanyu, ed., Riben Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu [Research on Japanese military strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1992), pp. 308-310 (internally circulated); and Liu Shilong, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian" [Three special characteristics of the current U.S.-Japan security structure], Riben Yanjiu [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 18-30, at p. 27. One article bases its optimism largely on the author's belief that, despite economic frictions, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stable. See He Fang, "Lengzhan Hou de Riben Duiwai Zhanlüe" [Japan's post-cold war international strategy], Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu [Research on foreign problems], No. 2 (1993), pp. 1-4.
41. Interviews, 1993-98. See also Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, p. 501. This book states in typical fashion, "Of all the factors that could compel Japan's military policy to change, U.S.-Japan relations will be the deciding factor." See also Wang Yanyu, ed., Riben Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu [Research on Japanese military strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1992), pp. 308-310 (internally circulated); and Liu Shilong, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian" [Three special characteristics of the current U.S.-Japan security structure], Riben Yanjiu [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 18-30, at p. 27. One article bases its optimism largely on the author's belief that, despite economic frictions, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stable. See He Fang, "Lengzhan Hou de Riben Duiwai Zhanlüe" [Japan's post-cold war international strategy], Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu [Research on foreign problems], No. 2 (1993), pp. 1-4.
42. Interviews, 1993-98. See also Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, p. 501. This book states in typical fashion, "Of all the factors that could compel Japan's military policy to change, U.S.-Japan relations will be the deciding factor." See also Wang Yanyu, ed., Riben Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu [Research on Japanese military strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1992), pp. 308-310 (internally circulated); and Liu Shilong, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian" [Three special characteristics of the current U.S.-Japan security structure], Riben Yanjiu [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 18-30, at p. 27. One article bases its optimism largely on the author's belief that, despite economic frictions, the U.S.-Japan alliance is stable. See He Fang, "Lengzhan Hou de Riben Duiwai Zhanlüe" [Japan's post-cold war international strategy], Waiguo Wenti Yanjiu [Research on foreign problems], No. 2 (1993), pp. 1-4.
43. For an early discussion of the two very different potential paths to Japanese buildups, see Cai Zuming, ed., Meiguo Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu [Studies of American military strategy] (Beijing: Academy of Military Sciences Press, 1993), pp. 218-233 (internally circulated).
44. For the logic of reassurance in official U.S. defense policy, see the Pentagon's United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region 1998, which states: "In addition to its deterrent function, U.S. military presence in Asia serves to shape the security environment to prevent challenges from developing at all. U.S. force presence mitigates the impact of historical regional tensions and allows the United States to anticipate problems, manage potential threats, and encourage peaceful resolution of disputes."
45. This common view often ignores the clear benefits to the United States of the Cold War version of the alliance. The United States was guaranteed basing in Japan, and 70-80 percent of those basing costs were covered by the Japanese. Without this basing, the United States would have great difficulty maintaining its presence in the region. For a cost analysis, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Restructuring U.S. Forces and Bases in Japan," in Mike M. Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1997), pp. 149-178.
46. See Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171-203, at p. 179.
47. The Nye report, named for former Assistant Secretary of Defense Joseph S. Nye, Jr., is United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense, February 1995. For an insider's look at concerns about how acrimonious economic disputes were harming the alliance, see David L. Asher, "A U.S.-Japan Alliance for the Next Century," Orbis, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 343-375, at pp. 346-348.
48. For discussion of these issues, see Mike M. Mochizuki, "A New Bargain for a New Alliance" and "American and Japanese Strategic Debates," in Mochizuki, Toward a True Alliance, pp. 5-40, 43-82, especially pp. 35, 69-70.
49. For discussion of these issues, see Mike M. Mochizuki, "A New Bargain for a New Alliance" and "American and Japanese Strategic Debates," in Mochizuki, Toward a True Alliance, pp. 5-40, 43-82, especially pp. 35, 69-70.
50. For the importance of the 1994 Korean crisis in officials' calculations, see Kurt M. Campbell, "The Official U.S. View," in Michael J. Green and Mike M. Mochizuki, The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance in the Twenty-first Century (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Study Group Papers, 1998), pp. 85-87.
51. For discussion of these issues, see Bruce Stokes and James Shinn, The Tests of War and the Strains of Peace: The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Study Group Report, January 1998). For the fear among U.S. officials that the Japanese public was moving away from support for the alliance in the 1990s, see Campbell, "The Official U.S. View."
52. For discussion of these issues, see Bruce Stokes and James Shinn, The Tests of War and the Strains of Peace: The U.S.-Japan Security Relationship (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Study Group Report, January 1998). For the fear among U.S. officials that the Japanese public was moving away from support for the alliance in the 1990s, see Campbell, "The Official U.S. View."
53. In particular, three military officers whom I interviewed in 1994 stressed these themes. For fears about Democrats and neo-isolationism, see Cai, Meiguo Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu, p. 223; and Liu Liping, "Jilie Zhendanzhong de Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce Sichao" [The storm over contending positions on U.S. foreign policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 6 (1992), pp. 15-18.
54. In particular, three military officers whom I interviewed in 1994 stressed these themes. For fears about Democrats and neo-isolationism, see Cai, Meiguo Junshi Zhanlüe Yanjiu, p. 223; and Liu Liping, "Jilie Zhendanzhong de Meiguo Duiwai Zhengce Sichao" [The storm over contending positions on U.S. foreign policy], Xiandai Guoji Guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 6 (1992), pp. 15-18.
55. For a similar argument made before Bill Clinton was elected president of the United States, see Li Shusheng, "Sulian de Jieti yu MeiRi zai Yatai Diqu de Zhengduo" [The disintegration of the Soviet Union and U.S.-Japan rivalry in the Asia Pacific], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 7 (July 1992), pp. 56-58. For an article about the emphasis on trade and the lack of strategic focus in Washington, see Lu Zhongwei, "Yazhou Anquanzhong de ZhongRi Guanxi" [Sino-Japanese relations in the Asian security environment], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 3 (March 1993), pp. 23-35, 42.
56. For a similar argument made before Bill Clinton was elected president of the United States, see Li Shusheng, "Sulian de Jieti yu MeiRi zai Yatai Diqu de Zhengduo" [The disintegration of the Soviet Union and U.S.-Japan rivalry in the Asia Pacific], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 7 (July 1992), pp. 56-58. For an article about the emphasis on trade and the lack of strategic focus in Washington, see Lu Zhongwei, "Yazhou Anquanzhong de ZhongRi Guanxi" [Sino-Japanese relations in the Asian security environment], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 3 (March 1993), pp. 23-35, 42.
57. Multiple interviews, 1995. For a published work arguing along these lines, see Yang Yunzhong, "Meiguo Zhengfu Jinyibu Tiaozheng dui Ri Zhengce" [Further adjustments in America's Japan policy], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 7 (July 1995), pp. 61-65.
58. For elaborations of these arguments, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 37-52; and an excellent article by Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 383-402. From various conversations it is still my strong impression that Beijing would be more fearful of a U.S. pullout if it were to occur. But this is no longer viewed as an imaginable outcome for the foreseeable future in Chinese foreign policy circles, so most analysts seem unwilling to discuss at length their views on such a hypothetical scenario.
59. For elaborations of these arguments, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 5 (September/October 1996), pp. 37-52; and an excellent article by Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, "Chinese Apprehensions about Revitalization of the U.S.-Japan Alliance," Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 383-402. From various conversations it is still my strong impression that Beijing would be more fearful of a U.S. pullout if it were to occur. But this is no longer viewed as an imaginable outcome for the foreseeable future in Chinese foreign policy circles, so most analysts seem unwilling to discuss at length their views on such a hypothetical scenario.
60. Interviews, 1996. See also Liu, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian," pp. 20-22; and Yang Bojiang, "Why [a] U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on [the] Security Alliance," Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1996), pp. 1-12.
61. Interviews, 1996. See also Liu, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian," pp. 20-22; and Yang Bojiang, "Why [a] U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on [the] Security Alliance," Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1996), pp. 1-12.
62. Interviews, 1996. See also Liu, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao Tizhi de San Ge Tedian," pp. 20-22; and Yang Bojiang, "Why [a] U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on [the] Security Alliance," Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 6, No. 5 (May 1996), pp. 1-12.
63. Liu Jiangyong, "New Trends in Sino-U.S.-Japan Relations," Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 8, No. 7 (July 1998), pp. 1-13.
64. See "The Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation," in Green and Mochizuki, The U-S.-Japan Security Alliance in the Twenty-first Century, pp. 55-72, at p. 65.
65. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. The Jiang quotation comes from a Reuters news service report on October 18, 1997.
66. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. Taiwan is a former Japanese colony (1895-1945). It is near international sea-lanes that are important to Japan. In addition, Chinese analysts argue that, tor straight-forward reasons relating to relative national power, Japan has a strategic interest in preventing Taiwan's high-technology and capital-rich economy from linking politically with the mainland. Moreover, some Chinese analysts view Taiwan as having geostrategic significance for Japan as a potential ally because of its location near the Chinese mainland. Another issue fueling mistrust of Japan is the feeling that Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, who attended college in Japan and who speaks Japanese fluently, may be more pro-Japan than pro-China. For a particularly alarmist argument along these lines, see Li Yaqiang, "What Is Japan Doing Southward?" Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and merchant ships], No. 6 (June 6, 1997), pp. 7-8, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, September 4, 1997. For a more sober analysis, see Yang Xuejun and Li Hanmei, "Yingxiang Weilai Riben Dui Wai Zhanlüe he Xingwei de Zhongyao Yinsu" [Important factors influencing future Japanese foreign strategy and conduct], Zhanlüe yu Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 1 (1998), pp. 17-22, at p. 21.
67. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. Taiwan is a former Japanese colony (1895-1945). It is near international sea-lanes that are important to Japan. In addition, Chinese analysts argue that, tor straight- forward reasons relating to relative national power, Japan has a strategic interest in preventing Taiwan's high-technology and capital-rich economy from linking politically with the mainland. Moreover, some Chinese analysts view Taiwan as having geostrategic significance for Japan as a potential ally because of its location near the Chinese mainland. Another issue fueling mistrust of Japan is the feeling that Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, who attended college in Japan and who speaks Japanese fluently, may be more pro-Japan than pro-China. For a particularly alarmist argument along these lines, see Li Yaqiang, "What Is Japan Doing Southward?" Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and merchant ships], No. 6 (June 6, 1997), pp. 7-8, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, September 4, 1997. For a more sober analysis, see Yang Xuejun and Li Hanmei, "Yingxiang Weilai Riben Dui Wai Zhanlüe he Xingwei de Zhongyao Yinsu" [Important factors influencing future Japanese foreign strategy and conduct], Zhanlüe yu Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 1 (1998), pp. 17-22, at p. 21.
68. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. Taiwan is a former Japanese colony (1895-1945). It is near international sea-lanes that are important to Japan. In addition, Chinese analysts argue that, tor straight- forward reasons relating to relative national power, Japan has a strategic interest in preventing Taiwan's high-technology and capital-rich economy from linking politically with the mainland. Moreover, some Chinese analysts view Taiwan as having geostrategic significance for Japan as a potential ally because of its location near the Chinese mainland. Another issue fueling mistrust of Japan is the feeling that Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, who attended college in Japan and who speaks Japanese fluently, may be more pro-Japan than pro-China. For a particularly alarmist argument along these lines, see Li Yaqiang, "What Is Japan Doing Southward?" Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and merchant ships], No. 6 (June 6, 1997), pp. 7-8, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, September 4, 1997. For a more sober analysis, see Yang Xuejun and Li Hanmei, "Yingxiang Weilai Riben Dui Wai Zhanlüe he Xingwei de Zhongyao Yinsu" [Important factors influencing future Japanese foreign strategy and conduct], Zhanlüe yu Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 1 (1998), pp. 17-22, at p. 21.
69. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. Taiwan is a former Japanese colony (1895-1945). It is near international sea-lanes that are important to Japan. In addition, Chinese analysts argue that, tor straight- forward reasons relating to relative national power, Japan has a strategic interest in preventing Taiwan's high-technology and capital-rich economy from linking politically with the mainland. Moreover, some Chinese analysts view Taiwan as having geostrategic significance for Japan as a potential ally because of its location near the Chinese mainland. Another issue fueling mistrust of Japan is the feeling that Taiwan's president, Lee Teng-hui, who attended college in Japan and who speaks Japanese fluently, may be more pro-Japan than pro-China. For a particularly alarmist argument along these lines, see Li Yaqiang, "What Is Japan Doing Southward?" Beijing Jianchuan Zhishi [Naval and merchant ships], No. 6 (June 6, 1997), pp. 7-8, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, September 4, 1997. For a more sober analysis, see Yang Xuejun and Li Hanmei, "Yingxiang Weilai Riben Dui Wai Zhanlüe he Xingwei de Zhongyao Yinsu" [Important factors influencing future Japanese foreign strategy and conduct], Zhanlüe yu Guanli [Strategy and management], No. 1 (1998), pp. 17-22, at p. 21.
70. This argument was made particularly forcefully in my interviews with three military officers in 1994. See also Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, pp. 502-503; and Wu Peng, "Riben Wei he Jianchi Xiang Haiwai Paibing" [Why Japan insisted on sending forces abroad], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 12 (December 1992), pp. 46-50.
71. This argument was made particularly forcefully in my interviews with three military officers in 1994. See also Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, pp. 502-503; and Wu Peng, "Riben Wei he Jianchi Xiang Haiwai Paibing" [Why Japan insisted on sending forces abroad], Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi [World economy and politics], No. 12 (December 1992), pp. 46-50.
72. For the earliest discussions of joint U.S.-Japan development of TMD and Tokyo's resistance to the plan, see David E. Sanger, "New Missile Defense in Japan under Discussion with U.S.," New York Times, September 18, 1993, p. A1. A year and a half later, the language on TMD in the 1995 Nye report belies Japan's reluctance to agree to joint research, stating that the United States "is exploring with Japan cooperative efforts" in TMD.
73. For the earliest discussions of joint U.S.-Japan development of TMD and Tokyo's resistance to the plan, see David E. Sanger, "New Missile Defense in Japan under Discussion with U.S.," New York Times, September 18, 1993, p. A1. A year and a half later, the language on TMD in the 1995 Nye report belies Japan's reluctance to agree to joint research, stating that the United States "is exploring with Japan cooperative efforts" in TMD.
74. Interviews, 1998. See also Wu Chunsi, "Tactical Missile Defense, Sino-U.S.-Japanese Relationship, and East Asian Security," Inesap Information Bulletin, No. 16 (November 1998), pp. 20-23.
75. Interviews, 1998. See also Wu Chunsi, "Tactical Missile Defense, Sino-U.S.-Japanese Relationship, and East Asian Security," Inesap Information Bulletin, No. 16 (November 1998), pp. 20-23.
76. Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma."
77. Although scholars differ on specific definitions of what constitutes a destabilizing offense and a stabilizing defense, all definitions in the current literature focus on states' capacity for fighting across borders and seizing enemy-held territory as the measure of offense-defense balance. See, for example, Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War"; and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82.
78. Although scholars differ on specific definitions of what constitutes a destabilizing offense and a stabilizing defense, all definitions in the current literature focus on states' capacity for fighting across borders and seizing enemy-held territory as the measure of offense-defense balance. See, for example, Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War"; and Charles L. Glaser and Chaim Kaufmann, "What Is the Offense-Defense Balance and Can We Measure It?" International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 44-82.
79. For the various reasons why I believe China would risk war, perhaps even with the United States, to prevent Taiwan's independence, see Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik."
80. See "U.S., Japan Agree to Study Missile Defense," Washington Times, September 21, 1998, p. 1; and "Japan Makes Missile-Defense Plan High Priority," Washington Times, November 6, 1998, p. 12.
81. See "U.S., Japan Agree to Study Missile Defense," Washington Times, September 21, 1998, p. 1; and "Japan Makes Missile-Defense Plan High Priority," Washington Times, November 6, 1998, p. 12.
82. Richard Fisher, quoted in Rob Holzer and Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S. Anticipates Approval from Tokyo on Joint TMD," Defense News, September 21-27, 1998, p. 34. See also Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence, and Julian Baum, "Hard Target," Far Eastern Economic Review. September 24, 1998, pp. 20-21. For a discussion of China's more general concerns about TMD, see Benjamin Valentino, "Small Nuclear Powers and Opponents of Ballistic Missile Defenses in the Post-Cold War Era," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 229-232.
83. Richard Fisher, quoted in Rob Holzer and Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S. Anticipates Approval from Tokyo on Joint TMD," Defense News, September 21-27, 1998, p. 34. See also Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence, and Julian Baum, "Hard Target," Far Eastern Economic Review. September 24, 1998, pp. 20-21. For a discussion of China's more general concerns about TMD, see Benjamin Valentino, "Small Nuclear Powers and Opponents of Ballistic Missile Defenses in the Post-Cold War Era," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 229-232.
84. Richard Fisher, quoted in Rob Holzer and Barbara Opall-Rome, "U.S. Anticipates Approval from Tokyo on Joint TMD," Defense News, September 21-27, 1998, p. 34. See also Peter Landers, Susan Lawrence, and Julian Baum, "Hard Target," Far Eastern Economic Review. September 24, 1998, pp. 20-21. For a discussion of China's more general concerns about TMD, see Benjamin Valentino, "Small Nuclear Powers and Opponents of Ballistic Missile Defenses in the Post-Cold War Era," Security Studies, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 229-232.
85. Statements by Chinese arms control and missile experts in the United States in August 1998, and discussions with one active and one retired military officer in China in November 1998.
86. Interviews with civilian analysts, November 1998.
87. Demonstrating that they are much less sensitive than TMD or other aspects of the Nye initiative, minesweepers would usually only be discussed by my interlocutors after I raised the issue.
88. For an interesting discussion of a scenario involving a PLA blockade of Taiwan, see Paul H.B. Godwin, "The Use of Military Force against Taiwan: Potential PRC Scenarios," in Parris H. Chang and Martin L. Lasater, eds., If China Crosses the Taiwan Straits: The International Response (New York: University Press of America, 1993), pp. 15-34. In 1998 a Chinese military officer said that missiles are a much more likely PLA strategy than mine-laying, but the blockade possibility cannot be ruled out entirely.
89. In fact, for our purposes we can assume such a low-level Taiwanese provocation because, under current U.S. policy (President Clinton's "three no's"), a greater provocation would likely preclude a U.S. response. The "three no's," pronounced by President Clinton in Shanghai, are no [U.S.] support for Taiwan independence; no support for two China's, or one China, one Taiwan; and no support for Taiwanese entrance into international organizations for which statehood is a prerequisite.
90. According to one study, about 90 percent of minesweeping operations have been in areas with no discernible mines. See Captain Buzz Broughton and Commander Jay Burton, "The (R)evolution of Mine Countermeasures," Proceedings of the Naval Institute, May 1998, pp. 55-58.
91. The United States' general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of it is based in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A new naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives have been in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See ibid.; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
92. The United States' general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of it is based in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A new naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives have been in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See ibid.; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
93. The United States' general weakness in minesweeping is widely recognized. Although the United States recently has developed new minesweeping and mine-hunting equipment, much of it is based in the United States and would require a significant amount of time to be sent to the theater. A new naval plan, "the fleet engagement strategy," backed by Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, calls for increased "organic" mine-hunting and minesweeping capabilities within battle groups that would involve airborne (helicopters), surface, and submarine-based capabilities. It is unclear how effective these initiatives have been in providing U.S. forces in East Asia with readily available capability in a crisis. See ibid.; "Cohen Expected to Respond This Week to Navy Brief on Mine Warfare," Inside the Navy, August 17, 1998, p. 3; and "Cohen Directs Navy to Add $53 Million to Develop Minehunting System," Inside the Navy, August 31, 1998, p. 1.
94. Although it demonstrates the potential problems of even Japanese defensive cooperation in the U.S.-Japan alliance, fortunately there are a lot of rather large "ifs" in the above blockade scenario. Even if most of these came to pass, one would hope that U.S. leaders would be wise enough to recognize the above dangers and would no put Japan into such a difficult dilemma.
95. For example, an internally circulated analysis of those Japanese buildups does not suggest opportunism or aggressive intent. See Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, chap. 14, and pp. 414-415.
96. Interviews, 1994.
97. For example, Beijing at times has tried to reassure Southeast Asian nations about its desire to settle the Spratly Islands disputes peacefully. Even if these are merely cynical tactics designed to buy time for China to concentrate on the Taiwan problem or develop force projection to handle the Spratlys dispute later, they demonstrate Beijing's ability to conceive of Southeast Asian fears about China.
98. For example, one book takes seriously Japan's fear of the Soviets during the Cold War, but places Japan's concern about China under the heading "Japan's Imagined Enemies," see Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, pp. 413-416. For another example, see Zhan Shiliang, "Yatai Diqu Xingshi he Zhongguo Mulin Youhao Zhengce" [The Asia-Pacific situation and China's good neighbor policy], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International studies], No. 4 (1993), pp. 1-3, 7.
99. For example, one book takes seriously Japan's fear of the Soviets during the Cold War, but places Japan's concern about China under the heading "Japan's Imagined Enemies," see Pan, Riben Junshi Sixiang Yanjiu, pp. 413-416. For another example, see Zhan Shiliang, "Yatai Diqu Xingshi he Zhongguo Mulin Youhao Zhengce" [The Asia-Pacific situation and China's good neighbor policy], Guoji Wenti Yanjiu [International studies], No. 4 (1993), pp. 1-3, 7.
100. See Michael J. Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy: From Commercial Liberalism to Reluctant Realism," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 34-58.
101. The increased frequency of such statements over time may be one effect of China's relatively high rates of economic growth in the 1990s in comparison to Japan.
102. In separate interviews in 1994 a military officer and a civilian analyst lamented that the vast majority of Chinese are incapable of thinking in ways empathetic to Japanese concerns about China. In 1996 a civilian analyst complained that too many Chinese leaders and security analysts are unable to separate their analyses of 1930s' Japan and 1990s' Japan.
103. Multiple interviews, 1993-98. In fact, one military officer was even quite critical of China's last round of military exercises in March 1996 because he was afraid that China revealed too much about its military to a vigilant and highly capable U.S. defense intelligence network.
104. China has worked in the past to block the creation of formal multilateral reassurance regimes in East Asia, such as the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, that might lead to condemnation of China's development and/or deployment of its force-projection capabilities. As Jianwei Wang argues, China has been more open to multilateralism in the economic realm than it has been in the security realm. Jianwei Wang, "Chinese Views of Multilateralism," in Yong Deng and Feiling Wang, In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World and Sino-American Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Rowman and Littlefield, forthcoming).
105. For example, at the July 1994 ARF conference and in earlier multilateral meetings with Southeast Asian representatives, China blocked any meaningful discussion of territorial disputes involving Chinese claims. See Allen S. Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China," Asian Survey, Vol. 37, No. 4 (April 1997), pp. 299-322.
106. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement of Multilateral Institutions," in Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, forthcoming); Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," China Journal 35 (January 1996), pp. 27-61; Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Regional Forum and IR Theory," paper prepared for the conference on "The Emerging International Relations of the Asia Pacific Region," University of Pennsylvannia, May 8-9, 1998. See also Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thoughts," Asian survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440.
107. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement of Multilateral Institutions," in Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, forthcoming); Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," China Journal 35 (January 1996), pp. 27-61; Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Regional Forum and IR Theory," paper prepared for the conference on "The Emerging International Relations of the Asia Pacific Region," University of Pennsylvannia, May 8-9, 1998. See also Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thoughts," Asian survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440.
108. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement of Multilateral Institutions," in Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, forthcoming); Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," China Journal 35 (January 1996), pp. 27-61; Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Regional Forum and IR Theory," paper prepared for the conference on "The Emerging International Relations of the Asia Pacific Region," University of Pennsylvannia, May 8-9, 1998. See also Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thoughts," Asian survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440.
109. See Alastair Iain Johnston and Paul Evans, "China's Engagement of Multilateral Institutions," in Johnston and Robert S. Ross, eds., Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power (London: Routledge, forthcoming); Johnston, "Learning versus Adaptation: Explaining Change in Chinese Arms Control Policy in the 1980s and 1990s," China Journal 35 (January 1996), pp. 27-61; Johnston, "Socialization in International Institutions: The ASEAN Regional Forum and IR Theory," paper prepared for the conference on "The Emerging International Relations of the Asia Pacific Region," University of Pennsylvannia, May 8-9, 1998. See also Rosemary Foot, "China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thoughts," Asian survey, Vol. 38, No. 5 (May 1998), pp. 425-440.
110. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. See also Wang, "Chinese Views on Multilateralism," in Deng and Wang, In the Eyes of the Dragon; and Wu Xinbo, "Integration on the Basis of Strength: China's Impact in East Asian Security," Asia/Pacific Research Center working paper, February 1998.
111. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. See also Wang, "Chinese Views on Multilateralism," in Deng and Wang, In the Eyes of the Dragon; and Wu Xinbo, "Integration on the Basis of Strength: China's Impact in East Asian Security," Asia/Pacific Research Center working paper, February 1998.
112. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. See also Wang, "Chinese Views on Multilateralism," in Deng and Wang, In the Eyes of the Dragon; and Wu Xinbo, "Integration on the Basis of Strength: China's Impact in East Asian Security," Asia/Pacific Research Center working paper, February 1998.
113. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. For an excellent analysis of ASEAN concerns and hopes about China, see Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China." For Chinese reactions to changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance along these lines, see Zhou Jihua, "RiMei Anbao Tizhi de Qianghua yu Dongya de Anquan" [The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security structure and the security of East Asia], Riben Xuekan [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 41-42; and Zhou, "Military Accords Create Suspicions," China Daily, October 7, 1996.
114. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. For an excellent analysis of ASEAN concerns and hopes about China, see Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China." For Chinese reactions to changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance along these lines, see Zhou Jihua, "RiMei Anbao Tizhi de Qianghua yu Dongya de Anquan" [The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security structure and the security of East Asia], Riben Xuekan [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 41-42; and Zhou, "Military Accords Create Suspicions," China Daily, October 7, 1996.
115. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. For an excellent analysis of ASEAN concerns and hopes about China, see Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China." For Chinese reactions to changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance along these lines, see Zhou Jihua, "RiMei Anbao Tizhi de Qianghua yu Dongya de Anquan" [The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security structure and the security of East Asia], Riben Xuekan [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 41-42; and Zhou, "Military Accords Create Suspicions," China Daily, October 7, 1996.
116. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. For an excellent analysis of ASEAN concerns and hopes about China, see Whiting, "ASEAN Eyes China." For Chinese reactions to changes in the U.S.-Japan alliance along these lines, see Zhou Jihua, "RiMei Anbao Tizhi de Qianghua yu Dongya de Anquan" [The strengthening of the U.S.-Japan security structure and the security of East Asia], Riben Xuekan [Japan studies], No. 4 (1996), pp. 41-42; and Zhou, "Military Accords Create Suspicions," China Daily, October 7, 1996.
117. Interviews, 1996 and 1998. I was impressed that multilateral options, previously often discounted by my interlocutors, were now raised as legitimate alternatives to U.S. bilateralism without my prompting.
118. In the psychological literature on the security dilemma, one is not supposed to try to solve security dilemmas by applying pressure but by reassuring distrustful states. See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chap. 3. In Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach, not only do tough Policies merely reproduce realist fear and cynicism, but gentle persuasion and appeasement are prescribed for even truly predatory regimes, such as Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. See Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425, at 409.
119. In the psychological literature on the security dilemma, one is not supposed to try to solve security dilemmas by applying pressure but by reassuring distrustful states. See Jervis, Perception and Misperception, chap. 3. In Alexander Wendt's constructivist approach, not only do tough Policies merely reproduce realist fear and cynicism, but gentle persuasion and appeasement are prescribed for even truly predatory regimes, such as Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. See Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It," International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2 (Spring 1992), pp. 391-425, at 409.
120. In fact, recent work on Chinese foreign policy since Tiananmen suggests that the fear of material sanctions and social stigmatization helps explain a broad range of cooperative Chinese foreign policies from a general, more constructive regional strategy to access to important international arms control institutions, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See Yu Bin, "China's Regional Views and Policies - Implications for the United States," and Hu Weixing, "China and Nuclear Nonproliferation," both in Deng and Wang, In the Eyes of the Dragon. See also Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement in Multilateral Institutions."
121. In fact, recent work on Chinese foreign policy since Tiananmen suggests that the fear of material sanctions and social stigmatization helps explain a broad range of cooperative Chinese foreign policies from a general, more constructive regional strategy to access to important international arms control institutions, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See Yu Bin, "China's Regional Views and Policies - Implications for the United States," and Hu Weixing, "China and Nuclear Nonproliferation," both in Deng and Wang, In the Eyes of the Dragon. See also Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement in Multilateral Institutions."
122. In fact, recent work on Chinese foreign policy since Tiananmen suggests that the fear of material sanctions and social stigmatization helps explain a broad range of cooperative Chinese foreign policies from a general, more constructive regional strategy to access to important international arms control institutions, such as the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. See Yu Bin, "China's Regional Views and Policies - Implications for the United States," and Hu Weixing, "China and Nuclear Nonproliferation," both in Deng and Wang, In the Eyes of the Dragon. See also Johnston and Evans, "China's Engagement in Multilateral Institutions."
123. These themes were still emphasized by my interlocutors in November 1998.
124. On the importance of Taiwan in the calculations regarding the scope of the U.S.-Japan alliance in the 1997 defense guidelines, see Michael Green, The U.S. View," in Green and U.S.-Japan Security Alliance, p. 75.
125. For more elaboration on my preferred position on U.S. strategy across the strait, see Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik." For elaboration on the three no's, see footnote 56 above.
126. Multiple interviews, November 1998. Of course, Chinese analysts about U.S. development of TMD as well.
127. Many Chinese experts believe that the United States' encouragement of Japanese military development and foreign policy assertiveness will unwittingly fuel Japanese confidence and nationalism (a process that has already begun according to Chinese analysts), and that eventually U.S.-Japan security relations could still deteriorate. See, for example, Liu, "Dangqian Rimei Anbao
128. For Japanese reticence on TMD, see Asher, "A U.S.-Japan Alliance for the Next Century," pp. 364-366.
129. There are no official published estimates of Japanese contributions to TMD. For some speculation, see Holzer and Opall-Rome, "U.S. Anticipates Approval from Tokyo on Jount TMD." The articles states that Japan might pay up to 20 percent of the cost for developing a TMD system covering Japan. According to Landers, Lawrence, and Baum, in "Hard Target," such a system could cost about $17 billion over the next several years. I am grateful to Cindy Williams and Eric Labs for their help in analyzing the costs of additional mini-clearing equipment.
130. For a discussion of problems in marketing strategies, see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), chap. 2.
131. China and Japan exchanged visits by their defense ministers in 1998. In later 1997 there was a meeting between Premier Li Pend and Prime Minister Hashimoto, and in November 1998 there was a summit between President Zemin and Prime Minister Obuchi.
132. Even if China does not reform politically, a perceived "Japan threat" could still prove dangerous, because it could affect negatively the nature of Chinese authoritarianism. On the dangers of democratization, see Edward Mansfield and Jack L. Snyder, "Democratization and the Danger of War," International Security, Vol. 20, No. 1 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.
133. As Nicholas Kristof argues perceptively, the worst outcome would be if Japan became more militarily active before it reached a higher degree of understanding with its neighbor. See Kristof, "The Problem of Memory," Foreitn Affairs, Vol. 77, No. 6 (November/December 1998), pp. 37-49, at pp. 47-48.
134. China has been building up these capabilities at a relatively fast pace in recent years, but in 1998 my interlocutors, however genuinely, said that joint U.S.-Japan TMD would lead China to increase the pace of this development.