Balance of power politics and the rise of China: Accommodation and balancing in East Asia

Security Studies

Volumn 15, Issue 3, 2006, Pages 355-395

  Ross, Robert S ^a  

^a BOSTON COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33845690724     PISSN: 09636412     EISSN: 15561852     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/09636410601028206     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (285)

1. The classic statements of this positions are those of Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), chap. 6
2. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 29
3. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, fifth ed., rev. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1978), chap. 12.
4. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987).
5. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 25-40
6. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars (Princeton, NY: Princeton University Press, 2001), chap. 7
7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996)
8. David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security, 27, no. 4 (spring 2003): 57-85.
9. Robert A. Pape, "Soft Balancing against the United States," International Security, 30, no. 1 (summer 2005), 17-45
10. Stephen G. Brooks and William C Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," International Security, 30, no. 1 (summer 2005), 72-108
11. Keir A. Leiber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing: Why The World is Not Pushing Back," International Security, 30, no. 1 (summer 2005), 109-39.
12. Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)
13. Jonathan Kirshner and Rawi Abdelal, "Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests," Security Studies, 9, nos. 1/2 (autumn 1999-winter 2000): 119-56
14. Klaus Knorr, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 6.
15. John J. Mearsheimer, "The Future of the American Pacifier," Foreign Affairs, 80, no. 5 (September/October 2001): 46-61
16. Richard K. Betts, "Wealth, Power and Instability: East Asian and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, 18, no. 3 (winter, 1993-1994): 53-54
17. Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia," Commentary, 110, no. 4 (November 2000): 17-26
18. James. F. Hoge, Jr., "A Global Power Shift in the Making," Foreign Affairs, 83, no. 4 (July-August 2004): 5.
19. The findings in this paper regarding post-cold war East Asia generally conform to Paul Shroeder's survey of alignment patterns in European diplomacy from the Napoleonic Wars through World War II. See "Historical Realist vs. Neo-Realist Theory," International Security, 19, no. 1 (summer 1994): 116- 24.
20. Waltz, Theory of International Relations, chap. 6. On balance-of-power theory and post-cold war politics, see Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul, James J. Wirtz, and Michael Fortmann (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2004). There is some discussion of the tendency of competitive domestic political processes to undermine balancing.
21. See Randall L. Schweller, Unanswered Threats: Political Constraints on the Balance of Power (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press).
22. For an overview of this neoclassical realist approach to foreign policy, see Gideon Rose, "Neoclasical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, 51, no. 1 (October 1998), 144-72.
23. These scholars have labeled such diplomatic resistance to U.S. unipolarity as "soft-balancing." See Pape, "Soft-Balancing against the United States"
24. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing."
25. See Keir A. Leiber and Gerard Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing, 130-33, for a critique of this use of the term "soft balancing."
26. This literature acknowledges strategic cooperation and military build-ups by other powers, but it critiques structual realism by focusing on these powers' narrow foreign policy intentions or the domestic sources of their behavior. In so doing they treat balancing as an outcome of policy rather than as a system-wide outcome, which is the traditional focus of structural realism and its balance of power theory. See Leiber and Alexander, "Waiting for Balancing," 119-25
27. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing," 79-80
28. Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, "Striking the Balance: Reply," International Security, 31, no. 3 (winter 2005-2006), 186-91.
29. For the structural approach and its emphasis on outcomes rather than intentions, see Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 116-23
30. Robert Art, "Striking the Balance," International Security, 30, no. 3 (winter 2005/2006), 177-85.
31. See Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, 18, no. 2 (fall 1993), 44-79
32. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, 17, no. 4 (spring 1993)
33. Art, "Striking the Balance."
34. For a discussion of contemporary balancing through military means short of alliances and arms races, see T.V. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy," International Secuirty, 30, no. 1 (summer 2005), 46-71. Unlike Pape in "Soft-Balancing against the United States" and Brooks and Wohlforth in "Hard Times of Soft Balancing," Paul defines soft balancing as traditional military efforts short of alliances and arms races. Art labels such behavior "hard balancing," reserving the term "soft balancing" for diplomatic opposition to a great power's activities.
35. See Art, "Striking the Balance."
36. For a critique of arguments questioning the presence of balance-of-power politics in the era of U.S. unipolarity, see Barry Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy: Response to Unipolarity?" Security Studies, vol. 15, no. 2 (April-June 2006), 149-86.
37. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," 149-86
38. Art, "Striking the Balance." This regional perspective is essentially John Mearsheimer's argument regarding the challenge of rising powers in The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).
39. On this point, see also Art, "Striking the Balance."
40. Paul, "Soft Balancing in the Age of U.S. Primacy" Art, "Striking the Balance."
41. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 127.
42. For an analysis of bandwagoning and balancing behavior in domestic political systems, see Avery Goldstein, From Bandwagon to Balance-of-Power Politics: Structural Constraints and Politics in China, 1949-1978 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991).
43. Schweller characterizes these states as "lesser great powers" insofar as they cannot fend for themselves against the great powers and must therefore depend on a great power for security. So defined, it is not clear how the strategic behavior of "lesser great powers" toward a rising power is any different from that of all states other than the great powers. Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 16-18.
44. Robert L. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, p. 29.
45. Also see, Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis, 1919-1939 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 103-105.
46. Rothstein, Alliances and Small Powers, 59, 62.
47. Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations, chap. 12, 181-84.
48. George Liska, Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1968), 27.
49. Jack S. Levy, "Balances and Balancing: Concepts, Propositions, and Research Design," in John A. Vasquez and Colin Elman, Realism and The Balance of Power: A New Debate (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 139-40.
50. Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back." In International Security, 19, no. 1 (summer 1994), 72-107.
51. Schroeder argues that European states have consistently accommodated dominant powers, but a close examination of his exceptions suggests balancing by Europe's most capable powers. Paul Schroeder, "Historical Reality vs. Neo-Realist Theory," International Security, vol. 19, no. 1 (Summer, 1994), 108-148.
52. Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 29-31. This article uses the term accommodation to capture the process of secondary state alignment with rising powers. Bandwagoning is often the preferred term for this process, but it can be misleading. First, the term is most commonly associated with domestic politics, in which political actors voluntarily flock to the stronger side for gain rather than out of strategic imperative for security. As Schweller has observed, bandwagoning in international politics is best characterized as "bandwagoning for profit." Second, as Kaufman has argued, bandwagoning suggests an either/all alignment, in which cooperation with a threatening great power precludes any cooperation with its great power rival. Yet such "submission" or "capitulation" is the behavior of the truly "weak state." Third, bandwagoning suggests a short-term process, yet alignment can be gradual, in response to gradual unequal rates of change among the great powers. During transition periods, alignments may exhibit considerable ambiguity.
53. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit," 80-81
54. Robert G. Kaufman, "To Balance or Bandwagon: Alignment Decisions in 1930s Europe," Security Studies, 1, no. 3 (spring 1992): 417-47.
55. Walt, The Origins of Alliances.
56. Ikenberry, After Victory
57. Pape, "Soft Balancing Against the United States."
58. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order; Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong."
59. Robert S. Ross, "The Geography of the Peace: Great Power Stability in Twenty-First Century East Asia," International Security, 23, no. 4 (spring 1999), 81-118
60. Robert S. Ross, "Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century.
61. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 16.
62. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade, 26-29.
63. See also Kirshner and Abdelal, "Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests."
64. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade
65. Kirshner and Abdelal, "Strategy, Economic Relations, and the Definition of National Interests"
66. Knorr, The Power of Nations, chap. 6.
67. David Baldwin, "Power Analysis and World Politics: New Trends versus Old Tendencies," World Politics, 31, no. 2 (January 1979): 161-94.
68. This argument concurs with Pape's findings regarding the ineffectiveness of sanctions in the absence of accompanying military coercion. See Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, 22, no. 2 (autumn 1997).
69. As this paper shows, because China's economic rise is a region-wide phenomenon, it is not possible to isolate the impact of military power on contemporary East Asian secondary state behavior to determine decisively whether military power is a sufficient condition to compel alignment. The conclusion briefly considers what additional research needs to be done to establish this conclusively.
70. Walt, in Origins of Alliance, uses formal and informal alliances as indicators of secondary-state alignment to analyze the polarized Middle East during the cold war.
71. These indicators of secondary-state alignment parallel Jervis's discussions of the "indices" of great power commitment to defend secondary states. Robert L. Jervis, Logic of Images in International Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 1989).
72. This argument is similar to Schweller's argument that great power penetration of a secondary state's society can encourage alignment. See Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
73. On the sources of soft power, see Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), chap. 1.
74. Art, "Striking the Balance"
75. Robert S. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Best," in Balance of Power: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century
76. Posen, "European Union Security and Defense Policy." Cf.,
77. Brooks and Wohlforth, "Hard Times for Soft Balancing."
78. For a discussion of Sino-Russian strategic balance in Central Asia, see Stephen J. Blank, "Who's Minding the Store?: The Failure of Russian Security Policy," Problems of Post-Communism, 45, no. 2 (March-April 1998): 3-11.
79. For a comprehensive discussion of Chinese ground-force modernization, see Dennis J. Blasko, The Chinese Army Today (New York: Routledge, 2004).
80. See also Dennis J. Blasko, "The New PLA Force Structure," in The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age, eds. James C. Mulvenon and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1999), 263-270
81. Dennis J. Blasko, "PLA Ground Forces: Moving Toward a Smaller, More Rapidly Deployable, Modern Combined Arms Force," in The People's Liberation Army as Organization, eds. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N. D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 315-322.
82. U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on the Military Power of the People's Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2003)
83. Andrew N.D. Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (ret.), "PLA Rapid Reaction Forces: Concept, Training, and Preliminary Assessment," in The People's Liberation Army in the Information Age
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85. Dennis J. Blasko, "PLA Ground Forces," 322-25.
86. Andrew N.D. Yang and Col. Milton Wen-Chung Liao (ret.), "PLA Rapid Reaction Forces;" Mulvenon, "The PLA Army's Struggle for Identity," 116-17.
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88. Susan M. Puska, "Rough but Ready Force Projection: An Assessment of Recent PLA Training," in China's Growing Military Power: Perspectives on Security, Ballistic Missiles, and Conventional Capabilities, eds. Andrew J. Scobel and Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 2002), 223, 244-45.
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93. On the survivability of PRC missile launchers, see Alan Vick, et al., Aerospace Operations Against Elusive Ground Targets (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001).
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95. On the intrinsic limitations of missile-defense systems in the Taiwan Strait, see James M. Lindsay and Michael E. O'Hanlon, Defending America: The Case for Limited National Missile Defense (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2001), 123-30.
96. On China's protracted discussion of whether to build a carrier, see Ian Storey and You Ji, "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions: Seeking Truth from Rumors," NavalWar College Review, 57, no. 1 (winter 2004): 77-93.
97. U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 2006).
98. Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China's Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), 97-99
99. Bernard D. Cole, "The PLA and 'Active Defense,"' in The People's Liberation Army and China in Transition, eds. Flanagan and Marti, 136
100. Bernard D. Cole, "China's Maritime Strategy," in The People's Liberation Army, ed. Puska, 305, 309
101. Lyle Goldstein and William Murray, "Undersea Dragons: China's Maturing Submarine Force." International Security, 28, no. 4 (spring 2004), 161-16.
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103. Also see James Brooke, "Korea Feeling Pressure as China Grows," New York Times, 8 January 2003, W1.
104. Yonhap, 27 July 2000, in Foreign Broadcast information Service (FBIS), KP0P20000727000014. The best treatment of this incident is Jae Ho Chung, "From a Special Relationship to a Normal Partnership: Interpreting the 'Garlic Battle,"' Pacific Affairs, vol. 76, no. 4 (Winter 2003-2004), 550-68.
105. "China Becomes South Korea's Number One Investment Target," China Daily, 2 February 2002, http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/news/2002-02-05/55641.html.
106. The Korea Herald, 12 January 2004, in FBIS, KPP20040112000037
107. Yonhap, 29 January 2004, in FBIS, KPP20040129000060.
108. On the trade figures, see the Republic of Korea custom figures at http://www.customs.go.kr/hp/PGAS301.jsp?year=2003 and http://www.customs.go.kr/hp/PGAS301.jsp?year=2002
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110. Xinhua, 19 May 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040519000077.
111. 2002 trade statistics are from the Taiwan Board of Foreign Trade; Central News Agency, 15 September 2002, FBIS, CPP20020915000025, Central News Agency, 28 September 2002, FBIS, CPP20020928000044
112. Central News Agency, 7 August 2002, FBIS, CPP20020807000167
113. Financial Times Global Newswire, 23 February 2004, at http://80-web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp2.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= 3d0c9141ea8048ef33dabe367041fe7e&_docnum=10&wchp= dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=237e75483e439ca7f083c6c74c8ac65b.
114. The investment statistics are in Central News Agency, 7 August 2002, FBIS, CPP20020807000167
115. Central News Agency, 21 October 2002, FBIS, CPP20021022000004
116. Zhongguo Xinwenshe, 3 January 2004, FBIS, CPP20040103000056.
117. International Trade Commission, U.S.-Taiwan FTA: Likely Economic Impact of a Free Trade Agreement Between the United States and Taiwan (Washington, D.C.: International Trade Commission of the United States, 2002), at http://www.usitc.gov/wais/reports/arc/w3548.htm.
118. For a similar conclusion, see Nicholas R. Lardy and Daniel H. Rosen, Prospects for a U.S.-Taiwan Trade Agreement (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2004).
119. Central News Agency, 4 July 2006, FBIS, CPP20060704968052
120. Editorial, Taipei Times, 13 June 2004, at http://taipeitimes.com/News/ edit/arhives/2004/06/13/2003174891
121. CNA, 7 August 2002, FBIS, CPP20020807000167
122. Central News Agency, 21 October 2002, FBIS, CPP20021022000004
123. Zhongguo Xinwenshe, 3 January 2004, FBIS, CPP20040103000056
124. Government Approves TSMC's Wafer Project," China Post, 1 May 2004
125. Zhongguo Xinwen She, 18 February 2004, FBIS, CPP20040228000102
126. Renmin Ribao, 26 December 2004, in FBIS, CPP20031226000049
127. Taipei Times, 6 January 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040106000145.
128. T.Y. Wang, "Lifting the No Haste, Be Patient Policy': Implications for Cross-Strait Relations," Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 15, no. 1 (2002): 131-39
129. Sheng Lijun, China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Relations, 2002).
130. For a Taiwan government discussion of the growing danger of dependence, see, for example, Central News Agency, 13 January 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040112000209.
131. World Bank Group, World Development Indicators.
132. For an early Chinese assessment of Japan's economic and societal problems, see Liu Xiaofeng and Zhang Yulin, Riben de Weiji (Japan's crisis) (Beijing: Renmin Chubanshe, 2001).
133. The figures are from the Japanese Customs Agency, http://www.customs.go.jp/toukei/srch/indexe.htm.
134. Ken Belson, "Japanese Capital and Jobs Flowing to China," New York Times, 17 February 2004.
135. Ken Hijino, Financial Times, 15 December 2001, 9, James Kynge, "Japan, China in 11th-hour Trade Deal," Financial Times, 22 December 2001, 7
136. James J. Pryzstup, "From Precipice to Promise," in Comparative Connections, October-December 2001, http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/ 0104Qjapan china.html.
137. David Ibison, "Koizumi Visits to War Shrine Attacked," Financial Times, 26 November 2004
138. Asahi Shimbun (English edition), 2 October 2004.
139. The figures are from the Japanese Ministry of Finance, http://www.mof.go.jp/english/.
140. For a Chinese discussion of the role of the Chinese market in ASEAN economies, see Zhang Yunling, Weilai 10-15 Nian Zhongguo zai Taipingyang Diqu Mianlin de Guoji Huanjing (The International environment China faces in the Asia-Pacific in the next 10-15 years), (Beijing: Zhongguo Shehui Kexue Chubanshe, 2003) 299-319.
141. Alice D. Ba, "China and ASEAN
142. Reinvigorating Relations for a 21st Century Asia," in Asian Survey, 43, no. 4 (July-August 2003): 638-44
143. Xinhua, 8 February 2004, FBIS, CPP20040208000018
144. Peter S. Goodman, "Made in China - With Neighbors' Imports," Washington Post, 5 February 2004
145. Brad Grosserman, "China's Influence in Asia Soars," Japan Times, 17 May 2004.
146. For Singapore statistics, see Singapore Department of Statistics, Government of Singapore. Philippine statistics are from Department of Trade and Industry, the Philippines, at http://tradelinephil.dti.gov.ph/ betp/trade_stat.expcod_sumprod.
147. Edward J. Lincoln, East Asian Economic Regionalism (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004):45-48, 55-56.
148. Also see Peter Drysdale and Xinpeng Xu, "Taiwan's Role in the Economic Architecture of East Asia and the Pacific," in Economic Reform and Cross-Strait Relations: Taiwan and China in the WTO, Julin Chang and Steven Goldstein, eds., (Hackensack, NJ: World Scientific, forthcoming 2008).
149. On the 2004 agreement, see Jane Perlez, "Chinese Premier Signs Trade Pact at Southeast Asian Summit," New York Times, 30 November 2004, 9.
150. Joel S. Wit, Daniel B. Poneman, and Robert L. Gallucci, Going Critical: The First North Korean Nuclear Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2004), 196-200.
151. Doug Struck, "Observers See Rising Risk of U.S.-N. Korea Conflict," Washington Post, 28 February 2003, 14
152. Bradley Graham and Doug Struck, "U.S. Officials Anticipate More Provocations by North Korea," Washington Post, 3 March 2003, 12
153. Doug Struck, "War Games on Korean Peninsula Upset North," Washington Post, 23 March 2003, 10
154. Korea Central News Agency, 1 April 2003, in FBIS, KPP20030401000074
155. Bradley Graham and Doug Struck, "U.S., Asian Allies Face Tough Choices," Washington Post, 25 April 2003, 18.
156. Agence France Press, 31 May 2003, in FBIS, JPP20030531000047
157. Yonhap, 31 May 2003, in FBIS, AFS KPP20030531000068
158. Yonhap, 7 August 2003, in FBIS, KPP20030807000014
159. Yonhap, 31 May 2003, in FBIS, AFS KPP20030531000020.
160. James Brooke, "Threats and Responses: Weapons
161. South Opposes Pressuring North Korea, Which Hints It Will Scrap Nuclear Pact," New York Times, 1 January 2003, 9.
162. James Brooke, "2 Koreas Sidestep U.S. to Forge Political and Pragmatic Links," New York Times, 26 June 2004, A1.
163. Chosun Ilbo, 8 March 2005, at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/ news/200503/200503080028.html
164. Yonhap, 20 January 2006.
165. William H. Gleystein, Jr., Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1999): 2-3, 12-13, 40-50.
166. "U.S. Considers Cuts to Forces in Korea," New York Times, 7 March 2003, 1
167. James Brooke, "Musings on an Exodus of G.I.'s, South Korea Hails U.S. presence," New York Times, 8 March 2003, 11
168. Thom Shanker, "Rumsfeld Reassures Seoul on Regrouping G.I.'s," New York Times, 18 November 2003, 10
169. Thom Shanker, "Pentagon Weighs Transferring 4,000 G.I.'s in Korea to Iraq," New York Times, 17 May 2004, 11
170. James Brook and Thom Shanker, "U.S. Plans to Cut Third of Troops in South Korea," New York Times, 8 June 2004, 1
171. Thom Shanker and David E. Sanger, "U.S. Defends Plan to Reduce Forces in South Korea," New York Times, 9 June 2004, 12.
172. Korea Times, 7 April 2005, at http://search.hankooki.com/times/ times_view.php?terms=%22yoon+code%3A+kt&path= hankooki3%2Ftimes%2Flpage%2F200504%2Fkt2005040716314810230.htm.
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174. James Brooke, Courtship of Beijing and Seoul: A New Twist for an Old Bond, New York Times, 26 February 2004
175. Choson Ilbo, 6 February 2004, in FBIS, KPP20040206000110
176. Xinhua, 8 July 2003, in FBIS, CPP20030708000197
177. Chosun Ilbo, 28 January 2005, at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/ news/200501/200501280026.html.
178. Eric V. Larson, et al., Ambivalent Allies?: A Study of South Korean Attitudes Toward the U.S. (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004): 62-64.
179. On U.S.-Taiwan differences over arms transfers, see Taipei Times, 23 June 2004, 1
180. Taipei Times, 17 November 2002, 2.
181. On the Taiwan defense budget, see Bernard D. Cole, Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects (New York: Routledge, 2006).
182. FBIS 26 September 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040926000026
183. Lilian Wu, "63% Favor Cross-strait Peace Agreement," Central News Agency, 22 July 2004, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis at http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp2.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= c1bc872511b58baa4015b41d5eed9d00&_docnum=1&wchp= dGLbVtz-zSkVA&_md5=41bd41e5c8a65bf7d2c1d44d4d774b76.
184. Taiwan News, 23 September 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040923000195.
185. On the defense budgets, see CNA, 2 November 2003, in FBIS, CPP20041102000130
186. FBIS Report, 22 October 2004, in FBIS, CPP20041022000164
187. Taipei Times, 4 September 2002, http://taipeitimes.com/news/2002/09/04/ print/0000166702
188. FBIS Report, in FBIS, 22 October 2004, CPP20041022000164.
189. Edward Gargan, "Long-Term Forecast for Taiwan remains Upbeat," New York Times, 22 March 1996, 35
190. Sheila Tefft, "Taiwan Moves to Restore Shaken Investor Confidence," Christian Science Monitor, 1 April 1996, 9
191. Steven Mufson, "China-Taiwan Conflict 'In Remission, Not Resolved,"' Washington Post, 22 April 1996, 17.
192. See the Taiwan Mainland Affairs Council's line graph of public opinion trends at http://www.mac.gov.tw/english/english/pos/9211/9211e_1.gif
193. Taipei Times, 10 February 2004, FBIS, CPP20040210000187
194. Lilian Wu, "63% Favor Cross-strait Peace Agreement"
195. Associated Press, 15 December 2003
196. FBIS Report, 16 January 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040116000193
197. Agence France Presse, 18 January 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040118000010
198. FBIS Report, 2 February 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040202000013
199. FBIS Report, 10 February 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040217000222
200. interviews with DPP and Taiwan government officials, January 2004
201. Taipei Times, 12 May 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040512000167
202. CNA, 12 May 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040512000186
203. Taipei Times, 24 May 2006, in FBIS, 200605241477.1 bf1b003a148a1534.
204. See the postelection poll results in CNA, 7 May 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040507000051.
205. "Pro-Independence Parties Defeated in Taiwan," New York Times, 11 December 2004.
206. The vote tally is reported in FBIS Report, 11 December 2004, in FBIS, CPP20041211000110.
207. Interview with DPP legislators and government officials, January 2004 and January 2005
208. South China Morning Post, 10 February 2004
209. Jacky Hsu, "Taiwan's Tycoons Stay Clear of Politics," South China Morning Post, 27 May 2004
210. report on Taiwan media reports in FBIS, CPP20060531326001.
211. The Straits Times, 15 June 2006, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp2.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= e72c8eeeb86c78f568ea64a9a93a20ef&_docnum=14&wchp= dGLbVtz-zSkVA&_md5=088c_b117dedfb6910e6727bd5d9ea74d.
212. Zhongguo Xinwenshe, 3 January 2004, FBIS, CPP20040103000056
213. interview with official from Taiwan's Mainland Affairs Council, January 2004
214. Mark Magnier, "Unions Across a Divide," Los Angeles Times, 22 November 2004, 1
215. Xinhua, 9 February 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040209000131
216. Zhongguo Xinwen She, 28 February 2004, in FBIS, CPP20040228000102
217. Xinhua, 28 February 2004, in FBIS, CPP2003022800083.
218. Chu Yun-han, "Taiwanese Nationalism and Its Implications: Testing the Worst-Case Scenario," Asian Survey, 44, no. 4 (July/August 2004)
219. G. Andy Chang and T.Y. Wang, "Taiwanese of Chinese? Independence or Unification?: An Analysis of Generational Differences in Taiwan," Journal of Asian and African Studies, 40, no. 1/2 (April 2005).
220. The best discusison of the transformation in Japanese defense policy is Christopher Hughes, "Japan's Re-emergence as a 'Normal' Military Power," Adelphi Paper, International Institute of Strategic Studies, no. 368-69.
221. See Paul S. Giarra and Akisha Nagashima, "Managing the New U.S.-Japan Security Alliance: Enhancing Structures and Mechanisms to Address Post-Cold War Requirements," in The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Future and Present, eds. Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1999).
222. Norimitsu Onishi, "Japan Support of Missile Shield Could Tilt Asia Balance of Power," New York Times, 3 April 2004, 1.
223. Amb. J. Thomas Shieffer, "Nuclear-powered Carrier to Replace Kitty Hawk," October 28, 2005, http://tokyo.usembassy.gov/e/p/ tp-20051028-77.htm.
224. Also see the interview with the U.S. Consulate General to Okinawa, Okinawa Times, 29 November 2005.
225. "Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Consultative Committee, 19 February 2005, at http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/42490.htm.
226. Washington Post, 9 November 2002, 21
227. James Dao, "Coalition Widens its Ocean Manhunt," New York Times, 17 March 2002, 20
228. Norimitsu Onishi, "Japan Heads to Iraq, Haunted by Taboo Bred in Another War," New York Times, 19 November 2003, 1.
229. Also see Michael H. Armacost, "Tilting Closer to Washington," in Strategic Asia 2003-04: Fragility and Crisis, eds. Richard J. Ellings and Aaron L. Friedberg (Seattle, WA: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004): 81-107.
230. Bennett Richardson "Japan Beefs Up its Defense Stance," Christian Science Monitor, 10 December 2004, 6
231. Reuters, 22 December 2005.
232. Kyodo, 7 November 2004, in FBIS, JPP20041107000035
233. Agence France Presse, 2 December 2005, in FBIS, document number JPP20051202064005
234. "Agency Plans Long-range Missile," Daily Yomiuri, 3 December 2004
235. Associated Press, 28 March 2005, at http://web.lexisnexis.com.ezp2.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= 9fd59ecade62caf183240d97c0919111&_docnum=3&wchp= dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=996686e606199acd926312655e7578ad
236. Los Angeles Times, 13 April 2005, 9.
237. David Pilling, "Comments and Analysis," Financial Times, 14 April 2004, 19
238. Anthony Faiola, "Japan's Draft Charter Redefines Military," Washington Post. 23 November 2005, 16.
239. Pilling, "Comments and Analysis,"
240. Howard W. French, "Can Japan Change," New York Times, 22 July 2003
241. Howard W. French, "Taboo Against Nuclear Weapons is Beijing Challenged in Japan," New York Times, 9 June 2002, 1.
242. See also, for example, Kan Ito, "China's Nuclear Power Will Control the World by 2020," Tokyo Shokun, 1 January 2006, in FBIS, document number JPP20051205016001.
243. Ming Wan, "Tensions in Recent Sino-Japanese Relations: The May 2002 Shenyang Incident," Asian Survey, vol. 43, no. 5 (September/October 2003), 826-844 at 840-42.
244. Japan Times, 24 March 2002, http://japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/ getarticle.pl5?nn2004034b4.htm
245. Japan Times, 16 March 2004, http://japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/
246. Kyodo, 18 October 2005, in FBIS, document number JPP20051018969067.
247. Sankei Shimbun, 6 December 2004, in FBIS, JPP20041206000024
248. "ODA Strategy Enters New Era," Daily Yomiuri, 1 April 2004.
249. On public attitudes toward leadership visits to the Yasukuni Shrine, see David Pilling, "Japanese Support Leader's War Shrine Visits," Financial Times, 14 December 2004, 11.
250. For trends in Japan's China policy, including policy on development assistance and the Yasukuni Shrine, see Lam Peng Er, "Japan's Deteriorating Ties with China: The Koizumi Factor," China: An International Journal, 3, no. 2 (September 2005)
251. Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
252. Although Indonesian acquiescence to U.S. interests is not an example of "balancing," it underscores the impact of superior great power capabilities on secondary state alignment. For coverage of U.S. and allied deployments, see Associated Press, 20 September 1999, http://web.lexisnexis.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= 57a25bcd92b49f6c74dd9007c4b4cb6a&_docnum=368&wchp= dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=fffecc384e4dbc3df79150490d9baba3
253. Associated Press, 22 September 1999, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= b9183fff6609e74faa289e5e-64bcee6c&_docnum=325&wchp= dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=9c7d6ea484c508c28c1ec1e0b978cac8
254. Northern Territory News, 29 September (1999) http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= 9798c778702e3f0ba3c7049fcfaa7a60&_docnum=264&wchp= dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=bae-069ec0e3bea71ac046a9d59c504251999
255. Sunday Telegraph, 1 August 1999, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= ef630a112aef68044afd11d37d2e2966&_docnum=722&wchp= dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=8e67f0d2075ebc6cf12932f0bd671194
256. Agence France Presse, 29 September 1999, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= 9798c778702e3f0ba3c7049fcfaa7a-60&_docnum=255&wchp= dGLbVtz-zSkVb&_md5=e28e25362018d518404554203ae17c43.
257. Indonesia National News Agency, 21 April 2004, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp2.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= 76a4267cd47b791b7b9ebace2d0e930a&_docnum=1&wchp= dGLbVzbzSkVb&_md5=16a73aef496eedf2b07d0af2b6aa991f
258. Jakarta Post, 18 May 2001
259. Antara, 23 January 2006, FBIS, document number 200607121477.1 3380004e8a7dbe5b
260. Jakarta Post, 21 March 2006, FBIS, document number 200603211477.1 f53d0027841bc9e0.
261. Ian Storey, Malaysia and the United States 2004-2005: The Best of Times? (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005), 5
262. Malaysiakini, 5 June 2006, FBIS, document number 200606051477.1 c1bf005f528d30b4.
263. Chan Kay Min, "High-Tech 'Stars' at New Naval Base," Straits Times, 11 March 2001, 1.
264. On Cobra Gold, see Edward Tang, "S'pore to Join Cobra Gold This Year," Straits Times, 14 January 2000, 42.
265. Anthony L. Smith, Singapore and the United States 2004-2005: Steadfast Friends (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, 2005), 4-5
266. Jim Garamone, "Singapore, U.S. Reaffirm, Strengthen Relationship," American Forces Press Service, 12 July 2005, at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/20050712_2040.html.
267. Robert Karniol, "U.S. Double's Personnel for 'Balikatan 2004,"' New York Times, 3 March 2004
268. Jane's Defence Weekly, http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp1.harvard.edu/ universe/document?_m=f8f4ff0aaed49e72d276f040fd92d480&_docnum= 1&wchp=dGLbVlz-zSkVA&_md5=4de002d0d845fe5adac-9f3ed08487dde
269. Richard Halloran, "U.S. Forces Prepare for Surprises in Asia," Japan Times, 29 March 2004
270. AFP, "Malampaya Defense 'Incidental' to War Games," Business World, 25 February 2004.
271. See also Ronald A. Rodriguez, "Conduct Unbecoming in the South China Sea?" PacNet, no. 22A (21 May 2004)
272. Business World, 16 November 2004, at http://web.lexis-nexis.com.ezp2.harvard.edu/universe/document?_m= 117ee4b415971d9e9c94a1b395b89156&_docnum=14&wchp= dGLbVlb-zSkVb&_md5=34bb4f-206e33cc74d9a92212ea9ee80d.
273. "RP Now Biggest Recipient of US Military Aid in East Asia," Manila Standard, March 6, 2004
274. Manila Standard, January 9, 2004.
275. For a full development of this argument, see Robert S. Ross, "Explaining Taiwan's Revisionist Foreign Policy," Journal of Contemporary China, 15, no. 48 (August 2006), 443-58.
276. cf., Walt, The Origins of Alliances, 23-24.
277. These findings support Robert Pape's findings that economic sanctions do not play an independent role in changing a target state's policy. Rather, alleged success of economic sanctions actually reflects the simultaneous presence of coercive military capabilities. See Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security, 22, no. 2 (autumn 1997).
278. Based on calculations from trade statistics provided by United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, at http://unstats.un.org.ezp1.harvard.edu/unsd/comtrade/default.aspx.
279. Ross, "Bipolarity and Balancing in East Asia."
280. "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," 5 January 1950, U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1950, vol. 6, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976): 260-61
281. and "Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State," 29 December 1949, FRUS, 1949, vol. 9, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1974): 467.
282. Also see Thomas J. Christensen, Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 106.
283. See, for example, Storey and You, "China's Aircraft Carrier Ambitions."
284. See also Cole, The Great Wall at Sea.
285. On the technological limitations of the PLA, see Bernard H.B. Cole and Paul Godwin, "Advanced Military Technology and the PLA: Priorities and Capabilities in the 21st Century," in The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999).