Strategic hedging and the future of Asia-Pacific stability

Washington Quarterly

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 145-167

  Medeiros, Evan S ^a  

^a RAND CORPORATION   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 28844445918     PISSN: 0163660X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/016366005774859724     Document Type: Article

References (64)

1. The term "hedging" is highly underdeveloped both in the international relations theory and the security studies literatures. This article's conceptualization of the U.S. and Chinese hedging strategies is drawn from recent work on European hedging strategies after the end of the Cold War. See Robert J. Art, "Europe Hedges Its Security Bets," in Balance of Power Revisited: Theory and Practice in the 21st Century, eds. T.V. Paul and James Wirtz (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2004), pp. 179-213.
2. For a comprehensive analysis of the variety of possible responses to rising powers, see Randall L. Schweller, "Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory," in Engaging China, eds. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999), pp. 1-32.
3. For a different use of hedging, see Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Dual Hedge," Foreign Affairs 81, no. 5 (September/October 2002): 110-121.
4. For an analysis of this problem, see David Edelstein, "Managing Uncertainty: Beliefs About Intentions and the Rise of Great Powers," Security Studies 12, no. 1 (Autumn 2002):1-40.
5. See also David M. Edelstein, "American Images of a Rising China: Lessons From History and Theory," in China in the American Political Imagination, ed. Carola McGiffert (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, 2003), pp. 6-15.
6. David M. Lampton, "Paradigm Lost: The Demise of Weak China," National Interest, Fall 2005, pp. 67-74.
7. Christopher Hill, "Emergence of China in the Asia-Pacific: Economic and Security Consequences for the U.S.," testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 7, 2005 (hereinafter Hill testimony).
8. For an in-depth analysis of China as a status quo power, see Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power," International Security 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 5-56.
9. Richard Armitage, "Insights Into the World: China, the Emerging Power," Daily Yomiuri, August 14, 2005.
10. See, for example, Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 1992);
11. David Michael Lampton, Same Bed Different Dreams: Managing U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000 (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 2001);
12. Robert L. Suettinger, Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations 1989-2000 (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
13. On specific U.S. efforts to shape Chinese foreign policy, see Robert S. Ross, "Engagement in U.S.-China Policy," in Engaging China, eds. Alastair Iain Johnston and Robert S. Ross (New York: Routledge, 1999).
14. Joseph S. Nye Jr., "East Asian Security: The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs 74, no. 4 (July/August 1995): 90-102.
15. Ashley J. Tellis, "Indo-U.S. Relations Headed for a Grand Transformation?" YaleGlobal, July 14, 2005, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=5999.
16. U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, "Foreign Military Training in Fiscal Years 2004 and 2005, Volume I," April 2005, http://www.state.gov/t/pm/rls/rpt/fmtrpt/2005/.
17. Jason Sherman, "In QDR, DOD Considers Capabilities Needed to Manage Relations With China," InsideDefense.com, May 12, 2005, http://www.insidedefense.com.
18. Joel Brinkley, "In New Tone, Rice Voices Frustration With China," New York Times, August 20, 2005, p. 1.
19. See "Interview With the New York Times: Secretary Condoleezza Rice," Washington, D.C., August 17, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/51312.htm.
20. Condoleezza Rice, "Remarks at Sophia University," Tokyo, March 19, 2005, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/43655.htm.
21. For a general statement on U.S. policy toward Japan, see Christopher R. Hill, "North East Asia: A Region of Vital Concern to the United States," testimony before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, May, 26 2005, http://www.state.gov/p/eap/rls/rm/2005/46827.htm.
22. For the case for using Japan to balance Chinese power, see R Armitage, "Insights Into the World."
23. For a full case for using allies to hedge against China, see Zalmay M. Khalilzad et al., The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and Military Implications (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1999.)
24. On the issues raised by the Global Defense Posture Review, see Larry A. Niksch, "U.S. Security Policies in the Western Pacific" (paper, 2005 Pacific Symposium), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/Pacific2005/niksch.pdf.
25. For the data in this section on U.S.-Indo relations, see K. Alan Kronstadt, "India-U.S. Relations," CRS Issue Brief for Congress, IB93097, August 1, 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB93097.pdf.
26. Ibid., p. 6. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB93097.pdf
27. Ibid., pp. 9-11. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB93097.pdf
28. Ibid., pp. 9-10. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IB93097.pdf
29. Eric G. John, "The United States and Southeast Asia: Developments, Trends, and Policy Choices," statement before the House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, September 21, 2005, http://wwwc.house.gov/international_relations/109/joh092105.pdf (hereinafter John statement).
30. Lee Kuan Yew, "ASEAN Must Balance China in Asia," New Perspectives Quarterly 18, no. 3 (Winter 2001): 20-21.
31. Christopher Bolkcom, "F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues," CRS Report for Congress, RL 30563, August 29, 2005, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/weapons/RL30563.pdf.
32. Ellen Nakashima, "Vietnam, U.S. to Improve Intelligence, Military Ties," Washington Post, June 17, 2005, p. 1.
33. Admiral William J. Fallon, testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, March 8, 2005, http://www.pacom.mil/speeches/sst2005/050308fallon_sasc.shtml.
34. Evelyn Goh, "Singapore and the United States: Cooperation on Transnational Security Threats" (paper, 26th Annual Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 8-10, 2005);
35. Evelyn Goh, "Meeting the China Challenge: The U.S. in Southeast Asian Regional Security Strategies," Policy Studies, no. 16 (Washington, D.C.: East West Center, 2005).
36. See John statement.
37. For example, all of these themes were mentioned in Rice's speech at Sophia University in Tokyo. See Rice, "Remarks at Sophia University."
38. Regarding Chinese fears of U.S. policy, see Wang Jisi, "China's Search for Stability With America," Foreign Affairs 84, no. 5 (September/October 2005): 39-48;
39. Peter Hayes Gries, "China Eyes the Hegemon," Orbis 49, no. 3 (Summer 2005): 401-412;
40. Yong Deng, "Hegemon on the Offensive: Chinese Perspectives on U.S. Global Strategy," Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 3 (Fall 2001): 343-365.
41. Wu Xinbo, "The End of the Silver Lining: A Chinese View of the U.S.-Japanese Alliance," The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 1 (Winter 2005-06): 119-130.
42. Tang Jiaxuan, "Vigorously Promoting China-U.S. Constructive and Cooperative Relations in the New Century" (address, Welcome Luncheon by National Committee on U.S.-China Relations and U.S.-China Business Council, July 27, 2005), http://www.ncuscr.org/articlesandspeeches/Tang_Jiaxuan_July2005.htm.
43. Michael D. Swaine, "China: Exploiting a Strategic Opening," in Strategic Asia 2004-2005, eds. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Seattle: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2004), pp. 67-101.
44. For an outline of these motivations in Chinese foreign policy, see Avery Goldstein, Rising to the Challenge: China's Grand Strategy and International Security (Palo Alto, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2005).
45. See also Avery Goldstein, "China's Emerging Grand Strategy: A Neo-Bismarckian Turn?" in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 57-106.
46. E Goh, "Meeting the China Challenge."
47. Ken Allen, "China's Foreign Military Relations: 2003-2004," Chinese Military Update 2, no. 5 (December 2004): 2-4.
48. See "China Non-committal on Backing India at UNSC," Press Trust of India, April 12, 2005, http://www.hindustantimes.com/news/181_1316929,0008.htm.
49. John W, Garver, "China's South Asian Interests and Policies," testimony before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, July 21-22, 2005.
50. See "Joint Statement of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation Regarding International Order of the 21st Century," July 1, 2005, http://www.chinaeurasia.org/files/CEF_Quarterly_August_2005.pdf.
51. U.S. Department of Defense, "The Military Power of the People's Republic of China 2005," http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf (hereinafter China Military report).
52. Colin Powell, remarks at Asia Society Annual Dinner, New York City, June 10, 2002, http://www.state.gov/secretary/former/powell/remarks/2002/10983.htm.
53. For a similar theme, see Douglas J. Feith, "Freedom, Safety and Sovereignty" (remarks, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., February 17, 2005), http://www.defenselink.mil/policy/speech/feb_17_05.html.
54. China Military report; Brinkley, "In New Tone, Rice Voices Frustration With China," p. 1.
55. E Goh, "Meeting the China Challenge."
56. See Eric Heginbotham and Christopher P. Twomey, "America's Bismarkian Asia Policy," Current History 104, no. 683 (September 2005): 243-250.
57. Evan Medeiros, "The U.S. Global Defense Posture Review and Implications for the Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific Region" (paper, Waldbröhl Transatlantic Dialogue on Asian Security, Berlin, December 11, 2004).
58. See Roy Kamphausen, "U.S. National Defense Strategy and Implications for the Asia-Pacific" (paper, 2005 Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii, June 9, 2005).
59. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno, "Images of Order in the Asia-Pacific and the Role of the U.S.," in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), p. 424.
60. See Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?" The Washington Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 15-28.
61. For more on hierarchy and power-sharing, see David Kang, "Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations," in International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, eds. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp. 163-193.
62. Glen Kessler, "Zoellick Details Discussions With China on Future of the Korean Peninsula," Washington Post, September 7, 2005, p. A22.
63. For a Chinese view, see Cao Huayin, "Chyi Dongbeiya Anquan Xin Kuangjia" [A humble analysis of the new framework for Northeast Asian security], China Reform Forum Journal, no. 10 (2004): 27-36.
64. See also W Jisi, "China's Search for Stability With America."