Political compromise and bureaucratic structure: The political origins of the Federal Reserve System

Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization

Volumn 25, Issue 2, 2009, Pages 472-498

  Jeong, Gyung Ho ^a   Miller, Gary J ^b   Sobel, Andrew C ^b  

^a CLAREMONT GRADUATE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 71949103598     PISSN: 87566222     EISSN: 14657341     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/jleo/ewn010     Document Type: Article

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