The constrained instability of majority rule: Experiments on the robustness of the uncovered set

Political Analysis

Volumn 16, Issue 2, 2008, Pages 115-137

  Bianco, William T ^a   Lynch, Michael S ^b   Miller, Gary J ^c   Sened, Itai ^c  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS   (United States)

^c WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 43149109962     PISSN: 10471987     EISSN: 14764989     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/pan/mpm024     Document Type: Article

References (26)

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