"A theory waiting to be discovered and used": A reanalysis of canonical experiments on majority-rule decision making

Journal of Politics

Volumn 68, Issue 4, 2006, Pages 838-851

  Bianco, William T ^a   Lynch, Michael S ^b   Miller, Gary J ^b   Sened, Itai ^b  

^a INDIANA UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 33749546946     PISSN: 00223816     EISSN: 14682508     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00474.x     Document Type: Article

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