The impact of oligopolistic competition in networks

Operations Research

Volumn 57, Issue 6, 2009, Pages 1421-1437

  Cominetti, Roberto ^a   Correa, José R ^a   Stier Moses, Nicolás E ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CHILE   (Chile)

^b Och Spine at New York Presbyterian Hospitals   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ATOMIC NETWORKS; CENTRALIZED CONTROL; COUNTER-INTUITIVE PHENOMENON; FLEXIBLE MACHINES; FREIGHT COMPANIES; IN-NETWORK; INTELLIGENT TRANSPORTATION SYSTEMS; MARKET POWER; MARKET STRUCTURES; NASH EQUILIBRIA; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; OLIGOPOLISTIC COMPETITION; OTHER APPLICATIONS; POTENTIAL FUNCTION; PRICING MECHANISM; TRAFFIC ASSIGNMENT PROBLEM; WARDROP; WARDROP EQUILIBRIUM;

COMMERCE; COST FUNCTIONS; INTELLIGENT VEHICLE HIGHWAY SYSTEMS; TELECOMMUNICATION NETWORKS;

COMPETITION;

EID: 70350637353     PISSN: 0030364X     EISSN: 15265463     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1287/opre.1080.0653     Document Type: Article

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