The price of anarchy for non-atomic congestion games with symmetric cost maps and elastic demands

Operations Research Letters

Volumn 31, Issue 5, 2003, Pages 327-334

  Chau, Chi Kin ^a   Sim, Kwang Mong ^a  

^a CHINESE UNIVERSITY OF HONG KONG   (Hong Kong)

Author keywords

Game theory; Non atomic congestion games; Price of anarchy

Indexed keywords

COSTS; GAME THEORY; TELECOMMUNICATION INDUSTRY;

NON-ATOMIC CONGESTION GAMES;

OPERATIONS RESEARCH;

EID: 0038487607     PISSN: 01676377     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-6377(03)00030-0     Document Type: Article

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