Stackelberg strategies and collusion in network games with splittable flow

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5426 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 133-146

  Harks, Tobias ^a  

^a TECHNISCHE UNIVERSITÄT BERLIN   (Germany)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

COSTS; GAME THEORY;

GENERAL NETWORKS; IN NETWORKS; LOAD-BALANCING; NASH EQUILIBRIUM; PRICE OF ANARCHIES; SPLITTABLE FLOWS; STACKELBERG; UPPER BOUNDS;

APPROXIMATION ALGORITHMS;

EID: 60349100664     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-93980-1_11     Document Type: Conference Paper

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