Among threats and a "perfect excuse": Understanding change in Japanese foreign security policy

Korean Journal of Defense Analysis

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 2009, Pages 297-314

  Hagström, Linus ^a   Turesson, Christian ^a  

^a Swedish Institute of International Affairs   (Sweden)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350349377     PISSN: 10163271     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/10163270903087238     Document Type: Article

References (154)

1. Constructivist reasons behind this prediction can be found in Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 118
2. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), 24.
3. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, MD and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), 208.
4. Reasons for predicting Japanese stability drawn more from the realist camp are found in Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International Security 22, no. 4 (Spring 1998): 171-203.
5. Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security," Security Studies 9, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 196-7.
6. Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy," The Pacific Review, 14, no. 2 (2001): 224-5.
7. Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan Rising: The Resurgence of Japanese Power and Purpose (New York: Public Affairs, 2007), 2.
8. Eugene A. Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, 82, no. 6 (November/December 2003): 74-90.
9. Christopher W. Hughes, Japan's Re-emergence as a "Normal" Military Power, Adelphi Paper 368-9 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004).
10. Gavan McCormack, "Remilitarizing Japan," New Left Review 29 (September/October 2004): 29-45
11. Masaru Tamamoto, "After the Tsunami, How Japan Can Lead," Far Eastern Economic Review 168, no. 1 (January 2005): 10-15.
12. Richard Tanter, "With Eyes Wide Shut: Japan, Heisei Militarization, and the Bush Doctrine," in Confronting the Bush Doctrine: Critical Views from the Asia-Pacific, ed. Peter Van Ness and Mel Gurtov (London and New York: Routledge Curzon, 2005), 154.
13. Richard J. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 4 (Fall 2006): 111-27.
14. David Arase, "Japan, The Active State? Security Policy After 9/11," Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 560-83.
15. Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NYand London: Cornell University Press, 2007), 64, 84, 107, 181.
16. Tomohito Shinoda, "Becoming More Realistic in the Post-Cold War: Japan's Changing Media and Public Opinion on National Security," Japanese Journal of Political Science 8, no. 2 (August 2007): 171-90.
17. Despite recent attempts to moderate the academic tendency to "overemphasize" or "overly dramatize" the changes that Japanese foreign security policy has undergone thus far, there is still much agreement on the factual circumstances that warrant discussion of such a change in the first place.
18. See Linus Hagstrom and Jon Williamsson, "'Remilitarization,' Really? Assessing Change in Japanese Foreign Security Policy," Asian Security 5, no. 3 (2009): 242-72.
19. On the increasing public acceptance of a revision of Article 9, see "Kenponi kan suru kihon shiryo" [Basic materials concerning the Constitution], 2001-2006, http://www.k3.dion.ne.jp/_keporin/siryou.htm.
20. Iokibe Makoto, Sengo Nihongaikoshi [A History of Postwar Japanese Diplomacy] (Tokyo: Yuhikakuaruma, 2006), 108.
21. On changing attitudes in political circles, see Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan: Military Modernization in Search of a 'Normal' Security Role," in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and Michael Wills (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research), 115.
22. Arase, "Japan, The Active State?" 573.
23. However, some argue that Japan is probably still a long way from acquiring a nuclear capability. See Christopher W. Hughes, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons: Implications for the Nuclear Ambitions of Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," Asia Policy, no. 3 (January 2007): 83-93.
24. Llewelyn Hughes, "Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet): International and Domestic Constraints on the Nuclearization of Japan," International Security 31, no. 4 (Spring 2007): 67-96.
25. For a thorough assessment of change in Japanese foreign security policy, see Hagstrom and Williamsson, "'Remilitarization,' Really?"
26. Above all, perhaps, Katzenstein and Okawara, "Japan's National Security," 194.
27. Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security 18, no. 2 (Fall 1993): 54-5, 64-70.
28. Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security 17, no. 4 (Spring 1993): 37-8, 46-7.
29. Kenneth N. Waltz, "Structural Realism after the Cold War," International Security 25, no. 1 (Summer 2000): 30, 32-5.
30. Cf. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," 114.
31. Hironori Sasada, "Youth and Nationalism in Japan," SAIS Review 26, no. 2, (Summer/Fall 2006): 113-14.
32. Arase, "Japan, The Active State?," 575-80.
33. Pyle, Japan Rising, 2.
34. Samuels, Securing Japan, 125-57.
35. Andrew L. Oros, "The Domestic and International Politics of Constitutional Change in Japan," Education About Asia 12, no. 3 (Winter 2007): 43.
36. Frances Rosenbluth, Jun Saito, and Annalisa Zinn, "America's Policy Toward East Asia: How It Looks from Japan," Asian Survey 47, no. 4 (July/August 2007): 595.
37. Yoichiro Sato, "The GSDF Will Go to Iraq Without a Blue Helmet," PacNet, no. 32, July 31, 2003, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/pac0332.pdf.
38. Stephen M.Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 22.
39. This is a rather conventional understanding of power in International Relations, especially in works representing various forms of realism. For an elaboration and a critique of this concept, and the way in which it is applied to Japan, see Linus Hagstrom, "Relational Power for Foreign Policy Analysis: Issues in Japan's China Policy," European Journal of International Relations 11, no. 3 (September 2005): 395-9.
40. Walt, The Origin of Alliances, 23. Of course, certain states-the United States in particular-have the logistical means to project power across the globe, regardless of physical distance.
41. Ibid. 24.
42. Since military and logistical capabilities for long-distance campaigns are both aspects of "offensive power," this criterion relates closely to the first two criteria and in a sense makes them superfluous.
43. Note. 25.
44. These three years were selected for representing relative calm in the international relations of Northeast Asia, at least compared to the disturbed state of regional affairs caused by the killings at Tiananmen Square (1989).
45. by the first North Korean nuclear crisis (1992-94).
46. by the Chinese nuclear weapons testing (1995).
47. by the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Japan-U.S. Joint Declaration on Security (1996).
48. by the firing of a North Korean missile over Japanese airspace (1998).
49. and by the icy relations between China and Japan (2001-2006). In 2006, moreover, the regional order was greatly upset by the North Korean testing of missiles and nuclear weapons. Although no year is completely eventless, and although policies during "calmer" years are bound to be affected by experiences from previous years, selecting less eventful years does help to avoid any distortion by unusually dramatic and unrepresentative foreign policies caused by "spur of the moment" reactions. Moreover, taking three years with a consistent time gap of eight years has the advantage that it highlights policy differences over time.
50. Jennifer M. Lind, "Pacifism or Passing the Buck: Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy," International Security 29, no. 1 (Summer 2004): 110.
51. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," 113.
52. Masaru Tamamoto, "A Nationalist's Lament: The Slippery Slope of Koizumi's Foreign Policy," Asia Program Special Report, February 2005, 12.
53. Public attitudes are analyzed in Shinoda, "Becoming More Realistic in the Post-Cold War."
54. Barry Buzan, Ole Waever and Jaap de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for Analysis (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, date), 23-4.
55. As for China, see e.g. Kazuko Mori, "New Relations between China and Japan: AGloomy, Frail Rivalry," Modern Asian Studies Review, 2 (2006), 57-63.
56. Linus Hagstrom, "Sino-Japanese Relations: The Ice that Won't Melt," International Journal 64, no. 1 (Winter 2008/09): 234-8.
57. As for North Korea, see e.g. Tessa Morris-Suzuki, "The Politics of Hysteria: America's Iraq, Japan's North Korea," Japan in theWorld, February 13, 2003, 5, http://www.iwanami.co.jp/jpworld/text/politicsofhysteria01.html.
58. Hyung Gu Lynn, "Vicarious Traumas: Television and Public Opinion in Japan's North Korea Policy," Pacific Affairs 79, no. 3 (Fall 2006): 483-508.
59. Samuels, Securing Japan, 81, 150.
60. Johan Eriksson, "Introduction," in Threat Politics: New Perspectives on Security, Risk and Crisis Management, ed. Johan Eriksson (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001), 15.
61. For statements representing the Chinese position, the editions of China's National Defense of 1998, 2000, 2006, and 2008 have been used. Unfortunately the Chinese Ministry of Defense did not produce this publication prior to 1998, making the period 1991-99 more difficult to assess than 1999-2007. As this is a bi-annual publication it was also not possible to target 1999 and 2007.
62. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1991-1992 (Oxford: Nuffield Press, 1991), 150-3.
63. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999-2000 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 186-9.
64. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007 (Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2007), 346-50.
65. David Shambaugh, "China's Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress," in Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty, ed. Ashley J. Tellis and MichaelWills (Washington, DC: National Bureau of Asian Research), 79.
66. Oros, "Domestic and International Politics," 44, endnote 14.
67. IISS, Military Balance 1991-1992, 150-3
68. IISS, Military Balance 1999-2000, 186-9
69. and IISS, Military Balance 2007, 346-50.
70. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1991-1992, 167-6
71. The Military Balance 1999-2000, 193-4
72. The Military Balance 2007, 357-9.
73. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1999-2000, 172.
74. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007, 331.
75. "MSDF's SM-3 Test Fails to Shoot Down Missile," Japan Times Online, November 21, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20081121a3.html.
76. "ASDF Shoots Down Missile in PAC-3 Test," Japan Times Online, September 19, 2008, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20080919a2.html.
77. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Joint Interview Given by Premier Wen Jiabao to Japanese Press," April 5, 2007.
78. cf. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on March 1, 2007," March 2, 2007.
79. "Foreign Ministry Spokesman Qin Gang's Regular Press Conference on March 13, 2007," March 14, 2007. PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs materials are available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/.
80. Government of the PRC, State Council, China's National Defense 1998, Chapter II.
81. Government of the PRC, State Council, China's National Defense 2000, Chapter II. All editions of China's National Defense are available at http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/27/content_17524.htm.
82. Government of the PRC, State Council, China's National Defense 2006, Chapter II.
83. Government of the PRC, State Council, China's National Defense 2008, Chapter II.
84. Government of the PRC, China's National Defense 1998, Chapter I.
85. Government of the PRC, China's National Defense 2000, Chapter I.
86. Ibid., Chapter V.
87. Government of the PRC, China's National Defense 2006, Chapter I.
88. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, "Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Qin Gang's Press Conference on February 27, 2007," February 28, 2007.
89. Government of the PRC, China's National Defense 2008, Chapters XIII and XIV.
90. Yasuhiro Matsuda, "Japanese Assessments of China's Military Development," Asian Perspective 31, no. 3 (2007), 187.
91. Cf. Hagstrom, "Sino-Japanese Relations," 236, 240.
92. "Japan Should Not Act Rashly," KCNA, January 5, 1999. All KCNA articles are available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
93. "Rodong Sinmun on Japan's Decision to Develop Information-Gathering Satellites," KCNA, January 7, 1999, http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
94. "Rodong Sinmun on Japan's Decision".
95. "Forestalling Attack Will Lead to Self-Destruction," KCNA, March 9, 1999.
96. "Samurais Draw Swords for Reinvasion of Korea," KCNA, May 7, 1999.
97. "Japanese Moves for Overseas Aggression Assailed," KCNA, July 29, 1999.
98. "Japan's Frenzied Moves for Overseas Aggression," KCNA, September 19, 1999. All KCNA articles are available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
99. See, for example, "Japanese Reactionaries' Moves for Militarization Assailed," KCNA, January 17, 2007.
100. "Japan's Ambition for Reinvasion Blasted," KCNA, January 31, 2007.
101. "Japanese Reactionaries' Preemptive Attack Doctrine Debunked," KCNA, May 22, 2007.
102. "Japan, Sworn Enemy of Korean Nation," KCNA, July 24, 2007. All KCNA articles are available at http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
103. "Samurai's War Hysteria under Fire," KCNA, January 4, 2007.
104. "Japs' Foolish Bid for Permanent Membership of UNSC Ridiculed," KCNA, January 6, 2007.
105. "Japanese Reactionaries' Ambition to Grab Tok Islet under Fire," January 25, 2007.
106. "Japan's Ambition for Reinvasion Blasted," http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
107. "Abe's Reckless Remarks under Fire," KCNA, March 7, 2007, http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
108. "Abe Regime under Fire for Denying Japan's Past Crimes," KCNA, April 13, 2007, http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
109. "KCNA Blasts Japan's Sinister Moves to Scuttle Six-Party Talks," KCNA, February 9, 2007.
110. "KCNA Blasts Japan's Scheme to Scuttle Six-Party Talks," KCNA, March 20, 2007.
111. "Japan's Participation in Six-Party Talks Would Create Only Instability in Their Work: KCNA," KCNA, July 4, 2007, http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
112. "Japan Urged to Repatriate All Abductees of DPRK," KCNA, July 10, 2007, http://www.kcna.co.jp/.
113. Here we probably disagree with Hughes, "Why Japan Will Not Go Nuclear (Yet)," 71.
114. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 1991 [Diplomatic Bluebook 1991], Chapter 4, Section 3.1.2. Most MOFA materials quoted in this article are available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/.
115. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 1992 [Diplomatic Bluebook 1992], Chapter 3, Section 3.1.1-2.
116. Japan's Defense Agency, Bo-ei hakusho 1991 [Defense of Japan 1991], Chapter 1, Section 5. Japanese editions of Defense of Japan are available at http://www.clearing.mod.go.jp/hakusho_web/.
117. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 2000 [Diplomatic Bluebook 2000] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000), 38-41.
118. E.g. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference by the Press Secretary," April 20, 1999.
119. Japan's Defense Agency, Bo-ei hakusho 1999 [Defense of Japan 1999], Chapter 1, Section 3.4.3.
120. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 2008 [Diplomatic Bluebook 2008] (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2008), 4.
121. See, for example, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference," February 16, 2007.
122. Japan's Defense Agency, Bo-ei hakusho 2007 [Defense of Japan 2007] (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2007), 49.
123. Ibid., 49-50.
124. Ibid., 55.
125. However, in December 2005, then-Foreign Minister Taro Aso-went so far as to call China "a considerable threat." This was later denied in a written statement, but Aso- repeated his assessment in April of the following year.
126. see Kanako Takahara, "China Posing a Threat: Aso," Japan Times Online, December 23, 2005.
127. Reiji Yoshida, "It's Official: China Not a Threat," Japan Times Online, February 1, 2006.
128. "Aso Says Chinaa Threat. Shrine Overtures Rebuffed," Japan Times Online, April 3, 2006. Articles in the Japan Times are available at http://www.japantimes.co.jp/.
129. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 1991, Chapter 4, Section 2.3.
130. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 1992, Chapter 3, Section 2.2.3.
131. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama to the General Session of the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference," Kuala Lumpur, July 22, 1991.
132. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Foreign Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Michio Watanabe to the 123rd Session of the National Diet," January 24, 1992.
133. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference by the Press Secretary," February 12, 1999.
134. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference by the Press Secretary," March 9, 1999.
135. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference by the Press Secretary," July 13, 1999.
136. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference by the Press Secretary," March 23, 1999.
137. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference by the Press Secretary," March 30, 1999.
138. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 2000, 19-22.
139. th Session of the Diet," January 19, 1999.
140. Japan's Defense Agency, Bo-ei hakusho 1999, Chapter 1, Section 3.2.2.
141. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Gaiko seisho 2008, 2.
142. Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference," March 22, 2007.
143. See, for example, Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Press Conference," March 6, 2007; "Press Conference," March 13, 2007.
144. Japan's Ministry of Defense, Bo-ei hakusho 2007, 34.
145. Ibid., 38.
146. Genron NPO, "Japan-China Joint Opinion Polls Reference Material," August 17, 2007, http://www.genron-npo.net/en/beijingtokyo2007/002797.html.
147. other polls cited in Matsuda, "Japanese Assessments of China's Military Development," 185.
148. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2007, 354-7.
149. Walt, The Origin of Alliances, 275-9.
150. On the fear of U.S. abandonment of Japan, see, for example. Samuels, "Japan's Goldilocks Strategy," 114.
151. Hughes, "North Korea's Nuclear Weapons," 80-1; 89-90.
152. "Saikin no nicchū kankei to chūgoku jijō" [Recent Japan-China relations and the Chinese situation], Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China Division, November 2007.
153. and "Chūgoku no keizai jijōto Nicchu- keizai kankei" [The Chinese economic situation and Japan China economic relations], Japan External Trade Organization, China and North Asia Division, October 2007.
154. Yoichi Funabashi, "Keeping Up With Asia: America and the New Balance of Power," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 5 (September/October 2008): 111. At the time of writing in May 2009, however, the Six-Party Talks were deadlocked.