Pacifism or passing the buck? Testing theories of Japanese security policy

International Security

Volumn 29, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 92-121

  Lind, Jennifer M ^a  

^a DARTMOUTH COLLEGE   (United States)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 4544278633     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/0162288041762968     Document Type: Review

References (171)

1. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
2. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
3. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
4. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
5. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
6. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
7. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
8. Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Sun-Ki Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine: Three Techniques for Institutionalization," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 389-412; Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 84-118; Thomas U. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum: Japan's Culture of Anti-militarism," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 119-150; Yoshihide Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 198-233; Glenn D. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan (London: Routledge, 1996); and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: East Asia Program, Cornell University, 1993).
9. For analyses predicting more assertive Japanese policies, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); and Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
10. For analyses predicting more assertive Japanese policies, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); and Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
11. For analyses predicting more assertive Japanese policies, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); and Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
12. For analyses predicting more assertive Japanese policies, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79; George Friedman and Meredith LeBard, The Coming War with Japan (New York: St. Martin's, 1991); and Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970).
13. For example, Richard K. Betts speculates on Japan's propensity to become "a regular military power." Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), p. 60. Denny Roy comments on "Japan's military weakness." Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Eugene A. Matthews writes, "[It is] unnatural for a country with Japan's international stature not to have a standing army," and that Japan's "armed services are unimpressive and weak, even compared to those of some of its neighbors." Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), p. 79.
14. For example, Richard K. Betts speculates on Japan's propensity to become "a regular military power." Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), p. 60. Denny Roy comments on "Japan's military weakness." Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Eugene A. Matthews writes, "[It is] unnatural for a country with Japan's international stature not to have a standing army," and that Japan's "armed services are unimpressive and weak, even compared to those of some of its neighbors." Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), p. 79.
15. For example, Richard K. Betts speculates on Japan's propensity to become "a regular military power." Betts, "Wealth, Power, and Instability: East Asia and the United States after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), p. 60. Denny Roy comments on "Japan's military weakness." Roy, "Hegemon on the Horizon? China's Threat to East Asian Security," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 149-168. Eugene A. Matthews writes, "[It is] unnatural for a country with Japan's international stature not to have a standing army," and that Japan's "armed services are unimpressive and weak, even compared to those of some of its neighbors." Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 82, No. 6 (November/December 2003), p. 79.
16. For example, in the post-World War II era, either a Japanese strategy of conquest or buck-passing could have been consistent with the realist paradigm. Realism, as a paradigm, therefore is not "confirmed" or "falsified" by Japanese security policy.
17. Berger, "From Sword to Chrysanthemum," p. 120.
18. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 194-195. Katzenstein argues that in 1994 Japan was ranked twenty-fifth in the world in terms of ground power, sixteenth in the world in terms of air power, and eighth in the world in terms of naval power. On the evolution of Japanese capabilities in the 1980s, see ibid., pp. 132-138.
19. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 194-195. Katzenstein argues that in 1994 Japan was ranked twenty-fifth in the world in terms of ground power, sixteenth in the world in terms of air power, and eighth in the world in terms of naval power. On the evolution of Japanese capabilities in the 1980s, see ibid., pp. 132-138.
20. Paul Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy," Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 11, 16.
21. Soeya, "Japan: Normative Constraints versus Structural Imperatives," p. 226.
22. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy"; and David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85.
23. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy"; and David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85.
24. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy"; and David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85.
25. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy"; and David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85.
26. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy"; and David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57-85.
27. For example, this flawed measure of military power yields the implausible conclusion that the United States is militarily weaker than Angola, Serbia, or Yemen, each of which spends a higher fraction of its GDP on defense than the United States. The United States spends 3 percent of its GDP on defense; Angola spends 19 percent, Serbia 10 percent, and Yemen 8 percent. From International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2001-2002 (London: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 300-303.
28. For a recent prominent example of an analysis using this imprecise, but useful, measure of aggregate power, see William C. Wohlforth, "The Stability of a Unipolar World," International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.
29. PPP numbers, however, probably overstate Russian and Chinese military power. See ibid.
30. A U.S. armored division, by comparison, typically includes about 300 tanks and 250 other armored fighting vehicles. Japan has only 200 Type-90 tanks (which are very modern and of the same generation as a U.S. Abrams M-1 tank) and about 290 other modern armored vehicles (Type-89 and Type-96 armored personnel carriers). International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2002-2003 (London: Oxford University Press, 2002).
31. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2001-2002 (London: Jane's Information Group, 2001), p. 299. Japan appears to be broadening its precision strike capabilities. See Patricia J. Parmalee, "JDAM Kits to Be Installed on Japan's F-2s," Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 1, 2003, p. 13.
32. Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2001-2002 (London: Jane's Information Group, 2001), p. 299. Japan appears to be broadening its precision strike capabilities. See Patricia J. Parmalee, "JDAM Kits to Be Installed on Japan's F-2s," Aviation Week & Space Technology, September 1, 2003, p. 13.
33. Substantial advantages accrue to the air force that enjoys superior command and control and situational awareness. For a description of these advantages in the air war over Vietnam, see Marshall L. Michel III, Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), especially pp. 175-178. See also the description of the air battle between Israel and Syria over the Bekaa Valley in 1982, in Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 92-96.
34. Substantial advantages accrue to the air force that enjoys superior command and control and situational awareness. For a description of these advantages in the air war over Vietnam, see Marshall L. Michel III, Clashes: Air Combat over North Vietnam, 1965-1972 (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1997), especially pp. 175-178. See also the description of the air battle between Israel and Syria over the Bekaa Valley in 1982, in Benjamin S. Lambeth, The Transformation of American Air Power (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2000), pp. 92-96.
35. Without aerial refueling, the F-15J combat radius is approximately 550 miles. This radius measures the maximum distance from Japanese air bases at which Japanese fighters could set up airborne patrols. Combat radius data are estimated from U.S. F-15s, which have roughly the same flight characteristics as Japanese F-15Js. See Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2001-2002, pp. 575-577. See also David A. Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick-Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), p. 57.
36. Without aerial refueling, the F-15J combat radius is approximately 550 miles. This radius measures the maximum distance from Japanese air bases at which Japanese fighters could set up airborne patrols. Combat radius data are estimated from U.S. F-15s, which have roughly the same flight characteristics as Japanese F-15Js. See Jane's All the World's Aircraft, 2001-2002, pp. 575-577. See also David A. Shlapak, John Stillion, Olga Oliker, and Tanya Charlick-Paley, A Global Access Strategy for the U.S. Air Force (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2002), p. 57.
37. The JASDF is purchasing four Boeing 767 tanker aircraft, with the first aircraft due for delivery in 2006. The JASDF has already begun training F-15J pilots for aerial refueling with U.S. tankers. See "Japan MOF OKs Outlay to Introduce Tanker Aircraft," Jiji Press wire service, December 20, 2001, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) JPP20011220000032; see also "Japan SDF to Begin Aerial Refueling Training in April," Jiji Press wire service, November 26, 2002, in FBIS JPP20021126000118.
38. The United States has the world's most powerful navy. Japan and Great Britain probably vie for second place.
39. Each battle group includes a destroyer with an advanced Aegis radar system, which protects the fleet from air and missile attacks. Of critical importance, the Aegis system, in combination with the Standard Missile, can defend the Japanese fleet from enemy aircraft beyond the range of most antiship cruise missiles.
40. Japan owns eighty P-3C aircraft. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2003-2004 (London: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 159. They have a mission radius of 1,000-1,300 nautical miles and are armed with Harpoon missiles. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ aircraft/p-3.htm. Currently Japan's P-3Cs cannot be escorted to their maximum range by fighter aircraft because the fighters have shorter range. But as the JASDF begins to field aerial refueling aircraft, it can escort their maritime patrol aircraft on long-range missions, greatly multiplying their potential effectiveness.
41. Japan owns eighty P-3C aircraft. International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2003-2004 (London: Oxford University Press, 2004) p. 159. They have a mission radius of 1,000-1,300 nautical miles and are armed with Harpoon missiles. See http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/systems/ aircraft/p-3.htm. Currently Japan's P-3Cs cannot be escorted to their maximum range by fighter aircraft because the fighters have shorter range. But as the JASDF begins to field aerial refueling aircraft, it can escort their maritime patrol aircraft on long-range missions, greatly multiplying their potential effectiveness.
42. Japanese P-3s could devastate the navy of any East Asian country. None of Japan's neighbors have naval forces with sophisticated air defense systems. In an unpublished analysis, Derek Eaton of RAND demonstrates the extreme vulnerability of surface ships with limited air defense capabilities to modern antiship cruise missiles and aircraft. In his analysis of the 1982 Falklands War, Eaton shows that even the poorly equipped and poorly trained Argentine air force was able to do great damage to the vaunted British navy. With only five antiship missiles in their inventory, the Argentines sank two British ships. Eaton notes that the Chinese navy has less capable air defense systems today than the British had in 1982. Eaton, "The Falkland Islands War," 2000. The Chinese navy, or the navy of any other East Asian country, would be highly vulnerable to Japanese P-3s.
43. For a useful survey, see Michael J. Green, "State of the Field Report: Research on Japanese Security Policy," Access Asia Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (September 1998), pp. 5-39.
44. Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 10; and Katzenstein. Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 3.
45. Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 10; and Katzenstein. Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 3.
46. Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine"; Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 10; and Katzenstein. Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 3.
47. Constructivists are not the only ones who argue that Japanese security policy is inconsistent with realism. David C. Kang, for example, discusses "Realism's Japan Problem." Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," p. 73. Chalmers Johnson writes, "The cases of prewar and postwar Japan directly challenge realist theory." Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 203.
48. Constructivists are not the only ones who argue that Japanese security policy is inconsistent with realism. David C. Kang, for example, discusses "Realism's Japan Problem." Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," p. 73. Chalmers Johnson writes, "The cases of prewar and postwar Japan directly challenge realist theory." Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 203.
49. Constructivists are not the only ones who argue that Japanese security policy is inconsistent with realism. David C. Kang, for example, discusses "Realism's Japan Problem." Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," p. 73. Chalmers Johnson writes, "The cases of prewar and postwar Japan directly challenge realist theory." Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 203.
50. Constructivists are not the only ones who argue that Japanese security policy is inconsistent with realism. David C. Kang, for example, discusses "Realism's Japan Problem." Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," p. 73. Chalmers Johnson writes, "The cases of prewar and postwar Japan directly challenge realist theory." Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard N. Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 203.
51. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, p. 8.
52. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 24, 204.
53. Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine," p. 393.
54. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 119, 116.
55. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 6.
56. Hook, Militarization and Demilitarization in Contemporary Japan, p. 8.
57. Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine." Katzenstein also argues that article 9 is an important restraint on Japanese security policy. See Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 148.
58. Chai, "Entrenching the Yoshida Defense Doctrine." Katzenstein also argues that article 9 is an important restraint on Japanese security policy. See Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 148.
59. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
60. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
61. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
62. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
63. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001); Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America's World Role (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998); Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 68-83; Eric J. Labs, "Beyond Victory: Offensive Realism and the Expansion of War Aims," Security Studies, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Summer 1997), pp. 1-49; and Randall L. Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State Back In," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Summer 1994), pp. 72-107.
64. Offensive realism is often mischaracterized as predicting that states will always pursue aggressive policies. For a clarification, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79, 164-165.
65. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
66. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
67. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
68. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
69. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Charles L. Glaser, "Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), pp. 50-90; Charles L. Glaser, "The Security Dilemma Revisited," World Politics, Vol. 50, No. 1 (October 1997), pp. 171-201; Jack L. Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); and Stephen Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999).
70. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17-22; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161; Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172; Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; and Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. ix-xx.
71. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17-22; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161; Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172; Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; and Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. ix-xx.
72. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17-22; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161; Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172; Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; and Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. ix-xx.
73. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17-22; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161; Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172; Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; and Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. ix-xx.
74. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17-22; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161; Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172; Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; and Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. ix-xx.
75. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 17-22; Jeffrey W. Taliaferro, "Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited," International Security, Vol. 25, No. 3 (Winter 2000/01), pp. 128-161; Gideon Rose, "Neoclassical Realism and Theories of Foreign Policy," World Politics, Vol. 51, No. 1 (October 1998), pp. 144-172; Stephen G. Brooks, "Dueling Realisms," International Organization, Vol. 51, No. 3 (Summer 1997), pp. 445-477; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157-182; and Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 3 (Spring 1996), pp. ix-xx.
76. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 162-164; and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
77. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 162-164; and Schweller, "Bandwagoning for Profit."
78. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). For a discussion of other strategies, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 5.
79. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). For a discussion of other strategies, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 5.
80. Waltz, Theory of International Politics; and Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987). For a discussion of other strategies, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, chap. 5.
81. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-496; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an example of a realist buck-passing strategy for the United States, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48. On Japanese buck-passing, see Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235-262.
82. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-496; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an example of a realist buck-passing strategy for the United States, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48. On Japanese buck-passing, see Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235-262.
83. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-496; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an example of a realist buck-passing strategy for the United States, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48. On Japanese buck-passing, see Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235-262.
84. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-496; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an example of a realist buck-passing strategy for the United States, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48. On Japanese buck-passing, see Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235-262.
85. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-496; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an example of a realist buck-passing strategy for the United States, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48. On Japanese buck-passing, see Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235-262.
86. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-496; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an example of a realist buck-passing strategy for the United States, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48. On Japanese buck-passing, see Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235-262.
87. Thomas J. Christensen and Jack Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance Patterns in Multipolarity," International Organization, Vol. 44, No. 2 (Spring 1990), pp. 137-168; Glenn H. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1984), pp. 461-496; Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics; Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984); and Robert Powell, In the Shadow of Power: States and Strategies in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For an example of a realist buck-passing strategy for the United States, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48. On Japanese buck-passing, see Susan J. Pharr, "Japan's Defensive Foreign Policy and the Politics of Burden Sharing," in Gerald L. Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War: Coping with Change (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), pp. 235-262.
88. On the distribution of alliance costs, see Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48 (1966), pp. 266-279; Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
89. On the distribution of alliance costs, see Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48 (1966), pp. 266-279; Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
90. On the distribution of alliance costs, see Mancur Olson and Richard Zeckhauser, "An Economic Theory of Alliances," Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 48 (1966), pp. 266-279; Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
91. On the connection between geography and buck-passing, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 273. On the role of military technology, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43.
92. On the connection between geography and buck-passing, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 273. On the role of military technology, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43.
93. On the connection between geography and buck-passing, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 273. On the role of military technology, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43.
94. On the connection between geography and buck-passing, see Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, p. 273. On the role of military technology, see Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks"; Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167-214; and Stephen Van Evera, "Offense, Defense, and the Causes of War," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 5-43.
95. Offensive realists focus on the presence of a wealthy ally that is willing to pay the costs of containing a threat; other scholars have also noted the importance of that ally's credibility. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). On what causes states to appear credible, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Realists have hypothesized numerous other conditions that make states more likely to adopt strategies that transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others. For example, both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is most common in multipolar systems. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79; and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Barry Posen has written that states will prefer to pass the buck when the expected cost of fighting is high. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. And Robert Powell has argued that states will engage in buck-passing (or, "wait") if the extent to which military capabilities cumulate is low. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
96. Offensive realists focus on the presence of a wealthy ally that is willing to pay the costs of containing a threat; other scholars have also noted the importance of that ally's credibility. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). On what causes states to appear credible, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Realists have hypothesized numerous other conditions that make states more likely to adopt strategies that transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others. For example, both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is most common in multipolar systems. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79; and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Barry Posen has written that states will prefer to pass the buck when the expected cost of fighting is high. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. And Robert Powell has argued that states will engage in buck-passing (or, "wait") if the extent to which military capabilities cumulate is low. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
97. Offensive realists focus on the presence of a wealthy ally that is willing to pay the costs of containing a threat; other scholars have also noted the importance of that ally's credibility. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). On what causes states to appear credible, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Realists have hypothesized numerous other conditions that make states more likely to adopt strategies that transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others. For example, both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is most common in multipolar systems. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79; and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Barry Posen has written that states will prefer to pass the buck when the expected cost of fighting is high. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. And Robert Powell has argued that states will engage in buck-passing (or, "wait") if the extent to which military capabilities cumulate is low. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
98. Offensive realists focus on the presence of a wealthy ally that is
99. Offensive realists focus on the presence of a wealthy ally that is willing to pay the costs of containing a threat; other scholars have also noted the importance of that ally's credibility. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). On what causes states to appear credible, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Realists have hypothesized numerous other conditions that make states more likely to adopt strategies that transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others. For example, both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is most common in multipolar systems. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79; and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Barry Posen has written that states will prefer to pass the buck when the expected cost of fighting is high. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. And Robert Powell has argued that states will engage in buck-passing (or, "wait") if the extent to which military capabilities cumulate is low. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
100. Offensive realists focus on the presence of a wealthy ally that is willing to pay the costs of containing a threat; other scholars have also noted the importance of that ally's credibility. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). On what causes states to appear credible, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Realists have hypothesized numerous other conditions that make states more likely to adopt strategies that transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others. For example, both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is most common in multipolar systems. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79; and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Barry Posen has written that states will prefer to pass the buck when the expected cost of fighting is high. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. And Robert Powell has argued that states will engage in buck-passing (or, "wait") if the extent to which military capabilities cumulate is low. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
101. Offensive realists focus on the presence of a wealthy ally that is willing to pay the costs of containing a threat; other scholars have also noted the importance of that ally's credibility. Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics"; and Victor D. Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism: The U.S.-Korea-Japan Security Triangle (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1999). On what causes states to appear credible, see Daryl G. Press, Calculating Credibility (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, forthcoming). Realists have hypothesized numerous other conditions that make states more likely to adopt strategies that transfer the costs of containing a threat onto others. For example, both offensive and defensive realists note that buck-passing is most common in multipolar systems. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79; and Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks." Barry Posen has written that states will prefer to pass the buck when the expected cost of fighting is high. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine. And Robert Powell has argued that states will engage in buck-passing (or, "wait") if the extent to which military capabilities cumulate is low. Powell, In the Shadow of Power.
102. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 23; Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 153-185.
103. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 23; Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytical Eclecticism," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 2001/02), pp. 153-185.
104. Previous analyses of Japanese security and realist theory include Paul Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy," Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 1-43; Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security," Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 178-219; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Postelassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy," Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001), pp. 221-240; and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171-203.
105. Previous analyses of Japanese security and realist theory include Paul Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy," Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 1-43; Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security," Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 178-219; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Postelassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy," Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001), pp. 221-240; and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171-203.
106. Previous analyses of Japanese security and realist theory include Paul Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy," Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 1-43; Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security," Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 178-219; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Postelassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy," Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001), pp. 221-240; and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171-203.
107. Previous analyses of Japanese security and realist theory include Paul Midford, "The Logic of Reassurance and Japan's Grand Strategy," Security Studies, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Spring 2002), pp. 1-43; Christopher P. Twomey, "Japan, the Circumscribed Balancer: Building on Defensive Realism to Make Predictions About East Asian Security," Security Studies, Vol. 9, No. 4 (Summer 2000), pp. 178-219; Tsuyoshi Kawasaki, "Postelassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy," Pacific Review, Vol. 14, No. 2 (2001), pp. 221-240; and Eric Heginbotham and Richard J. Samuels, "Mercantile Realism and Japanese Foreign Policy," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Spring 1998), pp. 171-203.
108. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 116.
109. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 194.
110. Some scholars have argued that U.S. credibility to defend Japan varied during the Cold War. See, for example, Cha, Alignment Despite Antagonism. I argue, however, that during the Cold War, U.S. credibility may have varied somewhat, but it always remained relatively high. The primary U.S. security strategy during the Cold War was to deny the Soviet Union control over the major industrial centers of the world. Japan was consistently singled out as one of these centers.
111. Mearsheimer, Tragedy of Great Power Politics, pp. 76-79.
112. Before the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviets maintained only 12-14 divisions in the Far East (out of their 160 total divisions). Even after the rift with China, the Soviets deployed only 30 ground divisions in the Far East. They also deployed tactical nuclear weapons and bombers in the region, but these were deployed near the Chinese border and were clearly aimed at China. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), p. 193. For information on Soviet divisions, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1962-1963 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962); and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1970-1971 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970).
113. Before the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviets maintained only 12-14 divisions in the Far East (out of their 160 total divisions). Even after the rift with China, the Soviets deployed only 30 ground divisions in the Far East. They also deployed tactical nuclear weapons and bombers in the region, but these were deployed near the Chinese border and were clearly aimed at China. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), p. 193. For information on Soviet divisions, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1962-1963 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962); and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1970-1971 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970).
114. Before the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviets maintained only 12-14 divisions in the Far East (out of their 160 total divisions). Even after the rift with China, the Soviets deployed only 30 ground divisions in the Far East. They also deployed tactical nuclear weapons and bombers in the region, but these were deployed near the Chinese border and were clearly aimed at China. Lowell Dittmer, Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications, 1945-1990 (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1992), p. 193. For information on Soviet divisions, see International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1962-1963 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1962); and International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 1970-1971 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970).
115. David F. Winkler, Cold War at Sea: High-Seas Confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 2000), p. 142.
116. Larry Niksch, "Japanese Attitudes toward Defense and Security Issues," Naval War College Review, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July/August 1983), pp. 57-72.
117. Norman D. Levin, "The Strategic Environment in East Asia and U.S.-Korean Security Relations in the 1980s," RAND N-1960-FF (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, March 1983), p. 2.
118. The Kurile Islands (north of the northernmost Japanese island, Hokkaido) were deeded to the Soviet Union after World War II, but Japan continues to claim ownership.
119. Derek Da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 94; and Kensuke Ebata, "Soviets Simulate Attack on Japan," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 28, 1985, p. 664.
120. Derek Da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1990), p. 94; and Kensuke Ebata, "Soviets Simulate Attack on Japan," Jane's Defence Weekly, September 28, 1985, p. 664.
121. Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986).
122. Da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific.
123. Levin, "The Strategic Environment in East Asia and U.S.-Korean Security Relations in the 1980s," p. 2.
124. Hisahiko Okazaki, "Japan's Security Policy: A Time for Strategy," International Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (Fall 1982), pp. 188-197.
125. Quoted in Thomas B. Modly, "The Rhetoric and Realities of Japan's 1,000-Mile Sea Lane Defense Policy," Naval War College Review, Vol. 38, No. 1 (January/February 1985), pp. 25-36.
126. Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's International Relations (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1991), p. 78.
127. Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 1977), p. 7.
128. I b i d.
129. China is not yet a serious military competitor, but it is on the path to becoming one. See Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73; and Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44.
130. China is not yet a serious military competitor, but it is on the path to becoming one. See Avery Goldstein, "Great Expectations: Interpreting China's Arrival," International Security, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1997/98), pp. 36-73; and Robert S. Ross, "Beijing as a Conservative Power," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 2 (March/April 1997), pp. 33-44.
131. Japan agreed in 1996 to provide rear-area support for U.S. operations in the event of a Korean war. Although it has made no explicit commitments regarding a war over Taiwan, Japan would likely permit the United States to use its bases, and it would probably provide U.S. forces with logistical and medical support. This support might lead adversaries to target Japan with ballistic missiles during a war; North Korea or China might threaten Japan with missile attacks to keep Japan out of a conflict, or might strike U.S. bases in Japan to disrupt rear-area operations.
132. See the discussion of these threats in Japanese Defense Agency White Papers. For example, Japan Defense Agency, Defense of Japan (Tokyo: Japan Defense Agency, 2003).
133. Da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific, pp. 221-223.
134. John Welfield, An Empire in Eclipse: Japan in the Postwar American Alliance System (London: Athlone, 1988), p. 446.
135. "Japan to Procure 4 Aerial Tankers in 5 Years," Jiji Press wire service, December 15, 2000, in FBIS JPP20001214000127; and "ASDF Begins Midair Refueling Drills with U.S. Air Tanker," Japan Economic Newswire, April 23, 2003.
136. "Japan to Procure 4 Aerial Tankers in 5 Years," Jiji Press wire service, December 15, 2000, in FBIS JPP20001214000127; and "ASDF Begins Midair Refueling Drills with U.S. Air Tanker," Japan Economic Newswire, April 23, 2003.
137. Tokyo has not yet decided to procure any of the next-generation fighter aircraft (e.g., the U.S. F-22 and Joint Strike Fighter); instead it relies on F-15Js and continues to produce the F-2 (a domestic F-16 equivalent).
138. "Japan Eyes Helicopter Carrier to Bolster Defense," Mainichi Daily News, August 30, 2003, p. 8. Analysts have long speculated on when Japan might acquire aircraft carriers. Depending on how one defines an "aircraft carrier," Japan may have already done so. There are many different kinds of aircraft carriers, with substantial differences in combat power. The U.S. "supercarriers," displacing 80,000-100,000 plus tons, have catapults that permit them to launch high-performance aircraft. By contrast, France and Britain own substantially smaller ships that are also called "carriers"; they displace only 20,000-40,000 tons and can launch only vertical or short take-off and landing aircraft, which have limited range and capabilities. A handful of other nations deploy a still-smaller variety of carrier typically restricted to helicopters, although sometimes also vertical take-off and landing aircraft: for example, Spain's 17,000-ton carrier, or Italy's two carriers of 7,500 and 10,000 tons. Japan's amphibious assault ships are similar in size to Italy's; the two additional carriers will be larger than those owned by Italy and slightly smaller than that owned by Spain. For tonnage data, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/index.html.
139. "Japan Eyes Helicopter Carrier to Bolster Defense," Mainichi Daily News, August 30, 2003, p. 8. Analysts have long speculated on when Japan might acquire aircraft carriers. Depending on how one defines an "aircraft carrier," Japan may have already done so. There are many different kinds of aircraft carriers, with substantial differences in combat power. The U.S. "supercarriers," displacing 80,000-100,000 plus tons, have catapults that permit them to launch high-performance aircraft. By contrast, France and Britain own substantially smaller ships that are also called "carriers"; they displace only 20,000-40,000 tons and can launch only vertical or short take-off and landing aircraft, which have limited range and capabilities. A handful of other nations deploy a still-smaller variety of carrier typically restricted to helicopters, although sometimes also vertical take-off and landing aircraft: for example, Spain's 17,000-ton carrier, or Italy's two carriers of 7,500 and 10,000 tons. Japan's amphibious assault ships are similar in size to Italy's; the two additional carriers will be larger than those owned by Italy and slightly smaller than that owned by Spain. For tonnage data, see http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/index.html.
140. Patricia J. Parmalee, "Fifth Aegis to Japan," Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 13, 2002, p. 15.
141. "Patriot Plus," International Herald Tribune, September 1, 2003; and "Defense Agency Requests 142.3 Billion Yen for Missile Defense," Japan Economic Newswire, August 29, 2003.
142. "Patriot Plus," International Herald Tribune, September 1, 2003; and "Defense Agency Requests 142.3 Billion Yen for Missile Defense," Japan Economic Newswire, August 29, 2003.
143. These numbers include only those vessels acquired in 1995 or later to omit those ships that had been ordered and nearly completed during the Cold War. Jane's Fighting Ships, 2002 (London: S. Low, Marston, and Company, 2001).
144. Sheila A. Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation within the U.S.-Japan Alliance," in Michael J. Green and Patrick M. Cronin, eds., The U.S.-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999), p. 89.
145. Japan began participating in regional exercises such as Fleet-ex and RIMPAC (with not only the United States but also other aligned nations in East Asia). See Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation within the U.S.-Japan Alliance"; and Da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific.
146. Japan began participating in regional exercises such as Fleet-ex and RIMPAC (with not only the United States but also other aligned nations in East Asia). See Smith, "The Evolution of Military Cooperation within the U.S.-Japan Alliance"; and Da Cunha, Soviet Naval Power in the Pacific.
147. According to the 1992 peacekeeping operations law ("PKO law"), the following five conditions must be met for Japan to participate in United Nations peacekeeping operations: a cease-fire must be in effect; Japan must be totally neutral in the conflict; all sides in the conflict must agree to the presence of the Japanese peacekeepers; the peacekeepers must be withdrawn if any of the forgoing conditions are not met; and finally, the peacekeepers cannot use force except to defend themselves, other peacekeepers, or supplies. Japanese peacekeepers are permitted to carry only sidearms and rifles.
148. Paul Midford, "Japan's Response to Terror: Dispatching the SDF to the Arabian Sea," Asian Survey, Vol. 43, No. 2 (March/April 2003), pp. 329-351.
149. Washington had sought Japanese participation in theater missile defense (TMD) since 1993 but, as the buck-passing theory would predict, Japan resisted. In the fall of 1998, a month after North Korea launched a Taepodong rocket over Japan, the Japanese government agreed to participate with the United States in joint research on TMD, and a year later the two countries agreed to codevelop the system. See "Missile Deal Talks with U.S.," Financial Times, February 11, 1997, p. 6; "Defense Agency Gets OK for U.S.-led Missile Research," Mainichi Daily News, October 24, 1998, p. 1; and "Japan, U.S. Agree to Joint Research on Anti-missile Defense Program," Mainichi Daily News, August 17, 1999, p. 1.
150. Washington had sought Japanese participation in theater missile defense (TMD) since 1993 but, as the buck-passing theory would predict, Japan resisted. In the fall of 1998, a month after North Korea launched a Taepodong rocket over Japan, the Japanese government agreed to participate with the United States in joint research on TMD, and a year later the two countries agreed to codevelop the system. See "Missile Deal Talks with U.S.," Financial Times, February 11, 1997, p. 6; "Defense Agency Gets OK for U.S.-led Missile Research," Mainichi Daily News, October 24, 1998, p. 1; and "Japan, U.S. Agree to Joint Research on Anti-missile Defense Program," Mainichi Daily News, August 17, 1999, p. 1.
151. Washington had sought Japanese participation in theater missile defense (TMD) since 1993 but, as the buck-passing theory would predict, Japan resisted. In the fall of 1998, a month after North Korea launched a Taepodong rocket over Japan, the Japanese government agreed to participate with the United States in joint research on TMD, and a year later the two countries agreed to codevelop the system. See "Missile Deal Talks with U.S.," Financial Times, February 11, 1997, p. 6; "Defense Agency Gets OK for U.S.-led Missile Research," Mainichi Daily News, October 24, 1998, p. 1; and "Japan, U.S. Agree to Joint Research on Anti-missile Defense Program," Mainichi Daily News, August 17, 1999, p. 1.
152. The two new Aegis destroyers and the upgrades to existing Aegis destroyers are specifically designed to give these ships antiballistic missile capabilities. The other new destroyer escorts will likely support these TMD-capable Aegis ships. Even Japan's new submarines, aerial refueling capabilities, and satellite reconnaissance capabilities can be understood under an antiballistic missile rubric. If Japan later acquires land attack cruise missiles (which the JDA has already requested), Japan will have a significant offensive capability against enemy ballistic missile launchers. Japanese satellites could be used to locate missile launchers, and cruise missiles could be launched against them from Japanese submarines and aircraft (whose range is expanded by Japan's aerial refueling capabilities). The JDA has justified recent acquisitions-and requested cruise missiles-for exactly this mission. See Patricia Parmalee, "Japan Orders Feasibility Study on Introduction of Tomahawk Cruise Missile," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 14, 2003, p. 13; and "Japan Not Mulling Cruise Missiles for Actual Use," Japan Economic Newswire, March 28, 2003.
153. The two new Aegis destroyers and the upgrades to existing Aegis destroyers are specifically designed to give these ships antiballistic missile capabilities. The other new destroyer escorts will likely support these TMD-capable Aegis ships. Even Japan's new submarines, aerial refueling capabilities, and satellite reconnaissance capabilities can be understood under an antiballistic missile rubric. If Japan later acquires land attack cruise missiles (which the JDA has already requested), Japan will have a significant offensive capability against enemy ballistic missile launchers. Japanese satellites could be used to locate missile launchers, and cruise missiles could be launched against them from Japanese submarines and aircraft (whose range is expanded by Japan's aerial refueling capabilities). The JDA has justified recent acquisitions-and requested cruise missiles-for exactly this mission. See Patricia Parmalee, "Japan Orders Feasibility Study on Introduction of Tomahawk Cruise Missile," Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 14, 2003, p. 13; and "Japan Not Mulling Cruise Missiles for Actual Use," Japan Economic Newswire, March 28, 2003.
154. For speculation about recent developments and the future of Japanese security policy, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Mission to Iraq Eases Japan toward a True Military," New York Times, January 16, 2004, p. 3; Howard W. French, "Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense," New York Times, July 22, 2003, p. 1; "Onward and Upwards," Economist, May 31, 2003, p. 40; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Flexes Military Muscle Over Korea," Times (London), May 22, 2003, p. 18; Amy Webb and Hideko Takayama, "Japan's Military Complex," Newsweek, December 9, 2002, p. 22; Shane Green, "Asia's Old Empire Thinks Once Again of Disturbing the Peace, " Sydney Morning Herald, April 5, 2003, p. 18; and Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism."
155. For speculation about recent developments and the future of Japanese security policy, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Mission to Iraq Eases Japan toward a True Military," New York Times, January 16, 2004, p. 3; Howard W. French, "Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense," New York Times, July 22, 2003, p. 1; "Onward and Upwards," Economist, May 31, 2003, p. 40; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Flexes Military Muscle Over Korea," Times (London), May 22, 2003, p. 18; Amy Webb and Hideko Takayama, "Japan's Military Complex," Newsweek, December 9, 2002, p. 22; Shane Green, "Asia's Old Empire Thinks Once Again of Disturbing the Peace, " Sydney Morning Herald, April 5, 2003, p. 18; and Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism."
156. For speculation about recent developments and the future of Japanese security policy, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Mission to Iraq Eases Japan toward a True Military," New York Times, January 16, 2004, p. 3; Howard W. French, "Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense," New York Times, July 22, 2003, p. 1; "Onward and Upwards," Economist, May 31, 2003, p. 40; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Flexes Military Muscle Over Korea," Times (London), May 22, 2003, p. 18; Amy Webb and Hideko Takayama, "Japan's Military Complex," Newsweek, December 9, 2002, p. 22; Shane Green, "Asia's Old Empire Thinks Once Again of Disturbing the Peace, " Sydney Morning Herald, April 5, 2003, p. 18; and Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism."
157. For speculation about recent developments and the future of Japanese security policy, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Mission to Iraq Eases Japan toward a True Military," New York Times, January 16, 2004, p. 3; Howard W. French, "Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense," New York Times, July 22, 2003, p. 1; "Onward and Upwards," Economist, May 31, 2003, p. 40; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Flexes Military Muscle Over Korea," Times (London), May 22, 2003, p. 18; Amy Webb and Hideko Takayama, "Japan's Military Complex," Newsweek, December 9, 2002, p. 22; Shane Green, "Asia's Old Empire Thinks Once Again of Disturbing the Peace, " Sydney Morning Herald, April 5, 2003, p. 18; and Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism."
158. For speculation about recent developments and the future of Japanese security policy, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Mission to Iraq Eases Japan toward a True Military," New York Times, January 16, 2004, p. 3; Howard W. French, "Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense," New York Times, July 22, 2003, p. 1; "Onward and Upwards," Economist, May 31, 2003, p. 40; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Flexes Military Muscle Over Korea," Times (London), May 22, 2003, p. 18; Amy Webb and Hideko Takayama, "Japan's Military Complex," Newsweek, December 9, 2002, p. 22; Shane Green, "Asia's Old Empire Thinks Once Again of Disturbing the Peace, " Sydney Morning Herald, April 5, 2003, p. 18; and Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism."
159. For speculation about recent developments and the future of Japanese security policy, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Mission to Iraq Eases Japan toward a True Military," New York Times, January 16, 2004, p. 3; Howard W. French, "Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense," New York Times, July 22, 2003, p. 1; "Onward and Upwards," Economist, May 31, 2003, p. 40; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Flexes Military Muscle Over Korea," Times (London), May 22, 2003, p. 18; Amy Webb and Hideko Takayama, "Japan's Military Complex," Newsweek, December 9, 2002, p. 22; Shane Green, "Asia's Old Empire Thinks Once Again of Disturbing the Peace, " Sydney Morning Herald, April 5, 2003, p. 18; and Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism."
160. For speculation about recent developments and the future of Japanese security policy, see Norimitsu Onishi, "Mission to Iraq Eases Japan toward a True Military," New York Times, January 16, 2004, p. 3; Howard W. French, "Japan Faces Burden: Its Own Defense," New York Times, July 22, 2003, p. 1; "Onward and Upwards," Economist, May 31, 2003, p. 40; Richard Lloyd Parry, "Japan Flexes Military Muscle Over Korea," Times (London), May 22, 2003, p. 18; Amy Webb and Hideko Takayama, "Japan's Military Complex," Newsweek, December 9, 2002, p. 22; Shane Green, "Asia's Old Empire Thinks Once Again of Disturbing the Peace, " Sydney Morning Herald, April 5, 2003, p. 18; and Matthews, "Japan's New Nationalism."
161. Analysts have long cited a standard list of military capabilities that Japan has forgone; the list, however, has been shrinking over time. Previously, Japan's failure to procure amphibious assault craft, helicopter carriers, precision-guided air-to-ground munitions, aerial refueling, and military satellites has been cited as evidence of Japanese antimilitarism; now Japan is acquiring all of these capabilities.
162. For statements by Fukuda Takeo and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in 1969, see Selig Harrison, Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 7. The Japan Defense Agency argued in 1970, "As for defensive nuclear weapons, it would be possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive nuclear weapons without violating the constitution." The Defense Agency reiterated this position in its 1980 Defense White Paper. Quoted in ibid., pp. 12-13. In 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Japanese officials discussed the need to keep Japan's nuclear options open in the event that North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Ibid., p. 29. Most recently, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo discussed the conditions under which Japan might decide to acquire nuclear weapons. See Howard W. French, "Koizumi Aide Hints at Change to No Nuclear Policy," New York Times, June 4, 2002, p. 10.
163. For statements by Fukuda Takeo and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in 1969, see Selig Harrison, Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 7. The Japan Defense Agency argued in 1970, "As for defensive nuclear weapons, it would be possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive nuclear weapons without violating the constitution." The Defense Agency reiterated this position in its 1980 Defense White Paper. Quoted in ibid., pp. 12-13. In 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Japanese officials discussed the need to keep Japan's nuclear options open in the event that North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Ibid., p. 29. Most recently, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo discussed the conditions under which Japan might decide to acquire nuclear weapons. See Howard W. French, "Koizumi Aide Hints at Change to No Nuclear Policy," New York Times, June 4, 2002, p. 10.
164. For statements by Fukuda Takeo and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in 1969, see Selig Harrison, Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 7. The Japan Defense Agency argued in 1970, "As for defensive nuclear weapons, it would be possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive nuclear weapons without violating the constitution." The Defense Agency reiterated this position in its 1980 Defense White Paper. Quoted in ibid., pp. 12-13. In 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Japanese officials discussed the need to keep Japan's nuclear options open in the event that North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Ibid., p. 29. Most recently, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo discussed the conditions under which Japan might decide to acquire nuclear weapons. See Howard W. French, "Koizumi Aide Hints at Change to No Nuclear Policy," New York Times, June 4, 2002, p. 10.
165. For statements by Fukuda Takeo and Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in 1969, see Selig Harrison, Japan's Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), p. 7. The Japan Defense Agency argued in 1970, "As for defensive nuclear weapons, it would be possible in a legal sense to possess small-yield, tactical, purely defensive nuclear weapons without violating the constitution." The Defense Agency reiterated this position in its 1980 Defense White Paper. Quoted in ibid., pp. 12-13. In 1993, when North Korea announced its withdrawal from the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Japanese officials discussed the need to keep Japan's nuclear options open in the event that North Korea developed nuclear weapons. Ibid., p. 29. Most recently, Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo discussed the conditions under which Japan might decide to acquire nuclear weapons. See Howard W. French, "Koizumi Aide Hints at Change to No Nuclear Policy," New York Times, June 4, 2002, p. 10.
166. Quoted in Harrison, Japan's Nuclear Future, p. 13.
167. Quoted in Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), p. 71.
168. Eugene Skolnikoff, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Kenneth Oye, "International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs," Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, August 1995.
169. Levite, "Never Say Never Again," p. 71.
170. See Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 116; and Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 194.
171. See Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, p. 116; and Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism, p. 194.