Why Japan will not go nuclear (yet): International and domestic constraints on the nuclearization of Japan

International Security

Volumn 31, Issue 4, 2007, Pages 67-96

  Hughes, Llewelyn ^a  

^a MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 34248342261     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: 15314804     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.2007.31.4.67     Document Type: Article

References (144)

1. Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970);
2. and Kenneth N. Waltz, "The Emerging Structure of International Politics," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993), pp. 44-79.
3. Peter J. Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996);
4. on nuclear weapons, see pp. 128-129; and Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993), pp. 165-171.
5. See also Thomas U. Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism: National Security in Germany and Japan (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998);
6. on nuclear weapons, see ibid., pp. x, 102.
7. Graham Allison, "The Specter of Nuclear Proliferation," Los Angeles Times, February 17, 2005;
8. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Ripe for Rivalry: Prospects for Peace in a Multipolar Asia," International Security, Vol. 18, No. 3 (Winter 1993/94), pp. 5-33;
9. and Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Struggle for Mastery in Asia," Commentary, Vol. 110, No. 4 (November 2000), pp. 17-26.
10. A number of senior current and former U.S. officials have also suggested that Japan may reconsider its position on nuclear weapons. They include Vice President Richard Cheney, former Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security John Bolton, Republican Senator John McCain, and former Secretary of Defense William Perry. For details, see Kurt M. Campbell and Tsuyoshi Sunohara, "Japan: Thinking the Unthinkable," in Campbell, Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, eds., The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2004)
11. chap. 9. The South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo also noted that "Japan's nuclear armament is only a matter of time." "Paving the Way for Japan's Nuclear Armament," Chosun Ilbo (English ed.), September 6, 2006, http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200609/ 200609060030.html.
12. Steve Andreasen, "Bush Must Strengthen Nuclear Weapons Treaty," Boston Globe, November 20, 2004. Andreasen was director of defense policy and arms control on the National Security Council from 1993 to 2001.
13. On the U.S.-Japan alliance and changes since the end of the Cold War, see Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2007), chaps. 2, 3;
14. and Christopher W. Hughes, "Japan's Reemergence as a 'Normal' Military Power," Adelphi Paper, No. 368-9 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2004), pp. 79-83.
15. A senior Ministry of Foreign Affairs disarmament official explicitly describes enthusiasm for multilateral regimes and the U.S. extended deterrent as security "insurance." See Yuji Miyamoto, "Beikoku no Ikkokushugi to Nihon no Kakugunshuku Seisaku" [American unilateralism and Japanese disarmament policyl, Ronza, April 2002, p. 128.
16. On extended deterrence, see Earl C. Ravenal, "Counterforce and Alliance: The Ultimate Connection," International Security, Vol. 6, No. 4 (Spring 1982), pp. 26-43.
17. This article does not address Japan's technological capacity to manufacture a nuclear device or delivery systems. For assessments, see Kuniko Ashizawa, "Nihon-Kakuhoyu no Sentaku" [Japan - The nuclear choice], Kaigai Jijo, No. 3 (1998), pp. 34-51;
18. and Matake Kamiya, "Nuclear Japan: Oxymoron or Coming Soon?" Washington Quarterly, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 69-71.
19. Following Douglass C. North, I distinguish between institutions and organizations. I define "institutions" as formal constraints, such as rules and laws. "Organizations," on the other hand, are defined as "groups of individuals bound by some common purpose to achieve objectives." See North, Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 3-5.
20. Japan's stance toward nuclear weapons appears useful for testing realist and constructivist theories of security policy, yet Japan's existing policies can be claimed to support both theories. For those in the normative school, Japan's policy toward nuclear weapons can be taken as evidence of the importance of nonmajoritarian or antimilitarist norms. For those in the realist school, Japan's reticence on nuclear weapons can better be explained by ongoing U.S. security commitments that guarantee its security against nuclear and conventional military threats. On the overdetermined outcome of Japanese nonnuclearization, see Scott D. Sagan, "Realist Perspectives on Ethical Norms and Weapons of Mass Destruction," in Sohail Hashmi and Steven Lee, eds., Ethics and Weapons of Mass Destruction: Religious and Secular Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 88.
21. On the role of the norm of nonmajoritarianism in Japanese security policy, see Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security, pp. 128-129, 146-147.
22. For a different argument on the role of norms in Japanese security policy, see Berger, Cultures of Antimilitarism; on nuclear weapons, see ibid., pp. x, 102.
23. For a critical assessment of the utility of framing debates solely in terms of realist, liberal, or constructivist paradigms, see Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the Case for Analytic Eclecticism," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 3 (Winter 20001/02), pp. 153-185.
24. Samina Ahmed, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices," International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999), pp. 178-204.
25. David J. Karl, "Proliferation Pessimism and Emerging Nuclear Powers," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996/97), p. 99.
26. See also Scott D. Sagan, "Rethinking the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation: Three Models in Search of a Bomb," in Victor A. Utgoff, ed., The Coming Crisis: Nuclear Proliferation, U.S. Interests, and World Order (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 28-33.
27. Philip H. Gordon, "Charles de Gaulle and the Nuclear Revolution," Security Studies, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Autumn 1995), pp. 118-148.
28. On the role of international and unit-level variables in China's decision to develop a nuclear deterrent, see Avery Goldstein, "Understanding Nuclear Proliferation: Theoretical Explanation and China's National Experience," Security Studies, Vol. 2, Nos. 3/4 (Spring/Summer 1993), pp. 213-255.
29. On the South African case, see Peter Liberman, "The Rise and Fall of the South African Bomb," International Security, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 45-86;
30. and Mitchell Reiss, "South Africa: Castles in the Air," in Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), pp. 7-43. 14.
31. Ariel E. Levite, "Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited," International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88.
32. Japan is subject to stringent examinations as a signatory to the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and multiple actors are involved in Japan's nuclear energy program, making it unlikely that nuclear materials could be diverted without the public being alerted.
33. More recently, the conditions under which Japan should decide to develop a nuclear deterrent have begun to be debated domestically. See Chuo Koron, Vol. 121, No. 12 (December 2006);
34. Shokun! Vol. 35, No. 8 (August 2003);
35. Institute for International Peace Studies, Nijjuisseiki no Kokkazo [A vision of Japan in the twenty-first century], p. 5, http://www.iips.org/j- kokkazou.html;
36. and Terumasa Nakanishi, ed., Nihon Kakubuso no Ronten [Debating Japanese nuclearization] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo, 2006).
37. David Ibison and Andrew Ward, "North Korea Warns of 'Nuclear Sea of Fire,'" Financial Times (Asian ed.), September 24, 2004.
38. Japan Defense Agency, Hdsei17-nen Iko ni kakawaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko [National defense program outline in and after 2005].
39. On the Iraqi nuclear program, see Khidhir Hamza, "Inside Saddam's Secret Nuclear Program," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 54, No. 5 (September/October 1998), pp. 26-33.
40. On proliferation threats to the NPT, see Chaim Braun and Christopher F. Chyba, "Proliferation Rings: New Challenges to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 2 (Fall 2004), pp. 5-49.
41. NSC-68 names Japan as a state toward which economic support should be provided to ensure it remained in the U.S. sphere of influence. Secretary of State Dean Acheson noted that "were Japan added to the Communist bloc, the Soviets would acquire skilled manpower and industrial potential capable of significantly altering the balance of world power." Private memo from Secretary of State Dean Acheson to Oliver Franks, December 24, 1949, Foreign Relations of the United States: 1949, Vol. 7, p. 927
42. quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 77.
43. Japan Defense Agency, Heisei 8-nen Iko ni kakawaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko [National defense program outline in and after 19961;
44. and Japan Defense Agency, Heisei 17-nen Iko ni kakawaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko.
45. Tetsuya Endo, Genshiryoku no Heiwariyo to Genshiryokuiinkai no Yakuwari [The peaceful use of nuclear energy and the role of the Atomic Energy Agency] (Tokyo: Atomic Energy Commission, 2002).
46. Senior official, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, August 23, 2004. Japan balked at becoming a party to the NPT, arguing that it discriminated by allowing the five established nuclear powers to possess nuclear weapons while denying that same freedom to others. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Statement by the Government of Japan upon the Signing of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty," in Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon no Gunshuku/Fukakusan Gaiko [Japan's disarmament and nonproliferation diplomacy] (Tokyo: Nihon Kokusai Mondai Kenkyujo, 2004), p. 280.
47. Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, "New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and Its Search for an Arms Control Strategy," Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 6 (July/ August 2000), p. 19.
48. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Japan's Efforts in Disarmament and Nonproliferation Education: Report Submitted to the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, April 29, 2004).
49. Yuri Kase, "Japan's Nonnuclear Weapons Policy in the Changing Security Environment: Issues, Challenges, and Strategies," World Affairs, Vol. 163, No. 3 (Winter 2003), p. 126.
50. Senior official, interview by author, August 23, 2004. See also Kaneko Kumao, "Japan Needs No Umbrella," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 52, No. 2 (March-April 1996), p. 48.
51. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Nihon no Gunshuku/Fukakusan Gaiko, 2006.
52. Senior official, Disarmament Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, interview by author.
53. See Shingo Nakajima, Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku: "Yoshida Rosen" wo Meguru Seiji/Gaiko/Gunji [Japanese defense policy in the postwar era: Politics, diplomacy, military affairs, and the "Yoshida doctrine"] (Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006).
54. Japan Defense Agency, Heisei17-nen Iko ni kakawaru Boei Keikaku no Taiko
55. Robert Gallucci, telephone interview by author, December 1, 2006.
56. Leon V. Sigal, Disarming Strangers (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 112.
57. Concerns about undermining Japanese confidence in the alliance also played a role in determining the U.S. negotiating position toward North Korea. See "U.S. Retained First-Strike Option to Keep Japan under Nuclear Umbrella, Japan Times, March 6, 2005.
58. Katsuhisa Furukawa, "Making Sense of Japan's Nuclear Policy: Arms Control, Extended Deterrence, and the Nuclear Option," in Benjamin L. Self and Jeffrey W. Thomson, eds., Japan's Nuclear Option: Security, Politics, and Policy in the 21st Century (Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, December 2003), p. 121.
59. Interview with Taro Aso, "Amerika ha Kaku no Kasa wo Kakuyaku Shita [America confirmed the nuclear umbrella], Chuo Koron, December 2006, pp. 54-63.
60. Some details of the discussion paper have been covered in the Japanese media. See, for example, "Nihon ha Kaku Hoyu ni Soguwazu, Boeicho ga Naibu Hokokusho" [Japan Defense Agency internal report: Possessing nuclear weapons unsuitable for Japan], Asahi Shimbun, February 19, 2003;
61. and "Boeicho, Nihon no Kaku Hoyu ni Hiteiteki 'Bei ni Izon ga Sairyo' '95-nen ni Hokokusho" [Japan Defense Agency report in 1995: Opposed to Japanese nuclearization, relying on the U.S. is best], Yomiuri Shimbun, February 20, 2003.
62. John K. Emmerson and Leonard A. Humphreys, Will Japan Rearm? A Study in Attitudes (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1973), p. 89.
63. "Reisengo, Towareru 'Hikaku' - Nihon no Kaku Seisaku ni Kansuru Kisoteki Kenkyu" [Questioning the nonnuclear status after the Cold War - Basic research into Japanese nuclear policy], Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 2004.
64. For a detailed examination of the 1968-70 report, see Yuri Kase, "The Costs and Benefits of Japan's Nuclearization: An Insight into the 1968/70 Internal Report," Nonproliferation Review, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Summer 2001), pp. 55-68.
65. The details on the process leading to the creation of the document rely on Peter Ennis, "'Ampo Minaoshi' Nichibei Sessho no Uchimaku" [Reviewing the alliance - The inside story of U.S.-Japan negotiations], Shukan Toyo Keizai, December 2, 1995, p. 75.
66. Joseph S. Nye, "The ''Nye Report': Six Years Later," International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 2001), pp. 95-103.
67. See Samuels, Securing Japan, chap. 4.
68. "Reisengo to iu kankyoka de, nihon no shuhenkoku ni oite kaku no kyoi ga hassei shita baai, beikoku no kakudai yokushi ha izen wagakuni ni totte yuiitsu kitai sezaru wo enai mono de arinagara, sono kino ga hikitsuzuki yuko na mono dearu koto wo hosho shite kureru yoso ha ushinawarete shimatta osore ga aru." See Japan Defense Agency, "Tairyo Hakai Heiki no Kakusan Mondai ni tsuite" [On the problem of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction], unpublished report, p. 23 (translation by author).
69. The report was completed in 1995, after the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis, but prior both to the 1998 North Korean missile launch over Japanese airspace and to statements by North Korean leaders that they had developed a nuclear device.
70. This is in contrast to the Pacific war, when the Japanese navy and army ran parallel programs with the goal of manufacturing a nuclear device. See Walter E. Grunden, Secret Weapons and World War II: Japan in the Shadow of Big Science (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), pp. 48-82.
71. For an outline of Japan's position during the negotiations, see Shuichiro Iwata, Kakusenryaku to Kakugunbikanri - Nihon no Hikakuseisaku no Kadai [Nuclear strategy and the management of nuclear armaments - The question of Japan's nonnuclear policyl (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International Affairs, 1996), pp. 142-148; and Tsuneo Akaha, "Japan's Nonnuclear Policy," Asian Survey, Vol. 24, No. 8 (August 1984), pp. 863-871.
72. On the U.S.-Japan alliance and changes since the end of the Cold War, see Samuels, Securing Japan, chaps. 2, 3.
73. Public statement by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, "On the Basic Plan Regarding Response Measures Based on the Law Concerning the Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance in Iraq," December 9, 2003, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/koizumispeech/2003/12/09press.html.
74. Interview with Aso, "Amerika ha Kaku no Kasa wo Kakuyaku Shita."
75. See, for example, "The Japan-U.S. Alliance of the New Century," joint statement issued by former Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and President George W. Bush, June 29, 2006.
76. See Michael J. Green, Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995).
77. For a comprehensive review of the ideological roots of Japan's drive to indigenize defense technologies, see Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994).
78. As part of their efforts to assuage international concern, managers of the civilian nuclear program have committed to maintain only enough plutonium to match Japan's needs. Delays in the construction of reprocessing facilities and reactors capable of using the mixed uranium oxide slated for use have meant this commitment has not been met.
79. Technological development and, more recently, environmental goals are also given as official justifications for the program.
80. Kazuya Fujime, Nihon no Enerugii Seisaku - Sono Kihon Mokuhyo to Kongo no Kadai [Japan's energy policy - Basic goals and future issues] (Tokyo: Institute of Energy Economics, Japan, 2000), p. 2.
81. Other ministries with regulatory competence over components of the civilian nuclear energy program are the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare; the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries; the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, and Transport; and the Environment Ministry.
82. Agency for Natural Resources and Energy (ANRE), Enerugii Hakusho [White paper on energy] (Tokyo: ANRE, 2003).
83. Susan E. Pickett notes that there was international consensus on the legitimacy of this strategy in the 1960s, although it was subsequently abandoned by other governments. Pickett, "Japan's Nuclear Energy Policy: From Firm Commitment to Difficult Dilemma Addressing Growing Stocks of Plutonium, Program Delays, Domestic Opposition, and International Pressure," Energy Policy, Vol. 30, No. 15 (December 2002), pp. 1338-1339.
84. Ibid., p. 1338.
85. Yasuhiko Yoshida, "Nihon no Kakubuso: Uratsuke no Toboshii Kanjoron" [Japanese nuclearization: An emotional argument with little evidence to support it], Asahi Shimbun, December 19, 2006.
86. "Gaishora Kaku Hoyu Rongi Yonin Hatsugen: Genshiryoku Gyokai ga Konwaku" [Foreign minister's and others' comments approving of debate on the possession of nuclear weapons: Bemusement from the nuclear energy industry], Toa Nipposha, November 11, 2006, p. 2.
87. For an overview of the constitutional debate over security policy, see J. Patrick Boyd and Richard J. Samuels, "Nine Lives? The Politics of Constitutional Reform in Japan," Policy Studies, No. 19 (Washington, D.C.: East-West Center, 2005).
88. For a view on the role of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau in Japanese security policy, see Samuels, Securing Japan
89. chap. 2. On the CLB, see Akira Nakamura, Sengo Seiji ni Yureta Kenpo Kyujo - Naikakuhoseikyoku no Jishin to Tsuyosa [Article nine in postwar politics - The confidence and power of the Cabinet Legislative Bureau] (Tokyo: Chuo Keizaisha, 2001).
90. Nobusuke Kishi, House of Councillors Cabinet Committee, 26th Diet sess., committee minutes, May 7, 1957.
91. See House of Councillors Special Committee on the South Korea-Japan Treaty and Other Matters, committee minutes, December 3, 1965.
92. "Hikakusangensoku - Seifu shuno no Minaoshi Hatsugen ni Jimintonai kara mo Gimonshi no Koe" [Nonnuclear policy - Voices of doubt from within the LDP about senior government leaders' calls for reconsideration], Mainichi Shimbun, June 1, 2002.
93. Japanese House of Representatives, "Shugiin Gun Suzuki Muneo kun Teishutsu Kaku Hoyu wo Meguru Seifu no Kenpo Kaishaku ni Kansuru Shitsumon ni Tai suru Tobensho" [Reply to question from Member of House of Representatives Muneo Suzuki regarding the government's constitutional interpretation on the possession of nuclear weapons], Naikakushushitsu, November 14, 2006.
94. Japan Defense Agency, "Boei Hakusho 16-nen" [White Paper on Defense, 2004] (Tokyo: Kokuritsu Insatsukyoku, 2004), p. 79.
95. The National Safety Agency was the precursor to the Japan Defense Agency.
96. James E. Auer, "Article Nine of Japan's Constitution: From Renunciation of Armed Force 'Forever' to the Third Largest Defense Budget in the World," Law and Contemporary Politics, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Spring 1990), p. 177.
97. See, for example, Bernard Brodie, "The Development of Nuclear Strategy," in Steven E. Miller, ed., Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984);
98. and Robert Jervis, The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution: Statecraft and the Prospect of Armageddon (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989).
99. Stephen Van Evera follows Jervis in arguing that nuclear weapons in a MAD world are defense dominant. Van Evera, Causes of War: Power and the Roots of Conflict (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999), p. 246.
100. Minoru Kusuda, Shuseki Hishokan: Sato Sori to no 10-nenkan [Prime ministerial secretary: My ten years with Prime Minister Sato] (Tokyo: Bungei Shunju, 1975), p. 166.
101. Hans M. Kristensen, "Japan under the Nuclear Umbrella: U.S. Nuclear Weapons and Nuclear War Planning in Japan during the Cold War," Working Paper (San Francisco, Calif.: Nautilus Institute, July 1999).
102. Shinichi Kitaoka, Jiminto: Seikento no 38nen [Liberal Democratic Party: 38 years as the governing party] (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1995), p. 130.
103. Kristensen, Japan under the Nuclear Umbrella.
104. Akihiko Tanaka, Anzenhosho: Sengo 50-nen no Mosaku [National security: The 50-year postwar search] (Yomiuri Shimbunsha: Tokyo, 1997), pp. 224-225.
105. Kusuda, Shuseki Hishokan, p. 167.
106. Memorandum of Conversation, PM Sato and President Johnson, January 1965, National Security File, Country File, Japan, box 253, 1 of 2, Lyndon Baines Johnson Library, Austin, Texas, quoted in Francis J. Gavin, "Blasts from the Past: Proliferation Lessons from the 1960s," International Security, Vol. 29, No. 3 (Winter 2004/05), p. 117 n. 50.
107. For Sato's position on nuclear weapons, see Akira Kurosaki, Kakuheiki to Nichibei Kankei: Amerika no Kaku Fukakusan Gaiko to Nihon no Sentaku 1960-1976 [Nuclear weapons and U.S.-Japan relations: Nonproliferation policies of the United States and Japan's choices, 1960-19761 (Tokyo: Yushisha, 2006), pp. 54-63, 187-222.
108. Tanaka, Anzenhosho, pp. 222-223.
109. Other postwar prime ministers, including Shigeru Yoshida and Hayato Ikeda, also expressed opinions at odds with Japan's three nonnuclear principles. See Yoshihide Soeya, Nihon no "Midoru Pawn-" Gaiko [Japan's "middle power" foreign policy] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shinsho, 2005), pp. 81-85.
110. On Ikeda, see also Nakajima, Sengo Nihon no Boei Seisaku, pp. 198-200.
111. "Hibaku Haruka ni Uragiri no 'Kaku Kaado'" ["Nuclear card" clearly betrays victims of nuclear bombs], Mainichi Shimbun (Osaka ed.), August 1, 1994.
112. "Kakuheiki ippan ni tsuite no seisaku ha kokusai seiji/keizaiteki na rigaisonshitsu no keisan ni motozuku mono de aru to no shushi wo kokumin ni keihatsu suru koto to shi, shorai manichi no baai ni okeru senjutsu kaku mochikomi ni sai shi muyo no kokunaiteki konran wo sakeru yo ni hairyo suru." Seisaku Kikaku Iinkai, Seisaku Kikaku Hokoku (Dai-ichigo): Wagakuni no Gaiko Seisaku Gaiko (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1969), p. 68 (translation by author).
113. "Tomen Kakuheiki ha hoji ha shinai seisaku wo toru ga, kakuheiki seizo no keizaiteki, gijutsuteki potensharu ha tsuneni hoji suru to tomo ni kore ni taisuru seichu wo ukenai you hairyo suru." Ibid., p. 67.
114. Kaneko Kumao, former Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and administrative aide in preparation of 1969 report, interview by author, Tokyo, Japan, June 10, 2005.
115. Shinichi Ogawa, "Problems of U.S. Extended Nuclear Deterrence for Japan," Occasional Paper, No. 88-13 (Cambridge, Mass.: Program on U.S.-Japan Relations, Harvard University, 1988), pp. 17-18. For a summary of Soviet deployments in the East Asian theater, see Richard H. Solomon and Masataka Kosaka, eds., The Soviet Far East Military Buildup: Nuclear Dilemmas and Asian Security (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1986), pp. 271-275.
116. For a review of these debates, see Ogawa, "Problems of U.S. Extended Deterrence for Japan."
117. Kyodo News, "Kaku Tosaikan no Ichiji Kiko Yenin wo: Gaisho no Shimon Kikan" [Foreign minister advisory body: Allow temporary port calls by nuclear-armed vessels], September 18, 2003.
118. Atomic Energy Commission, Twenty-second to Twenty-fourth Atomic Energy Conference, conference minutes, Tokyo, Japan, June 4, 2002-JuIy 2, 2002.
119. "Zenkoku Yoron Chosa no Ichiran, 1946-1995" [Summary of national opinion polls, 1946-1995], Asahi Shimbun, I am indebted to J. Patrick Boyd for these data.
120. Data collected by Central Research Services on behalf of the United States Information Agency. The data were obtained from the Japan Public Opinion Location Library, Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut.
121. Support for a public debate on the conditions under which nuclearization should be considered, on the other hand, garnered greater support, with 45.9 percent agreeing that it is reasonable to debate the question, and 50.9 percent opposed. See "Opinion Poll: Nuclear Weapons and North Korea," Yomiuri Shimbun, November 2006.
122. This section focuses on the decisionmaking process within the Liberal Democratic Party, given its long-standing position as governing party.
123. For details, see John E. Endicott, Japan's Nuclear Option: Political, Technical, and Strategic Factors (New York: Praeger, 1975), pp. 56-60.
124. "Kaiken Soan he no Iken wo Boshu he: Jimin Chosakai" [LDP review committee: Move to elicit public comment on constitutional reform proposal], Asahi Shimbun, November 18, 2004.
125. The project team responsible for preparing the draft bill included factional members from the then Hashimoto, Kato, Kono, Mori, Komura, Horiuchi, and Eto factions.
126. Ikuo Kabashima, "A Nuclear Japan," Japan Echo, Vol. 30, No. 4 (August 2003), pp. 36-38. A hint of earlier legislative preferences is provided in a background paper prepared by the United States for the meeting of Prime Minister Eisaku Sato and President Lyndon Johnson, which argued that few legislators held the view that Japan should become a nuclear weapons state: "Sato recently indicated . . . that he believes it only common sense for Japan to have nuclear weapons. . . . Fortunately, Sato's 'common sense' view does not prevail outside a narrow circle of conservatives." "Japanese Security Situation - Visit of Prime Minister Sato, January 11-14, 1965," Secret, Background Paper, SAT/B-21, January 7, 1965, p. 34.
127. Harukata Takenaka, Shusho Shihai: Nihon Seiji no Henbo [Prime ministerial rule: The transformation of Japanese politics] (Tokyo: Chuko Shinsho, 2006), pp. 149-155.
128. Shinichi Kitaoka, "Koizumi Naikaku no Rekishiteki na Ichi" [Locating the Koizumi cabinet in history], Chuo Koron, October 2001
129. in Kitaoka Shinichi, Nihon no Jiritsu [Japanese independence] (Tokyo: Chuo Koron Shinsha, 2004), pp. 118-130.
130. For assessments of Japanese foreign policy that emphasize this emerging consensus, see Michael Green, Japan's Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001);
131. and Daniel M. Kliman, Japan's Security in the Post-9111 World: Embracing a New Realpolitik (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2006).
132. Mike M. Mochizuki, for example, relates the 1995 revision of Japan's National Defense Program Outline to the decline in SDPJ power, arguing that the JDA saw the weakness of the SDPJ as an opportunity to carry out such a revision. See Mochizuki, Japan: Domestic Change and Foreign Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1995), p. 71.
133. Headquarters for the Administrative Reform of the Central Government, "Establishing a System with More Effective Political Leadership," in Central Government Reform of Japan (Tokyo: January 2001), pp. 2-3.
134. Takenaka, Shusho Shihai, p. 158.
135. Kenji Hayao, The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy (Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1993), p. 168; and Cabinet Secretariat, http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/gaiyou/sosiki/index.html.
136. Michael W. Chinworth, Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics, and Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1992), p. 13.
137. Green, Arming Japan, p. 68.
138. For a parallel discussion of the effects of the rise of prime ministerial power on the likelihood of constitutional and security policy reforms, see Boyd and Samuels, Nine Lives?
139. For details, see Tomohito Shinoda, Kantei Gaiko: Seiji Riidashippu no Yukue [Foreign policy from the prime minister's office: The direction of political leadership] (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbunsha, 2004).
140. Michael D. Swaine, Rachel M. Swanger, and Takashi Kawakami note, for example, seven groups of organizations that were involved in the decision to implement ballistic missile defense. Swaine, Swanger, and Kawakami, Japan and Ballistic Missile Defense (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), chap. 3.
141. The Finance Ministry does not have veto power over budgetary decisions, however. Most notably, control for Japan's overall budget design has also been transferred from this ministry to the Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy, located in the Cabinet Office, giving the prime minister greater control over budgetary processes. On the role of the Finance Ministry in budget design, see John C. Campbell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977);
142. and Maurice Wright, Japan's Fiscal Crisis: The Ministry of Finance and the Politics of Public Spending, 1975-2000 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).
143. For an assessment of Finance Ministry interests in defense spending, see Samuels, Securing Japan, chap. 2;
144. and Green, Arming Japan, pp. 20-22.