Mercantile realism and Japanese foreign policy

International Security

Volumn 22, Issue 4, 1998, Pages 171-203

  Heginbotham, Eric ^a   Samuels, Richard J ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0032222265     PISSN: 01622889     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1162/isec.22.4.171     Document Type: Article

References (126)

1. See, for example, the essays in two compendia on Japanese foreign policy: Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), and Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Japan's International Agenda (New York: New York University Press, 1994). Exceptions are Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's International Relations (London: Pinter, 1994); Chalmers Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mike M. Mochizuki, "American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need for a New Synthesis," in Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 2.
2. See, for example, the essays in two compendia on Japanese foreign policy: Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), and Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Japan's International Agenda (New York: New York University Press, 1994). Exceptions are Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's International Relations (London: Pinter, 1994); Chalmers Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mike M. Mochizuki, "American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need for a New Synthesis," in Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 2.
3. See, for example, the essays in two compendia on Japanese foreign policy: Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), and Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Japan's International Agenda (New York: New York University Press, 1994). Exceptions are Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's International Relations (London: Pinter, 1994); Chalmers Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mike M. Mochizuki, "American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need for a New Synthesis," in Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 2.
4. See, for example, the essays in two compendia on Japanese foreign policy: Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), and Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Japan's International Agenda (New York: New York University Press, 1994). Exceptions are Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's International Relations (London: Pinter, 1994); Chalmers Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mike M. Mochizuki, "American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need for a New Synthesis," in Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 2.
5. See, for example, the essays in two compendia on Japanese foreign policy: Gerald Curtis, ed., Japan's Foreign Policy after the Cold War (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1993), and Yoichi Funabashi, ed., Japan's International Agenda (New York: New York University Press, 1994). Exceptions are Takashi Inoguchi, Japan's International Relations (London: Pinter, 1994); Chalmers Johnson, "The State and Japanese Grand Strategy," in Richard Rosecrance and Arthur Stein, eds., The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993); and Mike M. Mochizuki, "American and Japanese Strategic Debates: The Need for a New Synthesis," in Mochizuki, ed., Toward a True Alliance: Restructuring U.S.-Japan Security Relations (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1997), chap. 2.
6. Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
7. Peter Katzenstein, Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996); and Peter Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policy Responses in a Changing World (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1993).
8. Samuel P. Huntington, "Why International Primacy Matters," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), p. 311.
9. Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Relations (New York: Random House, 1979), p. 126.
10. Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1987), p. 5.
11. Waltz, Theory of International Relations, p. 134; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 29.
12. Waltz, Theory of International Relations, p. 134; and Walt, Origins of Alliances, p. 29.
13. This rationale can be found in Waltz, Theory of International Relations, pp. 104-107. For realist critiques of institutionalism that make similar points, see Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realistic Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 497-508, and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 21.
14. This rationale can be found in Waltz, Theory of International Relations, pp. 104-107. For realist critiques of institutionalism that make similar points, see Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realistic Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 497-508, and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 21.
15. This rationale can be found in Waltz, Theory of International Relations, pp. 104-107. For realist critiques of institutionalism that make similar points, see Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation: A Realistic Critique of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International Organization, Vol. 42, No. 3 (Summer 1988), pp. 497-508, and John J. Mearsheimer, "The False Promise of International Institutions," International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3 (Winter 1994/95), p. 21.
16. Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 53, proposes that "free trade is more likely within than across alliances." See also Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 501, and Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 364-367.
17. Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 53, proposes that "free trade is more likely within than across alliances." See also Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 501, and Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 364-367.
18. Joanne Gowa, Allies, Adversaries, and International Trade (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994), p. 53, proposes that "free trade is more likely within than across alliances." See also Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of Cooperation," p. 501, and Arthur Stein, "The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United States, and the International Economic Order," International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 364-367.
19. See Glenn Snyder, "The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics," World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 4 (July 1994), pp. 471-472.
20. John Dower, Empire and Aftermath: Yoshida Shigeru and the Japanese Experience, 1878-1954 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 388-389.
21. Richard J. Samuels, "Rich Nation, Strong Army": National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1994), chap. 3.
22. Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 15, provides a full analytical summary of Japanese nontariff barriers. For a discussion of measures to discourage foreign investment, see Mark Mason, American Multinationals and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992).
23. Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1990), p. 15, provides a full analytical summary of Japanese nontariff barriers. For a discussion of measures to discourage foreign investment, see Mark Mason, American Multinationals and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: Council on East Asian Studies, Harvard University, 1992).
24. Jerome Cohen, Economic Problems of a Free Japan (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Center for International Studies, 1952), p. 89.
25. Mason, American Multinationals and Japan, p. 183.
26. Since 1976 the Japanese defense budget has remained essentially fixed as a percentage of GNP (around 1 percent by Japanese accounting practices or 1.5 percent by NATO accounting standards).
27. Herman Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate: Challenge and Response (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. 165.
28. GNP figures are from the World Bank, World Development Report (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994), pp. 166-167.
29. See, for example, Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), and Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48.
30. See, for example, Eric A. Nordlinger, Isolationism Reconfigured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), and Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 5-48.
31. The United States reduced the number of forward-deployed military personnel in Western Europe, where the threat has receded most dramatically, from more than 300,000 in 1989 to approximately 100,000 in 1997. U.S. forces have been withdrawn entirely from the Philippines, where the United States had been asked to pay a larger sum for basing rights.
32. On the increased assertiveness of U.S. economic policy, see Michael Mastanduno, "Preserving the Unipolar Moment: Realist Theories and U.S. Grand Strategy after the Cold War," International Security, Vol. 21, No. 4 (Spring 1997), pp. 49-88.
33. Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995).
34. "Japanese-South Korean Relations: Hatred of Japan at an All-time High," Asahi Shimbun, July 29, 1995, p. 1. A survey done in seven major East Asian cities showed that while a majority of the people interviewed in Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta) responded that "Japan had become a country which could be trusted," those in Seoul, Beijing, and Shanghai responded that it had not. See "In China and South Korea, Strong Distrust of Japan," Asahi Shimbun, August 13, 1995. These feelings help explain why a novel by a little-known author about a Korean nuclear attack on Japan sold 2 million copies in its first ten months in 1993 and why the popularity of President Kim Yong-Sam rose in 1994 after he ordered the destruction of the National Museum in Seoul, a structure originally built to house Japanese occupation authorities. See Katsuhiko Kuroda, "'Nichi-Kan Kakusensō Shōsetsu' no Kiken" (The danger of a "Japan-South Korean nuclear war novel"), Bungeishunjū, June 1994.
35. "Japanese-South Korean Relations: Hatred of Japan at an All-time High," Asahi Shimbun, July 29, 1995, p. 1. A survey done in seven major East Asian cities showed that while a majority of the people interviewed in Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta) responded that "Japan had become a country which could be trusted," those in Seoul, Beijing, and Shanghai responded that it had not. See "In China and South Korea, Strong Distrust of Japan," Asahi Shimbun, August 13, 1995. These feelings help explain why a novel by a little-known author about a Korean nuclear attack on Japan sold 2 million copies in its first ten months in 1993 and why the popularity of President Kim Yong-Sam rose in 1994 after he ordered the destruction of the National Museum in Seoul, a structure originally built to house Japanese occupation authorities. See Katsuhiko Kuroda, "'Nichi-Kan Kakusensō Shōsetsu' no Kiken" (The danger of a "Japan-South Korean nuclear war novel"), Bungeishunjū, June 1994.
36. "Japanese-South Korean Relations: Hatred of Japan at an All-time High," Asahi Shimbun, July 29, 1995, p. 1. A survey done in seven major East Asian cities showed that while a majority of the people interviewed in Southeast Asia (Bangkok, Manila, Singapore, and Jakarta) responded that "Japan had become a country which could be trusted," those in Seoul, Beijing, and Shanghai responded that it had not. See "In China and South Korea, Strong Distrust of Japan," Asahi Shimbun, August 13, 1995. These feelings help explain why a novel by a little-known author about a Korean nuclear attack on Japan sold 2 million copies in its first ten months in 1993 and why the popularity of President Kim Yong-Sam rose in 1994 after he ordered the destruction of the National Museum in Seoul, a structure originally built to house Japanese occupation authorities. See Katsuhiko Kuroda, "'Nichi-Kan Kakusensō Shōsetsu' no Kiken" (The danger of a "Japan-South Korean nuclear war novel"), Bungeishunjū, June 1994.
37. The official South Korean Defense White Paper listed Japan as a potential military threat in 1992. Under U.S. pressure, explicit references were subsequently deleted.
38. New York Times, February 15, 1996, p. 5.
39. See, for example, Shinju Butei, "Kan-Chū Kokkō Juritsu to Nichi-Kan Kankei" (Korean-Chinese normalization and Japanese-Korean relations), Bôei Kenkyû, No. 5 (1992).
40. According to Foreign Media Note, August 12, 1993, Gorō Saitō, a military analyst, pointed out in Gunji Kenkyū, May 1993, p. 2, that Moscow had recovered from the chaos of the Russian Revolution to field formidable Soviet forces in Siberia and the Maritime Province, and argued that the Japanese need "to learn from history the risk of Japan's northern threat recovering."
41. According to Foreign Media Note, August 12, 1993, Gorō Saitō, a military analyst, pointed out in Gunji Kenkyū, May 1993, p. 2, that Moscow had recovered from the chaos of the Russian Revolution to field formidable Soviet forces in Siberia and the Maritime Province, and argued that the Japanese need "to learn from history the risk of Japan's northern threat recovering."
42. For Chinese propaganda toward Japan, see Asahi Shimbun, September 14, 1995. On the larger effort to inspire nationalism, see "China, The New Nationalism," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 9, 1995, pp. 21-26.
43. For Chinese propaganda toward Japan, see Asahi Shimbun, September 14, 1995. On the larger effort to inspire nationalism, see "China, The New Nationalism," Far Eastern Economic Review, November 9, 1995, pp. 21-26.
44. Following harsh rhetoric from China on the issue, the central government apparently became alarmed at independent calls by student organizations for even tougher measures. The police were called upon to prevent further independent student agitation, and the government softened its own rhetoric.
45. See "Zhonghua Renmin Goughenguo Guofangfa" (People's Republic of China National Defense Law), Jiefangjunbao, March 19, 1997, p. 1, for full text of National Defense Law and Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1997, for data on Central Committee representation. The official Chinese military budget passed in March 1997 called for a 15 percent increase in defense spending - about the same rate as national economic growth.
46. See "Zhonghua Renmin Goughenguo Guofangfa" (People's Republic of China National Defense Law), Jiefangjunbao, March 19, 1997, p. 1, for full text of National Defense Law and Asahi Shimbun, September 19, 1997, for data on Central Committee representation. The official Chinese military budget passed in March 1997 called for a 15 percent increase in defense spending - about the same rate as national economic growth.
47. "Hoppō Jūshi Senryaku Minaoshi" (Northern-oriented strategy reconsidered), Asahi Shimbun, May 14, 1994, p. 13; and Michael Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 35-58.
48. "Hoppō Jūshi Senryaku Minaoshi" (Northern-oriented strategy reconsidered), Asahi Shimbun, May 14, 1994, p. 13; and Michael Green and Benjamin L. Self, "Japan's Changing China Policy," Survival, Vol. 38, No. 2 (Summer 1996), pp. 35-58.
49. See, for example, Shigeo Hiramatsu, "China's Naval Advance: Objective and Capabilities," Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 118-132; "Japan Asked to Halt Maneuvers," Beijing Review, November 5-11, 1995; and "Murayama to Raise Spratlys Issue with Li Peng," FBIS, March 9, 1995, p. 4.
50. See, for example, Shigeo Hiramatsu, "China's Naval Advance: Objective and Capabilities," Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 118-132; "Japan Asked to Halt Maneuvers," Beijing Review, November 5-11, 1995; and "Murayama to Raise Spratlys Issue with Li Peng," FBIS, March 9, 1995, p. 4.
51. See, for example, Shigeo Hiramatsu, "China's Naval Advance: Objective and Capabilities," Japan Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (Spring 1994), pp. 118-132; "Japan Asked to Halt Maneuvers," Beijing Review, November 5-11, 1995; and "Murayama to Raise Spratlys Issue with Li Peng," FBIS, March 9, 1995, p. 4.
52. The Maritime Self-Defense Force announced its intention to procure "Harrier-2 plus" fighters to April 1995. See the report in Tokyo Shimbun, April 28, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-083, May 1, 1995.
53. The Maritime Self-Defense Force announced its intention to procure "Harrier-2 plus" fighters to April 1995. See the report in Tokyo Shimbun, April 28, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-083, May 1, 1995.
54. The Maritime Self-Defense Force announced its intention to procure "Harrier-2 plus" fighters to April 1995. See the report in Tokyo Shimbun, April 28, 1995, in FBIS-EAS-95-083, May 1, 1995.
55. In Southeast Asia there has been active cooperation with regional states. For example, Japan coordinates its efforts toward Burma and Indochina with Thailand, where strong political and military ties have been reinforced by high levels of foreign aid, exchange programs for military officers, and constant high-level contact among diplomats. See "Ajia to Ampo Taiwa Sokushin" (Progress in [Japan's] Asia security dialogue), Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 1995; see also Japan Digest, March 20, 1995.
56. In Southeast Asia there has been active cooperation with regional states. For example, Japan coordinates its efforts toward Burma and Indochina with Thailand, where strong political and military ties have been reinforced by high levels of foreign aid, exchange programs for military officers, and constant high-level contact among diplomats. See "Ajia to Ampo Taiwa Sokushin" (Progress in [Japan's] Asia security dialogue), Asahi Shimbun, March 13, 1995; see also Japan Digest, March 20, 1995.
57. "Shinbōei Keikaku Taikō" (The new national defense program outline), Asahi Shimbun, November 29, 1995, p. 6.
58. Japanese Defense Agency procurement officer interview, September 18, 1997, Tokyo. The rise of the yen and the growth of the Japanese economy have resulted over the decades in the steady increase of Japanese defense spending in constant dollar terms. By fiscal year 1996 the Japanese defense budget reached almost $60 billion, easily the second largest defense budget in the world. Yet given the continued unwillingness of the Japanese to increase the share of GNP devoted to defense and the high price of domestically produced defense goods, even that amount is insufficient to produce a force with substantial power-projection capabilities.
59. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 1993-1994, map insert titled "Asia: The Rise of Defense Capability, 1984-1993" (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University Press, 1993). "Primary surface combatants" refers to combatant naval ships over 1,000 tons.
60. For realist predictions of the nuclearization of Japan, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-51, and Waltz, Theory of International Relations. As noted earlier, Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, is of particular interest in this regard. On Japan's technical capabilities and the concerns that Japan's plutonium-based energy program has engendered, see Eugene Skolnikoff, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Kenneth Oye, International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995).
61. For realist predictions of the nuclearization of Japan, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-51, and Waltz, Theory of International Relations. As noted earlier, Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, is of particular interest in this regard. On Japan's technical capabilities and the concerns that Japan's plutonium-based energy program has engendered, see Eugene Skolnikoff, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Kenneth Oye, International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995).
62. For realist predictions of the nuclearization of Japan, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-51, and Waltz, Theory of International Relations. As noted earlier, Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, is of particular interest in this regard. On Japan's technical capabilities and the concerns that Japan's plutonium-based energy program has engendered, see Eugene Skolnikoff, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Kenneth Oye, International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995).
63. For realist predictions of the nuclearization of Japan, see Christopher Layne, "The Unipolar Illusion," International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 1-51, and Waltz, Theory of International Relations. As noted earlier, Kahn, The Emerging Japanese Superstate, is of particular interest in this regard. On Japan's technical capabilities and the concerns that Japan's plutonium-based energy program has engendered, see Eugene Skolnikoff, Tatsujiro Suzuki, and Kenneth Oye, International Responses to Japanese Plutonium Programs (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1995).
64. "Beigun, Kaiji Haken wo Dashin: Boueicho Kyohi" (U.S. military sounds out [Japan on] dispatch of Maritime Self-Defense Force: Defense Agency declines), Asahi Shimbun, November 26, 1995, p. 1.
65. Patrick Cronin, "The U.S.-Japan Alliance Redefined," Strategic Forum, No. 75 (May 1996).
66. Yoshitaka Sasaki, "New Order in the Asia-Pacific Region and Japan's Non-military Role," unpublished paper presented to the Abe Fellows Symposium, Tokyo, December 19, 1996, p. 10.
67. See the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee on the Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, No. 507-97, September 23, 1997. Kajiyama Seiroku, Japan's chief cabinet secretary, resigned soon after being scolded by Secretary-General Katō Kōichi of the Liberal Democratic Party for asserting that Taiwan was "naturally included" within this area. See Asahi Shimbun, September 3, 1997.
68. See the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), Joint Statement of the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee on the Completion of the Review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, No. 507-97, September 23, 1997. Kajiyama Seiroku, Japan's chief cabinet secretary, resigned soon after being scolded by Secretary-General Katō Kōichi of the Liberal Democratic Party for asserting that Taiwan was "naturally included" within this area. See Asahi Shimbun, September 3, 1997.
69. Some refer to the "big bang" as a "big whimper." See Daily Yomiuri, February 3, 1997, p. 6.
70. A 1995 Department of Defense East Asian strategy statement (the so-called Nye Report) warns that "if public support for the relationship is to be maintained over the long term, progress must continue to be made by both sides in addressing fundamental economic issues." Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), p. 10. In a 1995 column, Thomas Friedman argued that "we are being played for fools. Japan will only change when we use the full strategic and economic weight of the U.S. to make it clear to Tokyo that a failure to open all its markets, with concrete results, will lead to a crisis in the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship - not just economic ones - and to specific retaliation against Japanese exports." New York Times, March 26, 1995, p. 15.
71. A 1995 Department of Defense East Asian strategy statement (the so-called Nye Report) warns that "if public support for the relationship is to be maintained over the long term, progress must continue to be made by both sides in addressing fundamental economic issues." Department of Defense Office of International Security Affairs, United States Security Strategy for the East-Asia Pacific Region (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995), p. 10. In a 1995 column, Thomas Friedman argued that "we are being played for fools. Japan will only change when we use the full strategic and economic weight of the U.S. to make it clear to Tokyo that a failure to open all its markets, with concrete results, will lead to a crisis in the U.S.-Japan strategic relationship - not just economic ones - and to specific retaliation against Japanese exports." New York Times, March 26, 1995, p. 15.
72. Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryūtarō, "Seeking a New Foreign Policy Toward China," speech to the Yomiuri International Economic Society, Tokyo, August 28, 1997.
73. Peter Evans, "Japan and the United States Diverge on Assistance to China," Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 19A (May 19, 1995). Japan protested Chinese nuclear testing in May 1995 and suspended grant aid for the coming year. However, given that grant aid represents only one-quarter of all Japanese official development assistance to China, given the limited nature of reductions in that aid, and given that Japan maintained its far more significant ($6 billion) yen loan package, it is clear that the use of this assistance for leverage on military issues is a secondary consideration at most. See Sankei Shimbun, May 24, 1995.
74. Peter Evans, "Japan and the United States Diverge on Assistance to China," Japan Economic Institute Report, No. 19A (May 19, 1995). Japan protested Chinese nuclear testing in May 1995 and suspended grant aid for the coming year. However, given that grant aid represents only one-quarter of all Japanese official development assistance to China, given the limited nature of reductions in that aid, and given that Japan maintained its far more significant ($6 billion) yen loan package, it is clear that the use of this assistance for leverage on military issues is a secondary consideration at most. See Sankei Shimbun, May 24, 1995.
75. A Financial Times, September 16, 1997, story as reported in the Japan Digest, September 22, 1997.
76. A Financial Times, September 16, 1997, story as reported in the Japan Digest, September 22, 1997.
77. For example, the United States has a defensive alliance with the Philippines; however, Washington declared that the treaty commits the United States only to the defense of the main islands, not to the defense of the Spratlys. That clarification came in the weeks following the Chinese seizure of a reef in that island group long claimed by the Philippines. Nor were U.S. military assets mobilized to combat piracy by Chinese vessels, many with military markings, against selective targets (including Japanese ships) in the South and east China Sea areas during the early and mid-1990s.
78. Keidanren, "Tokushū: Sangyō no Kūdōka ni Oeru" (Special issue: Responses to industrial hollowing), Gekkan Keidanren, March 1995, p. 21. See Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade. See also Henri-Claude de Bettignies, "Japan and E.C. '92," in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock, eds., Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 81, who suggests that "if one word can characterize the European-Japanese economic relationship, it is probably imbalance. Whether one looks at trade, investment, or people, the key feature remains disequilibrium, increasing over the years."
79. Keidanren, "Tokushū: Sangyō no Kūdōka ni Oeru" (Special issue: Responses to industrial hollowing), Gekkan Keidanren, March 1995, p. 21. See Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade. See also Henri-Claude de Bettignies, "Japan and E.C. '92," in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock, eds., Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 81, who suggests that "if one word can characterize the European-Japanese economic relationship, it is probably imbalance. Whether one looks at trade, investment, or people, the key feature remains disequilibrium, increasing over the years."
80. Keidanren, "Tokushū: Sangyō no Kūdōka ni Oeru" (Special issue: Responses to industrial hollowing), Gekkan Keidanren, March 1995, p. 21. See Lincoln, Japan's Unequal Trade. See also Henri-Claude de Bettignies, "Japan and E.C. '92," in Craig C. Garby and Mary Brown Bullock, eds., Japan: A New Kind of Superpower? (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1994), p. 81, who suggests that "if one word can characterize the European-Japanese economic relationship, it is probably imbalance. Whether one looks at trade, investment, or people, the key feature remains disequilibrium, increasing over the years."
81. Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance," in Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 3, argues that Japanese policymakers simply "cope" with crises and have "no calculated strategy." See also Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91), p. 24.
82. Michael Blaker, "Evaluating Japan's Diplomatic Performance," in Curtis, Japan's Foreign Policy, p. 3, argues that Japanese policymakers simply "cope" with crises and have "no calculated strategy." See also Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 70, No. 1 (1990/91), p. 24.
83. A broad range of realists and nonrealists alike have made these arguments. For essays on both sides of the issue, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, eds., The Cold War and After: Prospects for Peace (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1994).
84. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). The classical analysis is Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945 [1980]); For a test of Hirschman's "asymmetric trade dependence" hypothesis in the contemporary Asian context, see Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan, and Simon Reich, "Trade, Power, and APEC: Hirschman Revisited," forthcoming in International Interactions.
85. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). The classical analysis is Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945 [1980]); For a test of Hirschman's "asymmetric trade dependence" hypothesis in the contemporary Asian context, see Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan, and Simon Reich, "Trade, Power, and APEC: Hirschman Revisited," forthcoming in International Interactions.
86. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). The classical analysis is Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945 [1980]); For a test of Hirschman's "asymmetric trade dependence" hypothesis in the contemporary Asian context, see Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan, and Simon Reich, "Trade, Power, and APEC: Hirschman Revisited," forthcoming in International Interactions.
87. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985); and Stephen Krasner, Defending the National Interest: Raw Materials Investment and U.S. Foreign Policy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). The classical analysis is Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945 [1980]); For a test of Hirschman's "asymmetric trade dependence" hypothesis in the contemporary Asian context, see Davis B. Bobrow, Steve Chan, and Simon Reich, "Trade, Power, and APEC: Hirschman Revisited," forthcoming in International Interactions.
88. Paul Krugman, ed., Strategic Trade Policy and the New International Economics (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990).
89. Randall Schweller, "Realism and the Present Great Power System: Growth and Positional Conflict over Scarce Resources," paper prepared for the Olin Institute conference on "Realism and International Relations after the Cold War," Cambridge, Massachusetts, December 1995, p. 46.
90. This analysis is from George Gilboy, "Technology Dependence and Manufacturing Mastery," unpublished paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, Cambridge, 1995. See also Theodore Moran, American Economic Policy and National Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
91. This analysis is from George Gilboy, "Technology Dependence and Manufacturing Mastery," unpublished paper, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science, Cambridge, 1995. See also Theodore Moran, American Economic Policy and National Security (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
92. Russia in the nineteenth century was a first-rate military power, yet its industrial and technological base was second-rate. Spain in the sixteenth century, or China today, may also be regarded as strong military states without comparable economic or technological strength. Contemporary states such as Switzerland and Singapore stand out as examples of states with limited military capabilities but strong technological and financial ones.
93. See Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "The Case for Deep Engagement," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4 (July/August 1995), p. 91, for the use of this metaphor.
94. The best example of an economic superpower transforming itself rapidly into a military great power is the United States, which had been spending only 1.5 percent of its GNP on defense in the two decades before World War II. In 1939 the United States produced only a quarter as many military aircraft as Germany. Yet by 1941 it was producing well over twice as many military aircraft as Germany. (See Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers [New York: Random House, 1987], pp. 324, 332, 354.) The reverse example is sixteenth-century Spain. Not only did Spain's relentless wars weaken its financial position, but mercantile policies specifically designed to amass gold reserves for military operations rather than to promote manufactures also enervated Spanish industry. Ultimately, Spain lost its edge over England and even the United Provinces in both military technology and the relative ability to finance military operations.
95. The debate over "who is us?" was initiated by Robert Reich, "Who Is Us?," Harvard Business Review (January/February 1990), pp. 53-64; see also Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still Matters," American Prospect, No. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 37-49.
96. The debate over "who is us?" was initiated by Robert Reich, "Who Is Us?," Harvard Business Review (January/February 1990), pp. 53-64; see also Laura D'Andrea Tyson, "They Are Not Us: Why American Ownership Still Matters," American Prospect, No. 4 (Winter 1991), pp. 37-49.
97. Chalmers Johnson, "La Serenissima of the East," Asian and African Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 1984), p. 59.
98. Foreign Media Note, August 23, 1995, p. 1. This English-language compendium cites reports in Nikkan Kōgyō Shimbun, May 29, June 5, and July 25, 1995; Nikkei Sangyō Shimbun, July 13 and July 31, 1995; Nikkei Mechanical, May 1, 1995; and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 28, 1995.
99. Foreign Media Note, August 23, 1995, p. 1. This English-language compendium cites reports in Nikkan Kōgyō Shimbun, May 29, June 5, and July 25, 1995; Nikkei Sangyō Shimbun, July 13 and July 31, 1995; Nikkei Mechanical, May 1, 1995; and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 28, 1995.
100. Foreign Media Note, August 23, 1995, p. 1. This English-language compendium cites reports in Nikkan Kōgyō Shimbun, May 29, June 5, and July 25, 1995; Nikkei Sangyō Shimbun, July 13 and July 31, 1995; Nikkei Mechanical, May 1, 1995; and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 28, 1995.
101. Foreign Media Note, August 23, 1995, p. 1. This English-language compendium cites reports in Nikkan Kōgyō Shimbun, May 29, June 5, and July 25, 1995; Nikkei Sangyō Shimbun, July 13 and July 31, 1995; Nikkei Mechanical, May 1, 1995; and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 28, 1995.
102. Foreign Media Note, August 23, 1995, p. 1. This English-language compendium cites reports in Nikkan Kōgyō Shimbun, May 29, June 5, and July 25, 1995; Nikkei Sangyō Shimbun, July 13 and July 31, 1995; Nikkei Mechanical, May 1, 1995; and Nihon Keizai Shimbun, July 28, 1995.
103. Foreign Media Note, August 23, 1995, p. 2.
104. Sōfuchō Tōkeikyoku, ed., Rōdōryoku Chōsa Nenpō (Annual report on the labor force survey) (Tokyo: Sōfuchō Tokeikyoku, 1994), Table 6. On responses to hollowing, see Keidanren, "Tokushū"; see also National Institute for Research Advancement, "Sangyō no Kūdōka to Chiiki Keizai" (Industrial hollowing and regional economics), Seisaku Kenkyū, Vol. 8, No. 2 (February 1995).
105. Sōfuchō Tōkeikyoku, ed., Rōdōryoku Chōsa Nenpō (Annual report on the labor force survey) (Tokyo: Sōfuchō Tokeikyoku, 1994), Table 6. On responses to hollowing, see Keidanren, "Tokushū"; see also National Institute for Research Advancement, "Sangyō no Kūdōka to Chiiki Keizai" (Industrial hollowing and regional economics), Seisaku Kenkyū, Vol. 8, No. 2 (February 1995).
106. Sōfuchō Tōkeikyoku, ed., Rōdōryoku Chōsa Nenpō (Annual report on the labor force survey) (Tokyo: Sōfuchō Tokeikyoku, 1994), Table 6. On responses to hollowing, see Keidanren, "Tokushū"; see also National Institute for Research Advancement, "Sangyō no Kūdōka to Chiiki Keizai" (Industrial hollowing and regional economics), Seisaku Kenkyū, Vol. 8, No. 2 (February 1995).
107. For more on differences between the U.S. and Japanese strategic treatment of technology, see U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, ed., Multinationals and the U.S. Technology Base (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994). For comprehensive data on Japanese technology trade, see Kagaku Gijutsu Chō and Kagaku Gijutsu Seisaku Kenkyūjo, eds., Nihon no Gijutsu Yushutsu no Jittai: Nihon no Gijutsu, Shinhon to tomo ni Ajia E (The actual condition of Japanese technology trade Japanese technology and capital together toward Asia), (Tokyo: Kagaku Gijutsuchō, 1997).
108. For more on differences between the U.S. and Japanese strategic treatment of technology, see U.S. Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, ed., Multinationals and the U.S. Technology Base (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1994). For comprehensive data on Japanese technology trade, see Kagaku Gijutsu Chō and Kagaku Gijutsu Seisaku Kenkyūjo, eds., Nihon no Gijutsu Yushutsu no Jittai: Nihon no Gijutsu, Shinhon to tomo ni Ajia E (The actual condition of Japanese technology trade Japanese technology and capital together toward Asia), (Tokyo: Kagaku Gijutsuchō, 1997).
109. See Michael Green and Richard J. Samuels, "Recalculating Autonomy: Japan's Choices in the New World Order," NBR Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 1994), for how these choices are framed by politicians and bureaucrats. See also Kazuo Ogura, "Ajia no Fukken no Tamemi" (In the interest of Asia's revival), Chūō Kōron, July 1993, and Shigeki Tejima, "Sekkyoku shisei ni tenjita Nihon no Kaigai Toshi" (Japanese overseas investment turns active), Shūkan Tōyō Keizai, 1994.
110. See Michael Green and Richard J. Samuels, "Recalculating Autonomy: Japan's Choices in the New World Order," NBR Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 1994), for how these choices are framed by politicians and bureaucrats. See also Kazuo Ogura, "Ajia no Fukken no Tamemi" (In the interest of Asia's revival), Chūō Kōron, July 1993, and Shigeki Tejima, "Sekkyoku shisei ni tenjita Nihon no Kaigai Toshi" (Japanese overseas investment turns active), Shūkan Tōyō Keizai, 1994.
111. See Michael Green and Richard J. Samuels, "Recalculating Autonomy: Japan's Choices in the New World Order," NBR Analysis, Vol. 5, No. 4 (December 1994), for how these choices are framed by politicians and bureaucrats. See also Kazuo Ogura, "Ajia no Fukken no Tamemi" (In the interest of Asia's revival), Chūō Kōron, July 1993, and Shigeki Tejima, "Sekkyoku shisei ni tenjita Nihon no Kaigai Toshi" (Japanese overseas investment turns active), Shūkan Tōyō Keizai, 1994.
112. Michael Borrus, "Left for Dead: Asian Production Networks and the Revival of U.S. Electronics," MITJP Working Paper No. 96-24 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Japan Program, 1996); and John Ravenhill, "Japanese and U.S. Subsidiaries in East Asia: Host Economy Effects," MITJP Working Paper No. 96-07 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Japan Program, 1996).
113. Michael Borrus, "Left for Dead: Asian Production Networks and the Revival of U.S. Electronics," MITJP Working Paper No. 96-24 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Japan Program, 1996); and John Ravenhill, "Japanese and U.S. Subsidiaries in East Asia: Host Economy Effects," MITJP Working Paper No. 96-07 (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT-Japan Program, 1996).
114. China is almost alone among Japan's trading partners to enjoy a bilateral trade surplus ($19 billion in 1996). Trade data are from the Japanese Ministry of Finance web page: http://www.mof.go.jp/trade-at/199638c.htm.
115. Asahi Shimbun, November 13, 1994.
116. Ichirō Ozawa, Blueprint for a New Japan (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1994).
117. This argument is made explicitly by Ozawa, ibid.
118. FBIS, June 6, 1995, pp. 1-2.
119. Richard J. Samuels, "The Industrial Destructuring of the Japanese Aluminum Industry," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 495-509. See Mark Tilton, "Informal Market Governance in Japan's Basic Materials Industries," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), for more on upstream integration overseas by Japanese firms.
120. Richard J. Samuels, "The Industrial Destructuring of the Japanese Aluminum Industry," Pacific Affairs, Vol. 56, No. 3 (Fall 1993), pp. 495-509. See Mark Tilton, "Informal Market Governance in Japan's Basic Materials Industries," International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 4 (Autumn 1994), for more on upstream integration overseas by Japanese firms.
121. Noboru Makino, "Kokka no Haken wa Gijutsuryoku de Kimaru" (National supremacy is decided by technological strength), Chūō Kōron (July 1990), p. 111.
122. Shintaro Ishihara and Akio Morita, "No" to Ieru Ajia (The Asia that can say "no") (Tokyo: Kappa Hard, 1989), p. 14.
123. Cited in Kenneth Pyle, The Japanese Question: Power and Purpose in a New Era (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1992), p. 38.
124. Masahara Gotoda, Seiji To Wa Nanika? (What is politics?) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988), p. 97. Johnson, "La Serenissima of the East," also offers a compelling comparison between Japan and Venice.
125. Masahara Gotoda, Seiji To Wa Nanika? (What is politics?) (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1988), p. 97. Johnson, "La Serenissima of the East," also offers a compelling comparison between Japan and Venice.
126. The "cork in the bottle" metaphor is from General Henry Stackpole, former commandant of U.S. Marines in Japan, Washington Post, March 27, 1990.