Fairness with an honest minority and a rational majority

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 5444 LNCS, Issue , 2009, Pages 36-53

  Ong, Shien Jin ^a   Parkes, David C ^b   Rosen, Alon ^c   Vadhan, Salil ^b  

^a Goldman Sachs Group   (United States)

^b HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^c INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER   (Israel)

Author keywords

Fairness; Game theory; Secret sharing

Indexed keywords

BROADCAST CHANNELS; COMMUNICATION CHANNEL; EARLY STOPPING; ECONOMIC MODELS; EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION; FAIRNESS; HIGH PROBABILITY; SECRET RECONSTRUCTION; SECRET SHARING; SIMPLE PROTOCOL; THRESHOLD SECRET SHARING;

CRYPTOGRAPHY; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; NETWORK SECURITY;

GAME THEORY;

EID: 70350273678     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-00457-5_3     Document Type: Conference Paper

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