Chapter 12 Redistribution

Handbook of Income Distribution

Volumn 1, Issue , 2000, Pages 677-789

  Boadway, Robin ^a   Keen, Michael ^b  

^a QUEEN S UNIVERSITY   (Canada)

^b INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND   (United States)

Author keywords

D3; D6; D7; equity; H2; I3; incidence; Redistribution; tax transfer policy

Indexed keywords

EID: 70350227346     PISSN: 15740056     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1016/S1574-0056(00)80015-9     Document Type: Review

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